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TOWARD THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS
By
L. K. Northwood
School of Social Work
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.

What is it that the citizen buys each year when he pays his taxes?
He buys a set of promises from those who govern. The first promise is "to
organize the common activities of the society for the good of the individual
or the whole" (Webster, 1976, p. 497). The power rests in organization;
where there is no organization there is no government. Second, the
government promises "to exert a determining or guiding influence over
expenditures and the availability of choices." Third, it promises to keep
"a straight course, under proper control, or in smooth operation for the
Finally, it promises "to exercise
good of the individual or the whole."
continuous sovereign authority, especially to control and direct the making
and administration of policy."
Thus, what a citizen expects from his government, what he hopes he is buying
with his taxes, are a set of public social policies that are benevolent,
sound, and reasonable. And a public social policy may be defined as the
promise that the government makes to its citizenry.
Throughout the years the taxpayer in the United States has become skeptical
about what he is getting for his money. For example, in 1978, the average
tax collected by the federal government from every four-person household was
$5,104, according to the statistics of Tax Foundation, Inc., reported in the
Seattle Times of March 6, 1978 (Brandon, Rowe, and Stanton, 1978; W. Cohen,
1978). This does not include the high local and state taxes on food,
property, and income. Taxes continue to go higher and higher each year, and
the taxpayer--squeezed by price inflation which is rising more rapidly than
his paycheck--is beginning to demand an accounting.
What is the money being spent for, and is there a sound reason for this?
What the taxpayer wants to know is whether government social policies are
benevolent, sound and reasonable?
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the nature of social policies
and the public policymaking process. It is demonstrated that public social
policies tend to accrue an aura or ideology of benevolence that is only
partially warranted, and that may be quite misleading to policy analysts and
citizenry. The major thrust of the paper is to consider the social policy
process as a strategy for public decision-making. As such, properly organized,
it can provide an alternative and complementary strategy to electoral politics
and protest movements. To be effective as a strategy, three major barriers
must be overcome: the lack of openness in the public policy process, the active
discouragement of citizen participation, and the failure to evaluate policy
outcomes. Some notions are advanced about how social policy analysts and
researchers can improve their work and thereby assist in the democratization of
thp nrnrp c

What is the Nature of the Public Social Policy Process?
There are seven general characteristics of the public policy process
frequently identified by its analysts. These are presented in this section
of the paper.
1.

First of all, it should be noted that usual definitions of public
policy do not stress the implied promise contained in government social
policy. Thus a policy is considered as the formal statement of the
guiding goals and acceptable procedures governing a plan of organized
action. Unlike an impromptu command or suggestion, it represents a
reasoned decision. It embodies "a definite course of method selected
from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide
and determine present and future decisions (Webster, 1976, p. 890).
According to Gil (1973, p. 12), policies lead to, but need not be
codified in formal legal instruments. They are merely the "guiding
principles or courses of action adopted and pursued by societies and
their governments, as well as by various groups or units within
society. . . . Specific policies govern, or are intended to govern,
specified domains of society or its subunits."

2.

Policies, however, are not simply the property of governmental units.
They may be formulated by individuals or groups that are nongovernmental
in character, and they may be implemented by any unit or subunit of
society. In general, policies, whether formulated under private or
government auspices, overtly or covertly, are public in character.
They are intended to influence the activities of government, some
sector of society, or the people as a whole. Thus, in a democracy,
governmental policies are usually accorded a review, and are intended
to be "of the people, by the people, and for the people." The extent
to which this is a true statement is moot. Nevertheless, the public
character of such policies is strongly sanctioned both by tradition and
legislative mandate. No definition of policy was found by the author
that does not embrace this assumption.

3.

At its point of inception, the policy act represents an agreement or
compromise among the individuals or parties engaging in the decision
making. Moreover, it is shaped and compromised by subsequent
interpretations given it, and through the activities required for its
implementation. Thus a social policy is more than a formal statement
per'se; it is a normative process. The policy itself is not simply an
inert instrument through which social changes flow. For example, an
important social policy, such as the Social Security Act, has acquired
an independent status of its own. While formally instituted in the.
legislative bureaucracy, it has become a part of the culture and
tradition of the United States. In this way, policies over time, in
general, exhibit both the characteristics of directed social change and
growth. They are planned, negotiated and accumulated on the basis of
the decisions with which an organization is confronted. The author
makes the same distinction between social policy and social program as
does Tropman et al. (1976, p. xiii): "Policy is seen as a source of
action or intended action conceived as deliberately adopted, after a
review of possible alternatives, and pursued or intended to be pursued,"

while a social program is adapted to achieve a certain set of limited
objectives and goals. Social program relates only to a small part of
the social system in which we live. Social policy is of a much broader
nature. It relates to a series of programs aimed at achieving some
objectives and goals. It relates to the social system in its entirety.
4.

The establishment of a policy is a collective attempt to deliberately
shape or guide the social changes that are taking place in the
organization and the environment, and to assure that there will be a
desired outcome. As such, the policy process is an attempt at directed
social change. And all policies are developed within an organizational
context which is dynamic and changing.
The policy attempts to shape subsequent action not only by specifying
the ends towards which the efforts are directed. It also places
restrictions on the means to be employed in the plan of organized
action. The restrictions are specified in the statement of "acceptable"
principles and procedures to be employed in affecting the outcomes.

5.

Every policy embodies theories of problem formulation and solution.
However, the policy is not simply a solution to a specified problem.
The policy encompasses appropriate modifications in the key processes
which transform a given condition into a social problem. Thus, the
social changes induced and guided by policy are intended to modify the
social conditions per se to assure that such social problems are
ameliorated, removed or prevented (L. K. Northwood, 1966, pp. 8-9).
Policy has a much broader objective than simple problem-solving. While
most policy analysts would agreewith the point of view expressed in
this paragraph, many of them emphasize the latter three stages of the
policy process which are described in the following section while they
ignore the first stage. By downplaying the initial problem solution
stage of the policy, analysts tend to discount the trial-error
character of the process; they underplay the real social conflicts that
are engendered around social policies. Therefore, it is safe to say
that no significant social policy has been introduced and institutionalized without the support of a mass movement and in the teeth of
important mass opposition.

6.

Generally, every enduring policy becomes transformed and institutionalized during the processes of its formulation and implementation. It
assumes a charter of its own, a social structure for its personnel,
auxiliaries and beneficiaries, and a collective will to survive that
resides in its culture and practices. And every enduring policy also
helps to generate its opposition.
The four critical stages in the institutionalization process are (Gil,
1973, pp. 36-55; Gilbert and Specht, 1974, pp. 14-20):
I. The problem/solution stage, which embodies questions of the
following order: Which of the many domains of concern to a
society constitutes the focus of the policy? What is the problem?
Whose problem? What conditions require change? What is the
solution?

II. The goals/objectives stage, which involves winning sufficient
public support for the policy, and which answers questions such
as: Who benefits and who does not? How would the policy affect
this domain in substantive terms? How would society as a whole be
affected by the substantive consequences of the policy?
III. The Planning/implementation stage, which spells out how the
benefits are to be provided and with what hypothesized effects. A
key question is: What effects may be expected from the interaction of the policy with various forces within and without society?
IV. The review and evaluation stage, which assesses both the policy's
performance and achievements. Such questions are asked as: What
alternative policies could be defined to achieve the same or
different policy objectives concerning the specific domain? Was
the planned change efficient and effective? Can it be accomplished more efficiently and effectively by another means?
7.

A final characteristic of public social policies, and of social welfare
policies in particular, is the aura of benevolence with which they are
invested. This ideology of benevolence has many positive functions,
but it also can be quite misleading and non-productive. The author is
is accord with the commonly held belief that social welfare policies
ought to be directed toward improving the human condition and with
solving serious social problems. However, the stated intention of the
policy is often at variance with its known effects and consequences
(Northwood, 1977, 1978). Therefore, a policy should'be characterized
as benevolent only after careful analysis is made of the policy in
action, and whether it achieves the desired outcome of improved social
conditions for its designated beneficiaries and the society as a whole.
For these reasons, this section is devoted to an examination of the
ideology of benevolence and the part it plays in the characterization
of social policy. In particular, we will be concerned with the assumption that all policies of the political state, called the "welfare
state" or the "welfare society," are benevolent social policies simply
because of their auspices.

How does the ideology of benevolence come to permeate social policy?
First of all, this is a natural process. Most of the terminology employed
in the discussion of social policies is already made up of words and concepts which are positively valued in the society such as: social, social
welfare, beneficiaries, problem-solving, responsibility in planning,
effectiveness, efficiency, user satisfaction, equity, equality, well-being,
volunteerism, altruism, and so forth. Social planning is conceived of as an
active effort to do something thoughtfully and rationally; and that is
better than doing nothing. Social policies, ipso facto, are "social reforms"
because they involve an alteration in "bad" existing conditions. Thus, the
suggestion of beneficence is implied in the label "social reform."
Furthermore, to be enacted and implemented, social policies must win public
support. They are frequently formulated in rhetoric that evokes traditional
values, national pride and community solidarity. The policy objectives are

transformed into slogans for public consumption. These slogans may
characterize a single social policy where no enabling legislation has come
into existence, or they may characterize a single social program which is
not guided by a comprehensive framework of social policy. Where there are
both social programs and a comprehensive framework of policy, the nation
with this implementing machinery is sometimes called a "welfare state" or a
"welfare society."
For example, it is sometimes forgotten that "The Welfare State" had its
origins in the times of war and, in fact, has been characterized as a "war
strategy." The Parliament of Great Britain commissioned Sir William Beverage
to draw up a plan for the reform of social services in June, 1941, when the
bombs were falling in the streets next to Westminster. The plan called for
the maintenance of full employment, comprehensive free health care and
rehabilitation services, and social insurance from the cradle to the grave.
By 1945, the term "Welfare State" had achieved popular currency. Titmuss,
the eminent welfare historian, characterizes this movement as "an imperative
for war strategy . . . that the war could not be won unless millions of
ordinary people, in Britain and overseas, were convinced that we had
something better to offer than had our enemies--not only during but after
the war (Titmuss, 1969, p. 82).
The outline of the "Welfare State" in the United States took shape somewhat
earlier and for somewhat different reasons. Romanyshin (1971, p. 159)
reports that the "New Deal" measures of the 1930's:
. . . were designed to preserve the capitalistic system from total
collapse. Establishing measures of income security, social legislation
in this period also served to bolster a badly shaken economy and to
preserve rather than dismantle the market system. One may indeed say
that social welfare is, in fact, the answer of liberal capitalism to
the challenge of socialism.
These propagandistic uses of social policies impose an added imperative to
mitigate possible conflict and opposition, and to present the policy in
glowing and positive terms which testify as to its progressive character and
benevolence.
By far the most frequently used strategy for incorporating an ideology of
benevolence is the practice of social policy analysts to build into their
definitions of the social policy process desirable procedures and desirable
outcomes. Thus, for T. H. Marshall (1967, preface), social policy is "the
policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the
welfare of citizens, by providing them with services of income."
For both
Titmuss (1968, p. 188-89) and Marshall, social policy flows from the state's
right to interfere with individual freedom and economic liberty to promote
the welfare of the whole population (Baumleier and Scholl, 1977, p. 1454).
Pusic (1969) defines social policy as "the quest for equalization under
conditions of growth," and Boulding thinks of it as "the sum total of public
policies that underpin and strengthen the "integrative system" in any
society (Rohrlich, 1977, p. 1465)." Where the nature of the desired outcome
is assuring the happiness, prosperity or well-being of any society, the
policy'is called "social welfare policy." It is postulated that social
welfare policies are intended to improve the conditions of life of the

public in general and to alleviate the distress of the poorest and most
disadvantaged.
Moreover, for Gil (1973, p. 13):
Social policies are a special type of policies, namely, policies which
deliberately pertain to the quality of life and to the circumstances of
living in society, and to the intra-societal relationships among
individuals, groups and society as a whole. And any specific social
policy, irrespective of its unique content, objectives and scope, is
thus one discrete instance of this type of policies.
It is a shared "common domain" that identifies a social policy and
differs it from policies in general.

Another way of conferring benevolence on social policies involves the prior
labeling of the political state as a "welfare state."
Once having accorded
this label, the social programs and policies are accorded benevolence
without testing whether the designation is warranted or not. This dubious
process is followed by Blanche Coll (1977, p. 1503) in her assessment of
social welfare in the United States. The existing policy framework is cast
in an image of benevolence, which ignores the reality described in the third
part of this paper. For Coll:
The welfare state, which emerged in all western democracies after World
War II, is characterized by a large complex of interlocking preventive
and protective laws and organizations, designed to provide, at the
least, universal access to the mainstream of society. . . . In affluent
countries, such as the United States, social welfare includes
considerably more than assuring the necessities to support life.
Inherent in the philosophy of the welfare state is the ever present,
active assistance to individuals and groups to facilitate their
attaining and maintaining a respectable life style.
Whereas, Call merely asserts the benevolence of the United States as a
"welfare state," Miller and Clark (1977), following Wilensky (1975), have
attempted to prove that the United States is not a "welfare state laggard"
in comparison with other modern industrial nations. The authors start with
a statement that (Ibid., p. 382) "it seems obvious that the United States is
not meeting the welfare needs of all its citizens in an adequate and
equitable manner." However, after an analysis of the trends in national
spending for warfare and welfare, they conclude that "the United States
actually spent more in welfare state programs than would be predicted for a
country of its description, at least for 1966 (Ibid., p. 398)." Not a
single word in the article questions the "benevolence" of the national
priorities, and not a single comparison is made of the discrepancy of the
"welfare state" objectives and the achievement of these objectives.
The easy way that certain policy analysts have conferred benevolence on
almost every policy of "welfare states" located in the United States and
Western Europe, and, in contrast, have denigrated almost every social policy
in the countries of Eastern Europe, has led to much criticism and also to
much misunderstanding about the nature of social welfare and social policies.

For example, the conservative "supporter" of the "welfare society" in Great
Britain, William Robson, denies that a benevolent program of protections,
entitlements and benefits can exist in countries of a socialist persuasion
because they lack the "social freedom" which is an "essential ingredient of
the welfare state" (Robson, 1976, p. 16). At the same time, he deplores
that Great Britain has not yet achieved the status of a "welfare society"
because of misguided interpretations of principles of equity and equality,
economic redistribution, central planning, nationalization and public
ownership, collective bargaining in the public sector, and so forth.
On the other hand, David Gil, a progressive social welfare analyst, views
all welfare state policies and services as characterized by "inequality,
domination, competition and self-orientation" (1976, p. 147). That is, in
essence they are non-benevolent. They are designed to "pacify, condition
and control their populations, and defend and perpetuate their systems"
"to abolish
(Ibid., p. 161). There is only one "real solution" to welfare:
its institutionalized version by liberating productive resources and
assuring success to these resources to all humans on equal terms so that
they may become free, independent, productive and self-reliant citizens of
Is it too much to
self-directing, democratic and cooperative communities."
ask of Gil that he outline workable alternatives in other terms than a
statement of basic values and philosophy?
What Robson and Gil have in common is a philosophic stance, albeit differing
in content, which grows out of their own personal experiences and their
assessments of the social conditions in which they are situated. However,
it is hard reality in an imperfect world that requires a much more concrete
and scheduled program of policies and practices if policies are to be made
beneficial and if reform is to be consummated.
What Are the Criteria of Benevolence
How, then, can a test of the benevolence of a social policy be made empirically? As indicated earlier, it is not sufficient merely to have indicators
of intention in the initial statement of goals, objectives and "acceptable"
operating procedures for the policy; there must be tests of actual
performance and actual outcome. A policy must be sound and reasonable in
order to achieve its effectiveness. Furthermore, policies which are unsound
and unreasonable cannot be benevolent for the society as a whole in the long
run. Therefore, we incorporate criteria of social effectiveness and efficiency into the test of the benevolence of a policy.
Gilbert and Specht (1974, pp. 39-46) point out that there are three "core
values" that shape the design of social welfare policy, and which provide
some of the criteria by which it may be judged as benevolent or not. The
three core values are equality, equity and adequacy.
Equality relates to the outcome of the benefit allocations proposed in the
policy. Are the benefits allocated in such a way as to equalize the distribution of resources and opportunities available in the society?
Equity is the value which prescribes "that people receive that which they
deserve based on their contributions to society, modified by considerations

not of their own making
for those whose inability to contribute is clearly
the benefits
(Gilbert and Specht, p. 41). The question must be asked: Do
Of course, there are
actually go to beneficiaries designated by the policy?
according to
many "equitable inequalities" that are normatively sanctioned,
Gilbert and Specht. For example, preferential treatment is accorded
veterans, and in unemployment benefits that vary in proportion of prior
earnings. There is always some debate over who should receive preferential
treatment. Most social welfare policies single out the poorest and the most
disadvantaged sectors of society for preferential treatment. In the case of
the United States, however, the "iron rule" of the English Poor Law of 1834
still prevails, that is, that the benefits given the poor and the needy
shall not exceed "the situation of the independent laborer of the lowest
class." This provision is intended to assure that able-bodied recipients
support themselves by their own work rather than depending on government
welfare.
At the same time, the provision of limited or inadequate benefits to the
poor directly contradicts the third core value listed by Gilbert and Specht,
that of adequacy. Adequacy refers to "the belief that it is desirable to
provide a decent standard of physical and spiritual well-being, quite apart
from concerns of whether benefit allocations are equal or differential
according to merit" (Ibid., pp. 41-42).
The three core values of equality, equity and adequacy provide some of the
criteria for the evaluation of the benevolence of social policy. In essence,
they answer the question: Does the social policy achieve distributive
justice? A social policy that does not achieve distributive justice is
hardly a benevolent policy.
There are three other important criteria that relate to benevolence of
social policy. They refer to the "acceptable" principles and procedures for
implementing the policy. They are the principles of social effectiveness,
efficiency and democracy.
The simplest definition of effective is "capable of producing a result"
(Webster, 1976, p. 362). A socially effective policy is one capable of
producing the desired outcome with a minimum of undesirable side effects.
Thus, a policy aimed at eliminating, preventing or mitigating a social
problem condition must have at its disposal the resources necessary to
produce the desired effects. The resources include manpower, finances,
organization, social controls and the knowledge of how to combine these and
other elements into workable strategies.
The validity of any measure of social effectiveness is affected by the scope
assigned to social welfare practice. Some analysts conceive of social
welfare practice as simply a "benefit-allocation mechanism functioning
outside the market place" (Gilbert and Specht, 1974, p. 28). Thus, they
restrict their analysis to the activities of social welfare agencies and
organizations per se. Everything else, the economic, political and cultural
activities of the broader society, are considered "externalities" which, to
be sure, have an effect on social welfare practice, but which are not
subject to the controls built into the policy.

The rationale for such a narrow definition of social policy is based on the
assumption that social welfare practice typically involves a non-monetary,
reciprocal exchange between recipients and society via the welfare agencies,
whereas the market system operates on a much different basis--that of buyers
and sellers, exchanging concrete goods and services, usually in direct cash
transactions for private profit. While it is true that there is a marked
difference between market transactions and those that occur in welfare
programs, it is also true that the market activities vitally affect the
social welfare. In reality, people and social services respond to the
market conditions in many vital ways. As Marshall (1972, pp. 19-20) has
observed:
The central function of welfare, in fact, is to supercede the market by
taking goods and services out of it, or in some way to control and
modify its operations so as to produce a result which it could not have
produced itself. In contrast to the economic process, it is a
fundamental principle of the Welfare State that the market value of an
individual cannot be the measure of his right to welfare.
The claim of the individual to welfare is sacred
partakes of the character of a natural right . .
the Welfare State does not merely have the right
has the right to receive it, even if the pursuit
particularly hot (Marshall, 1965, p. 268).

and irrefutable and
. but the citizen of
to pursue welfare; he
has not been

Therefore, social policies should be constructed which have as their central
focus the alteration of conditions that prevail in the private market. And
these policies are sound welfare policies because they are designed to
improve the social welfare for particular categories or the society as a
whole. Policies which follow the narrow guidelines can only hope to shuffle
services and programs within existing agency orbits, and their social
effectiveness is limited. They depend on the dubious benevolence of private
entrepreneurs to reform the economy and the society, while the agencies
concentrate their focus on social programs that are allegedly responsive to
human need and concentrate on building integration and a sense of community
in an unjust society.
The second criterion refers to the efficiency of organization in the
implementation of policy. Efficiency is a standard in which the performance
of the organization is compared with its cost in time, money and energy
(Webster, 1976, p. 465). In order to measure efficiency it is necessary to
search out the underlying principles on which the system of services is
rendered, to challenge their plausibility and validity, and to examine the
consequences of pursuing programs based on these principles (Rein, 1970, p.
463). No new policy is proposed that does not promise improvements in the
efficiency of the organization and cost effectiveness--these are highly
regarded as beneficient societal values. Furthermore, where these
principles are coupled with procedures that allow for freedom of choice,
freedom of dissent and citizen participation in the provision, delivery and
review of services, there is seldom disagreement among users, professional
persons or the public in general. The ideology of benevolence is, then,
incorporated into the means of execution of the policy.

The final criterion of the benevolence of a social policy is derived from an
examination of how the policy is implemented. The criterion is called
democracy. There are many meanings of the term in the context of social
policy.
First of all, democracy means that there will be provisions for effective
citizen participation in all phases of the social policy process.
Representative democracy is a form of organization which provides the
mandate and the procedures for formally involving the people and their
representatives in the policy process. But as organizations grow in size
and complexity, the day-to-day participation in the process of governing
becomes more attenuated, and special forms and procedures need to be
instituted. These vary greatly depending on whether the primary purpose of
participation is to give or get information; to facilitate conjoint planning
or decision making; to permit review or sanction; or to mobilize the people
in the organization and delivery of services. A democratic social policy
process involves all these strategies.
Second, democracy refers to the openness of the policy process. Too many
policies, too often, are formulated behind closed doors. The information on
which policy is based is not often easily available to the public; or it is
shrouded in secrecy; or it is scheduled for release in insufficient time and
quantity to permit careful study; or it is released after the fact when the
initial guiding decisions have already been formulated. Since policies, and
governmental social policies in particular, are essentially a public process,
it is essential that the information processes be organized in such a way
that they are open to the general public and their representatives, easily
accessible, and presented in a scheduled way so that the policy choices and
procedures are real and understandable.
Third, social policies affect human life. There are many considerations of
choice which affect the manner in which the policy is implemented. For
instance, the values of privacy, dignity, work, independence and participation influence the criteria of eligibility, the forms of social provision,
the design of delivery, and financial arrangements. If all individuals are
to be treated as equal members of society, the allocation of benefits should
avoid shame, stigma or excessive bureaucratic rigamarole. Where provisions
are offered in forms which, necessarily, must restrict the individual's
choice, these must be weighed carefully in scale of the public welfare. The
freedom to dissent and to advocate must be preserved. Furthermore, on
issues concerning local autonomy vs. centralized control, the values
inherent in local autonomy should be carefully considered. During the
policy process it may become necessary to sacrifice some aspects of cost
effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve the beneficient practice of
democratic participation and social effectiveness.
In summary, all six criteria should be observed in the assessment of social
policies, and together they form the basis on which a policy can be adjudged
as benevolent, sound and reasonable. The leading questions that should be
asked of a social policy are as follows. Questions 1 and 2 pertain particularly to the benevolent character of the policy; question 3 to its soundness;
and question 4 to its reasonable character.

1.

Does the policy achieve distributive justice as measured in terms of
equality, equity and adequacy? Does the policy improve the social
conditions of the designated beneficiaries?

2.

Does the policy allow for the broadest form of democratic participation
consistent with the achievement of the desired outcome? Does the
policy conflict with or render void an essential principle of democratic
government?

3.

Is the policy socially effective; does it facilitate the desired
outcome? If not, why not? Are sufficient resources allocated to the
implementation of the policy so that it can be socially effective? Are
sufficient controls placed on the problem producing conditions such
that the desired outcome can not be obtained? Does the achievement of
the desired outcome also result in producing effects that are worse
than the original problem conditions? What can be done about this?

4.

Is the policy efficiently organized, administered and financed?

The United States as a Welfare State
It is instructive to identify a few of the areas in which the United States
has developed ameliorative social programs during the recent years, but, as
yet, has failed to construct comprehensive social policies to guide their
activity.
Some typical welfare state goals are to provide "full employment" without
discrimination for all members of the society who are willing and able to
work, and to regulate the economic system in ways that will assure a
"decent" standard of living with social security "from the cradle to the
grave." To what extent has the United States--the most affluent "welfare
state"--assessed the need for, and formulated comprehensive social policies
to achieve these goals? The following assessments are drawn in large part
from official government documents and the analysis of "experts" published
in the Encyclopedia of Social Work (1977), the authoritative sourcebook of
the National Association of Social Workers in the U. S.
Child Welfare Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning
child welfare (Kahn, 1977, pp. 104-105).
No comprehensive survey of the status of American children exists.
. . . There are no reliable data about child abuse and neglect, despite
widespread publication of alleged rates by advocates of expanded
programs to correct abuse.
U. S. social policy, based on free-market and minimalist intervention
ethic, lacks general family allowances, which are common in most
industrialized countries. . . . In the U. S., some working women may
have modest paid maternity leaves and others have none. In Western and
Eastern European countries, generous paid maternity leaves are common.
. . . This country lacks the universal public health monitoring and
medical care coverage for children that most other industrialized
countries have. . . . Public housing proqrams are fewer than in most
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Family Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning
families. "In spite of the lip service given to the sanctity of the family
as the basic and most important social unit, there is no national policy or
commitment to substantiate that value" (Giavannoni and Billlingsley, 1977,
p. 407).
"The United States has the reputation of having the highest divorce rate in
the civilized world, and, with a few partial exceptions this appears to be
true" (Leslie, 1977, p. 378). One out of six children under age 18 lived in
one-parent families in 1974, and Paul Glick (1978, p. 53), Senior Demographer
of the U. S. Bureau of Census, estimates that, given the current trends in
divorce and separation, "45 percent of all children born in 1977 will spend
a significant length of time as members of a one-parent family before they
reach the age of 18."
More mothers in one-parent families worked in March 1978 than in two-parent
families, 58.6 percent as compared with 47.8 percent (Bureau of Labor
Statistics Report 531). Furthermore, a Special Labor Force Report (Hayghe,
1976, pp. 13, 18) demonstrated that women had to work in order to survive,
and to help their family "ameliorate the impact of the combination of
inflation and recession on family income. . . . Wives contributed an average
of 26 percent of their families' wage and salary income . . . in March
1975."
Welfare of the Aging. "While scientific advances in the twentieth century
have enabled more human beings to reach old age, there has been a severe lag
in meeting their social, health and economic needs. In effect, longer
physical life too often (in the U. S.) is accompanied by loss of dignity and
social death" (Brody, 1977, p. 74).
Life expectancy at birth increased from about 47 years in 1900 to 71.9 years
in 1974. At the turn of the century the over-65's represented about
4 percent of the total U.S. population; today they comprise about 10 percent.
By the year 2000 it is estimated that there will be about 30.6 million
people over 65 in the U.S. This is a phenomenal growth in the aging
population.
However,
. . . In
costs of
of Labor
1977, p.

"older persons have half the income of their younger counterparts.
1974 about 43 percent of the aged couples could not afford the
the theoretical budget for retired couples prepared by the Bureau
Standards for a modest but intermediate standard of living" (Brody,
57).

"American values such as achievement and success, activity and work,
efficiency, practicality and progress are antithetical to old age in that
the social roles assigned to the elderly do not mesh. . . . Existing social
service systems are mostly inadequate and inappropriate to the needs of the
elderly. . . . Advances have been made in . . . (the) coordination of
practice, research, education, policy and planning, but there is still a lag

in accumulation of knowledge about aging, in its communication to
practitioners, and in its translation into policy and planning" (Brody,
1977, p. 58, 76-77).
Health Policy. "The hazard of income loss because of sickness or injury,
the problems of families with overwhelming medical debts, and the tragedy of
medical care postponed or neglected because of ignorance or because of
prohibitive costs in money or time lost from work have long been a central
concern of social welfare policy" (Piore, 1977, p. 526).
"By 1976, expenditures for medical care . . . amounted to more than
$118.5 billion. . . . Between 1959 and 1974 personal health care
expenditures rose from $10.1 billion to $90.3 billion. About 46 percent of
the total rise is attributed to price increases" (Piore, 1977, p. 529, 530).
From 1977 to 1978, in one year, the costs rose by about 15 percent. Although
"two-thirds of these costs are met by third parties--government, private
health insurance and philanthropy," it is estimated that "40 million Americans
remain outside both the public and voluntary health benefit coverage programs"
(Ibid., p. 539).
There is growing consensus on the need for a national health insurance
system, but neither Congress nor the medical profession have taken the
necessary steps in that direction. "Currently the U.S. ranks 14th among the
nations of the world in infant mortality, which is widely considered a proxy
measure of the health status of a nation" (Ibid., p. 535). "Despite the
common view of the U.S. as progressive, countries such as France, England
and Wales and Sweden have longer life expectancy at birth for both sexes"
(Brody, 1977, p. 56). And there are clear health differences by race in the
U. S. In 1973, for example, the average life expectancy of non-whites was
65.8 years as contrasted with 72.2 years for the white population in the
country as a whole (Piore, 1977, p, 535).
Income Maintenance and Redistribution. The evidence of persistent, enduring
poverty in the United States is indisputable. According to the U. S. Bureau
of the Census (1977, pp. 1-2):
There were 25.9 million persons below the poverty level in 1975,
comprising 12 percent of all persons. Between 1974 and 1975 the number
of persons below the low-income level increased by 2.5 million or
10.7 percent, reflecting the continued inflation and sluggishness in
the economy. For example, during this period the poverty thresholds
increased 9.1 percent reflecting the changes in consumer prices,
whereas personal income per capita increased only 7.5 percent. In
addition, the average annual unemployment rate rose from 5.6 percent to
8.5 percent and the number of persons who exhausted their unemployment
benefits increased from 2.0 million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975.
The increase of 2.5 million low-income persons during the 1974-1975
period was the largest single year increase observed since 1959, the
first year for which poverty data were available. . ..
Between 1974 and 1975, the increase in the number of persons below the
poverty level was quite pervasive, occurring for both Black and White
persons, for persons of Spanish origin, and for the young as well as
the elderly. Particularly large percentage increases were observed for
Whites, persons under 65 years, and husband-wife families.

While changes have been effected in "absolute poverty" as measured by the
poverty threshold, very little has been accomplished by further income
equality in the nation. Using the simplest measure of income distribution-the share of the annual income received by portions of the population ranked
by income--the lowest 20 percent of the population has never varied from a
3-4 percent share, while the highest 20 percent has always received about
44 percent (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). The economic conditions
which produced this situation shortly after World War II have persisted up
until the present time. Despite the War on Poverty and other governmental
efforts of the past decades, there has been no general reduction in income
equality from 1947 to 1975. Apparently, there will be no economic "welfare
reform," promised by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, without a
substantial restructuring of the American economy (Northwood, 1978).
A similar assessment could readily be constructed in the social policy areas
pertaining to housing, education, nutrition, community services,
transportation, environmental protection, legal services, the criminal
justice system, and in almost every facet of the life of the society.
The formulation of social policy and the choosing of goals involves making
priority choices. It is myopic not to consider military expenditures as a
social policy choice. As history has proved, the selection of military
policies has many damaging effects for social development, not the least of
which is the reduction of resources available to fund social programs and
implement social policies (Northwood, 1977). Such a political perspective
leads to a key question about the policy process. One may ask: "Who is
winning and who is losing, and what goods (money, status, power) are they
winning or losing by this or that policy decision?" (Tropman et al., 1976,
p. 10). This political question is central and should be used to analyze
any policy proposal (Boulding, 1967; Hillsman, 1976).
In 1976, U.S. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman commented that military
spending in the proposed budget for 1977 "accounted for one-quarter of all
spending, almost 50 percent of all Federal revenues not earmarked for trust
funds, and 70 percent of all 'controllable outlays'" (Holtzman, 1977). She
proposed that military spending be reduced by $10 billion and the funds be
diverted to a variety of social programs to relieve the effects of inflation
and unemployment, and to provide support for health, education and welfare;
services to the youth and the aging; mass transit construction; and crime
prevention. Her proposal failed to receive enough votes for passage.
Similar attempts were rejected by Congress in 1977 and 1978. However, the
campaign to shift national priorities continues to receive popular and
legislative support. At the same time military budgets grow steadily. And
as the U. S. continues to arm itself, it has also become the leading arms
exporter in the world. According to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the United States delivered a total of $31.6 billion worth of arms
to foreign countries between 1965 and 1974, or just under 50 percent of all
arms traded on the international market (U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1976, p. 73).
In 1954 the New York Times called the United States a "reluctant welfare
state." Twenty-five years later a more appropriate designation would be the
"Warfare-Welfare State."

Toward the Democratization of the Social Policy Process
There are many legal and quasi-legal means of affecting how the government
is run in a democracy. Among the quasi-legal means frequently employed by
most people at some times in their lives are tax evasion and bending or
breaking the law. But most people engage in government legally by observing
the spirit of the law, exercising the vote, or serving in office. In
addition, they may protest what they consider to be an injustice, petition
their elected representatives or other governmental functionaries, or
otherwise enter the social policy process either directly through some form
of government sponsored citizen participation, or indirectly through their
activity with political parties, civic organizations, and social movements.
All of these latter, legally sanctioned activities, make up the social
policy process.
In this paper we have emphasized the thesis that the public social policy
process, in essence, is a vehicle through which government can, and should
be, democratized if it is conducted appropriately and toward that end. The
social policy process has the potential for focusing attention on the major
social problems and the serious shortcomings of the society. Through it,
ameliorative programs can be proposed in the context of alternatives which
can be assessed in terms of the available resources and the desired outcomes.
It has the capacity of generating information about the success of failure
of a particular program, why this is so, and how it can be altered to be
more effective. Thus, the policy process provides one basis for evaluating
the general effectiveness of government. This is much different than
choosing among candidates or officeholders merely on the basis of their
promises, the usual practice in a representative democracy.
Properly organized, the social policy process can facilitate democratic
government. The electoral process, on the one hand, allows the citizenry at
fixed periods of time--the time of elections--to select the men and women
who occupy the formal positions in elective bodies, and who enjoy the rights
and responsibilities for guiding the policy process. In contrast, social
policy process is continuous and ongoing. It provides a channel of
immediate access of the citizenry to the machinery of government. It
involves the direct participation of the citizen, not his representative.
Furthermore, it allows the specialized expertise of the participant to be
brought to bear on the policy. The specialized expertise may derive from
participating in the program, such as a welfare recipient or a service
professional.
As pointed out in the paper, the social policy process is not conducted in
this democratic way in today's modern "warfare-welfare state," the United
States. The purpose of this section of the paper is to identify some of the
barriers to the democratization of the social policy process. Three
barriers are identified. They pertain to (1) the openness of the social
policy process; (2) the relative uninvolvement of the citizenry in the
process, especially of the primary users and social professionals; and
(3) the absence of near-absence of systematic, comprehensive evaluation of
social policies.

The Openness of the Social Policy Process
As the third section of the paper demonstrated, there are few, if any,
comprehensive guiding social policies of relevance to the type of issues
with which the "welfare state" is supposed to be concerned: employment,
inflation, health, education, welfare, housing, the social security of
children, families, and the aging.
In the absence of such policy and for other reasons, the government engages
in endless committee activity devoted to fact-finding about social problem
conditions. Thus, it is safe to say that no nation is as well equipped as
the United States with information about the prevailing problems of the
society. However, this information is not brought to bear in effective
programs to remove or prevent the society from suffering the consequences of
the problems. Occasionally, a committee report may lead to the establishment and/or funding of an ameliorative social program. However, the history
of such efforts demonstrate conclusively that such programs have attained a
modicum of effectiveness only when they have been accompanied by the insistence of mass movements. These movements largely have exerted their
influence through mass protest and through the ballot box rather than
through the internal workings of the social policy process.
The most successful social policies in terms of their effectiveness have
been concerned with military and economic development. The federal government has consistently and regularly allocated some $1.5 trillion to military
expenditures during the past three decades (Sivard, 1977). With the allocation it has achieved, not without tremendous waste of funds and resources,
the greatest military power that the world has ever known. Whether this
great military power provides adequately for the nation's security is a
debatable point.
The economic development has been furthered and fostered through the
military and other programs, particularly through fiscal policy which
provides subsidies to business and industry, and which exempts them from the
payment of tens of billions of dollars in taxes each year. For example,
corporate income taxes in 1944 provided 33.6 percent of the total federal
income in tax revenues, whereas, by 1974, it was only 14.6 percent (Brandon,
Rowe and Stanton, 1976, p. 22). Economists Joseph Pechman and Benjamin
Okner (1974) calculate that if all the special tax breaks were eliminated,
we could cut the income tax rates by an average of 43 percent. Wealthy
individuals who now effectively reduce their tax bills by more than
43 percent would then actually pay more, while the majority would pay less.
Moreover, net interest payments on the national debt of $650 billion
accounted for 14 percent of the domestic baseline expenditures in the U.S.
in 1977 (Schultze, 1976, p. 345). This may be considered as a direct
subsidy to individuals and corporations who own most of the government
bonds.
In making its budget decisions and in the review of its operating
procedures, the federal government has understandably been reluctant to
expose its policy making machinery to the public view, or even to the
scrutiny of Congress in general. Much of the information which guides
social policy is secret or accessible to only a few highly placed
individuals. For Years the military budqets were simply rubber stamped by

an acquiescent Congress while almost every social program, which issued out
of committee after prolonged debate, was subjected to further detailed
examination and criticism. For example, during the Nixon "imperial
presidency" dozens of social programs were vetoed, and when they were
repassed by Congress over the presidential veto, the enabling funds were
diverted or impounded. This situation came to a head in the Watergate Era
when Congress passed legislation to enable its review of budgetary matters
and to restrict the scope of the presidential veto (Gartner, Greer, and
Riessman, 1973; Northwood, 1977, unpublished). Subsequently, President
Carter has challenged some of these Congressional restrictions as excessive
and unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Congress attempts through the courts to
secure access to information about the covert activities of the CIA and the
FBI in order that they can perform adequate budgetary review as to the
nature and effectiveness of these activities.
But much of the policy activity of Congress is not of such a sensitive
nature that it must be protected from the public. However, the ordinary
procedures of Congress preclude widespread public participation. On many
issues, the body simply goes into "executive session" which forbids participation by outsiders. Moreover, hearings on proposed policy changes are
held at the whim of the committee chairman to which proposals are submitted.
The committee hearings often occur in Washington, and at times that are
convenient to its members, not the public. Furthermore, the legislative
processes by which a bill is enacted are complicated, and not understood by
many of those who wish -to be heard. There is not time enough for everybody
to participate who wants to.
The volume of legislation is massive, too much for any congressman to absorb
by himself. Furthermore, Congress has "disabled itself" by the way control
is exercised over expenditures: revolving funds are established; government
corporations are created; the refusal to prohibit transfers between
appropriations; the authorization of the use of departmental receipts
without the limitation of amount; the voting of lump sum appropriations
(O'Connor, 1974, p. 114).
As a result of these and other complicating procedures, the process of
governing becomes more and more indirect. Congressmen become more dependent
on the polling process as a source of information. They hold informal
meetings with organized constituencies which are far removed from the
decision making process. They come to rely on the people who are close to
them for advice. Among these are the paid legislative representatives of
special interest groups, who can afford to maintain offices near the action,
who are more-or-less skilled in legislative and political persuasion, and
who have the resources to perform personal favors or offer other incentives
in return for the legislator's vote. There are probably hundreds of effective
lobbyists representing business, military and economic interests for every
advocate of consumers-and health, education and welfare agencies. Even the
latter are often more sensitive to the issues and concerns of the
professionals than they are to the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged.
In the discussion so far, the reference has been to the social policy
process at the national governmental level. A similar account could be
constructed of the state and local levels--with a similar result. To be
sure, there are ways in which the policy process differs at these levels.
In 9anaral, legislators are more accessible, more informed about local

problem conditions, and more responsive to mass persuasion which can be
organized more easily in the local area. Furthermore, most officeholders
depend upon a home area for their election, and they tend to listen to home
town voters more than others. However, local and state governments do not
have at their disposal massive national resources often required for the
solution of serious social problems. Consequently, there has grown up a
traditional division of labor among governmental units in which issues of
the social welfare are usually considered to rest in the domain of national
government. Thus, they may be ignored by local governmental units.
The Discouragement of Citizen Participation
One of the unfortunate consequences of this relatively closed system of
policy making has been the discouragement of citizen participation both in
the electoral and social policy processes. For example, Walter Dean Burnham
(1970) conducted a survey of the voting turnout in 20 leading "western"
nations between the years of 1945-1969. He found that an average of less
than 60 percent of the eligible voters participated in elections in the
United States as compared with an average of 83.3 percent in the balance of
the nations. While it is said that a large proportion of Americans belong
to at least one voluntary association, perhaps half the adult population of
the United States, very few are "active" in organizations that involve
themselves in "politics," perhaps one in seven persons (Smith and Freedman,
1972, Chapter 4).
Labor unions are frequently considered as effective
channels for influencing social policy. However, in the United States
during the period 1950-1970, the labor force increased by 20 million
persons, but unions enrolled barely one-quarter of that number, a very low
proportion in comparison with trade union membership in the industrialized
nations of the world (Anderson, 1974, p. 164).
Thus, the great majority of the people are not affiliated with voluntary
associations with a particular interest in the policy process. At the same
time, in every city, town and hamlet of the nation a small proportion of the
population is actively engaged in such efforts, and in many organizational
forms. Perhaps the most influential are the political parties and
associations, the organized trade unions, business, commercial and
professional associations, the churches, the single and multiple issue
movements that emerge around particular sectors of the population (women,
minorities, the aging); particular issues (taxation, peace, protection of
the consumer or the ecology), or particular activities (sports, religious
culture, hobbies). All of these are more or less active when the social
policy affects their area of interest. In other words, with a few notable
exceptions, they do not have a sustained and scheduled relationship with
respect to the public policy process.
In fact, the political participation by voluntary associations and their
members is actively discouraged by the government in several effective ways.
First, there are restrictions on the political activities in which
government workers may engage imposed by many governmental units. In
addition, associations which are politically active may have their tax
exempt status cancelled; and they are required to pay higher postal rates.
Furthermore, political surveillance and other forms of harrassment have
been used by the government during recent years

activities that run counter to the prevailing administration. The ambiguous
definition and uneven enforcement of such provisions does not mitigate their
chilling effect.
The voluntary associations which are involved in public policy making and
administration have a particular relationship to the government agencies
with which they are associated. Some are given access to the means of
policy making and administration, and some are not. Warner (1973,
pp. 253-254), who has reviewed the empirical literature on the subject,
comments: "Both policy and administration are essentially political
processes, and therefore mediation by voluntary associations requires
competition in political struggle."
Some voluntary associations are
"captured" or "coopted" by the administrative agency; in some instances, the
reverse occurs. In any case, the special working relationships "differ
markedly from the general image of voluntary associations as 'free standing'
units of society that appeal to public agencies for consideration of
particular points of view, as well as to mobilize public opinion and
'educate the public'." Where voluntary associations take on a public or
quasi-public character, few of them have adequate machinery for public
accountability when they take on public functions. For example, business
and professional associations may be accorded the right to accredit or
police the activities in their area of expertise, yet turn out to be more
responsive to their colleagues than to the society.
Although federal regulations are more cognizant of, more numerous, more
developed, and more consequential toward citizen participation than they
were a decade ago, "a single, explicated uniform and consistent federal
policy concerning citizen participation has neither been established legislatively or administratively." That is the conclusion of Hans Spiegel, who
reviewed the subject in 1971. Furthermore, he points out that:
The federal administration at its highest levels favors citizen participation that is congruent with and not disruptive of municipal and
federal program management, (and it) opposes citizen participation that
results in citizen control over, as contrasted with citizen involvement
in, any key aspects of programs. (Spiegel, 1971, p. 14)
The federal record of support for citizen participation is in accord with
this conclusion. As a case in point, Pivin and Cloward have been leading
advocates of "disruptive strategies" to force bureaucratic agencies to meet
the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged. An agency following this
strategy instituted "massive rent strikes" and "mass claims for welfare
benefits" (Pivin and Cloward, 1971). For a time, the agency was supported
by federal grants and a large national foundation. These funds gradually
disappeared. This example is not atypical; it is a general rule. Therefore
we conclude that it is unlikely that the federal government will finance any
significant reform unless the class composition of the governing bodies
change.
Pivin writes (Pivin and Cloward, 1974, p. 340): "As localities lose their
political autonomy, the forces that remain viable will be those capable of
exerting national influence." And that influence will be exerted through
organizing citizen participation around progressive social policies with or
without government support and funding.

Failure to Evaluate Policy Outcome
The effectiveness of social policy can only be measured with certainty if
there is a systematic evaluation of the outcome of the process. Without
this evidence one cannot be sure of what effects and consequences were
actually produced by the policy, and whether these were the desired ones.
Even where the outcome is thoroughly and systematically assessed, there is
room for doubt and uncertainty, given the level of development of the
research technology in social evaluation. But without the application of
the science that exists, speculation remains rampant, and the hope of the
society to be guided by social policies that are benevolent, sound and
reasonable is a pipedream and a narcotic.
What the measurement of the outcome can produce is reasonable information
whether the policy actually affected the lives of the designed beneficiaries
and whether the designated problem conditions were somewhat ameliorated.
Outcome measurement can tell us whether the policy had little or no desired
effects, or, instead, contributed to worsening conditions. Finally, it can
provide useful evidence to indicate a different line of social intervention.
It should be remembered that the evaluation of outcome differs from the
evaluation of performance, which is concerned with efficiency in the organization and administration of policy. Thus, it is entirely possible to be
very efficient in performing activities that may satisfy the consumer and
the producer, but be worthless in producing the desired effects.
There are very serious questions about whether any social program, let alone
a social policy, has ever been evaluated systematically in terms of its
efficiency and effectiveness in the United States. The reasons for this are
many.
In the first place, social programs are primarily considered by congressmen
as a vehicle for distributing money or services to designated persons or
districts rather than a way of testing the soundness of a social policy
(D. Cohen, 1972). While lip service is given to the policy, and it may
provide a persuasive rationale for the passage of legislation, many
congressmen are more concerned with getting something done immediately for
the electorate than with the evaluation of long term effectiveness. Thus,
where evaluation is required by the enabling legislation, usually this
pertains to the efficiency in costs and administration, which can be
measured immediately.
Second, social programs are frequently drafted in terms that stress legal,
administrative and fiscal restrictions while the plan of organization and
intervention is expressed more generally in order to allow for innovation.
Moreover, since programs may be instituted simultaneously in many areas and
under widely differing auspices, it is difficult to manage their evaluation,
even where responsibility for this is kept in federal hands. Although the
research evaluation may be centrally administered, the data are collected
locally where the action takes place. There are dozens of sources of
variation and error that exist where there is no standardized design and
methodology, and the data are collected and analyzed by persons with
insufficient knowledge, skill and motivation. All of these variations and
errors will occur in the implementation of broadscale social programs.

The complex problems of evaluation have been discussed by Alice Rivlin
(1971) and others (Haveman, 1977; Rossi and Williams, 1972; Caro, 1977;
Weiss, 1972). Her conclusion is that:
Neither social service systems nor government programs are organized to
generate information about their effectiveness. Furthermore, new
techniques or combinations of resources are not tried out systematically so that their effectiveness can be evaluated. Until programs are
organized so that analysts can learn from them and systematic
experimentation is undertaken on a significant scale, prospects seem
dim for learning how to produce better social services.
Furthermore, she doubts that systematic experimentation can be devised,
organized and funded by the federal government for reasons such as the
following: First of all is the large dollar cost of experimentation.
Besides costliness, there are many ethical questions such as: Does society
have the right to take risks with the lives and well-being of individuals in
the name of experimentation? Can services be provided to some people and
not to others in the name of experimentation? If legal and moral questions
can be answered satisfactorily, there are many technical research problems
to be solved, such as appropriate sampling, replication and the control of
extraneous variables. A major barrier is the long time it takes from the
initiation of the study to the production of usable results in policyrelevant forms. Rivlin notes that "experiments may become substitutes for
action or excuses for inaction" (p. 118).
Despite these disadvantages, Rivlin believes that , "the federal government
should follow a systematic experimentation strategy in seeking to improve
the effectiveness of social action programs." Her approach is to decentralize the authority for making evaluations of effectiveness. First of
all, the local community should be held accountable for how federal dollars
are spent with rewards being bestowed on local agencies which produce more
efficiently. To be sure, there are difficulties in this strategy because
local sponsors might be influenced to bias their research methodology and
findings to assure a steady flow of federal investment. However, this might
be partially overcome by the federal government developing and refining
performance measures, defined in terms of the program outcomes, which would
be instituted and monitored at the federal level.
Moreover, Rivlin advocates experimenting with mechanisms prevalent in the
private market economy for certain programs. For example, instead of
federal support to public education in general, vouchers might be provided
to parents who could choose the school in which they would enroll their
children. Such a voucher system would "accentuate existing problems of
income equality" if the parents chose to pay the premium required in
addition to the government voucher to send their children to more expensive
schools, offering richer curricula, smaller classes and more elaborate
facilities. But this outcome might be controlled through providing larger
vouchers to poor children, and in other ways.

Even though economists know that the private market "does not work perfectly
in the private sector," Rivlin (p. 134, 138-139) notes that there are
offsetting hqnefits:
Perhaps major national manufacturers would invest considerable sums in
new educational techniques, hoping that they could be proved more
effective and then sold to schools seeking to enhance their attractiveness to students. These companies, however, would tend to invest in
hardware and materials on which they could retain exclusive rights
through patents and copyrights. There might be serious neglect of
methods and approaches that, while conceivably more effective than
hardware, could be easily copies without compensation to the original
developer.
Rivlin's comments are not atypical. They characterize the orientation of
the government analysts toward social programs and social policies. First,
they recognize the essential need for outcome evaluation if any adequate
measure of effectiveness is to be obtained. Then they raise a host of
technical, moral and political problems that explain why such measures have
not been instituted in the United States, and which render them unlikely in
the future. Third, they tend to shift the responsibility for systematic
evaluation from federal to local authorities. Finally, they reaffirm their
faith, albeit with reservations, in the efficacy and the benevolence of
private market mechanisms as the best way to do the job.
Critics of this line of reasoning are quick to note that the failure to
evaluate the effectiveness of social programs and social policies is closely
related to the reluctance of the government to open up its policy machinery
to critical inspection and with its efforts to discourage citizen participation
in the policy process. The three factors are intertwined and interrelated.
Therefore, any realistic program to democratize the social policy process in
America will have to engage in political reform to be successful. This does
not mean that small measures cannot be taken now to improve every facet of
the process, but that, in so doing, attention must also be directed to
improving the social policies that govern the policy making machinery.

A Modest Agenda for Social Policy Researchers
Researchers and scholars, no matter what their field of inquiry, are
expected to be guided by the standards and ethics which pertain to
scientific inquiry and its conduct. This means, among other things, that
they work to assure the validity and reliability of their research, and that
they share the methodology and findings in ways that promote the growth and
development of science and scientifically guided practice. Furthermore,
when working with human subjects, they are required to employ a variety of
safeguards which protect people from unfair manipulation, exploitation,
embarrassment, or harm.
In addition to these standards, researchers and scholars have an increased
responsibility when they deal with social policy issues. We have stressed
the functions of social policy for achieving benevolent, sound and reasonable changes in the society through the enhancement of the democratic
problem solving process. It is the responsibility of the social policy

analyst to conduct his work in such a way that these democratic potentials
are maximized.
Donald N. Mitchell (1970, p. 3) has posed this issue nicely in the question:
"Who has the right to do what to whom, on what grounds?" Thus, there must
continue to be an ever-present challenge to sources of legitimacy and
authority in society. Mitchell sees this as one of the important roles of
the voluntary association in society. In this paper we postulate that it is
the responsibility of every worker in social welfare organization to review
his/her activities from time to time in the perspective of the issues raised
by this question, including especially the social policy researcher. To
meet this added responsibility, the following modest program is proposed for
social policy researchers and scholars:
1.

Understand the nature of the public social policy process and its
potential for democratizing government.

2.

Conduct research in ways: that maintain the openness of the public
policy system with respect to quantity, quality, accessibility and
timing of information relevant to policy formulation and decision-making;
that facilitate the organization and scheduling of citizen participation
in all activities of the process; that require the clear specification
and measurement of the desired outcomes for all policies.

3.

Identify the implicit and explicit value assumptions that underlie
social policies, and elaborate both the positive and negative effects
and consequences of a policy and its implementation.

4.

Explore the potentials of working with non-governmental organizations,
voluntary associations, and social movements interested in improving
the distributive justice for the user and the consumer.

This paper has begun the analysis of the nature of the social policy process
and its potential for democratization. But much remains to be done. To
begin with, it is necessary to root out the conservative ideology that
automatically accords benevolence to government social policies and to the
policies of the "welfare state." The works of Galper (1975), Gil (1973,
1976), O'Connor (1973, 1974), Romanyshin (1971, 1974), Bailey and Brake
(1975), Roby (1974) Cloward and Pivin (1971, 1974), Mandell (1975), Castells
(1977) and Titmuss (1962, 1969, 1974) are helpful in this respect, among
others. However, there are many themes in this body of writing which
belittle the importance of social planning and the social policy process as
necessary vehicles for democratization, with which the author does not
agree. Time does not allow a detailed analysis of this important subject.
Furthermore, there are many small reforms that can be made in the practice
of policy and the policy making machinery which can facilitate major reform
if this is not lost sight of in the tinkering process. Policy researchers
can enter the struggle right now by improving their current research and
organizational techniques.
For example, where data are collected firsthand as in social surveys and
systematic observation, the process can be scheduled in ways that information is given to the respondent as well as information obtained from the

respondent, if not prior to data collection then immediately following. It
is possible to use citizen review panels before, during and after the data
collection. These have relevance both to improving the research and
informing the public. Where data are gathered strictly from secondary
sources, the same potential exists for citizen review and interpretation.
Furthermore, the information process should be organized and scheduled so as
to promote conjoint planning and decision making.
Policy related research typically has been associated with the management
echelon of organization. However, there is no inevitable reason why this
needs to be so. Of course, management frequently is the sponsor or funder
of such research and often controls access to the data. Therefore, it may
be difficult, or seemingly difficult, for the researcher to institute an
open policy stance. Thus, it would seem that the researcher is faced with a
moral problem when he opposes management policy. There are many alternatives available to the researcher in such cases. What the author is arguing
for is that the researcher take the moral stance that public policy is an
open process and that he guide his behavior accordingly. The resourceful
researcher can usually devise procedures for circumventing onerous
restrictions. The motivated researcher can usually manage, over time, to
organize his research activities in ways and in settings which are conducive
to his interests and amenable to the open policy (Kim and Wellons, 1976).
It should be recognized, however, that with growing specialization and
bureaucratization of research and the settings in which it is done, the work
is so fragmented that many of the personnel are not even aware of the policy
implications and the policy uses to which data are amenable. Furthermore,
the difficulties of organizing and scheduling citizen participation in the
research process may seem like an obstacle or barrier to productivity,
unnecessary work for meager results, or a task beyond the scope of the
researcher or for which he is ill-prepared to manage effectively. In
addition, he may never have questioned the utility or benevolence of his
work--that is what he is paid to do. These many reasons underscore the
necessity for raising the consciousness of those engaged in social welfare
work, and especially the researchers engaged in evaluation of social
programs or social policy.
One way of doing this is to clearly spell out the desired outcomes and
beneficiaries of the research. Another, more preferable way is for the
researcher and the scholar to put their skills and talents to use with
organizations which are clearly directed toward achieving distributive
justice for the consumers and the users of social policy. By association
with the disadvantaged sectors of society, the researcher and the scholar
can acquire a better understanding of the problem conditions and a realistic
knowledge of what is required for their amelioration. Too many professionals
forget whatever experiences they may have had in the past that impelled them
to seek ameliorative change, and they begin to shape their work according to
the status quo expectations of their sponsors.
But it need not be this way
Of course, it will require a political
struggle to realize the democratic potentials of the social policy process,
just as it requires a political struggle to elect good men and women to
office and to keep them oriented toward distributive justice. The current
high cost of running for public office effectively places this option beyond
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the means of most people. This makes it imperative that the
social policy
process be kept open and democratic in its means and ends. In
this, social
policy analysts, at least, can play their part in helping bring
about a
better tomorrow.
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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the central dimensions which have emerged
in the current welfare reform debate. They include adaquacy, work incentives, family stability and cost.
The last legislative session introduced a new group of "welfare reform" proposals, each attempting to
address these critiques of the current welfare system. Considering four
major bills including Carter's Comprehensive Program for Better Jobs
and Income on the basis of recent research findings, results in a
tentative preference for Carter's plan. It addresses the major reform
dimensions better than the others and would result in modest improvements. Nevertheless, true reform is unlikely to be achieved by any
of these approaches if more fundamental intervention in the labor
market is not taken.

The welfare reform debate has been rescued once more by the Carter
Administration from the domain of academics and the social welfare
community. It has resided there since its ignominious fall from favor
after the defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). In the new round
of public discussions very little of its fundamental content has changed
in over a decade.
Indeed, the central issues of debate and the ideological positions which seize them have remained remarkably unscathed by
the multitude of important social and economic changes which have
occurred over the last decade.
Though the prevailing concerns of welfare reform have remained
relatively unchanged, the political climate in which reform must take
place has altered considerably. Years of seemingly uncontrollable
inflation and unemployment, coupled with a view that government cannot
work, have soured many on the value of large government policies and
programs. This is reinforced by the recent onslought of taxpayer revolt against government spending and the attendant fraud and mismanagement perceived as an inevitable counterpart of government programs.
At the same time, however, considerable progress has been made in

the state of social science knowledge. Several income maintenance
sources
experiments have been completed, analyses of longitudinal data
on the
circulated, and a variety of important social science evidence
nature and determinants of poverty permit a more informed discussion
of the policy options.
Nevertheless, politics and research continue to be inextricably
bound to one another and the current interpretations of the relationships
of recent research findings to proposed bills for welfare reform have
not been completely satisfying. This paper will attempt to assess the
value that current research findings have for selecting among the major
welfare reform proposals.
These dimensions represent those which political debate has
identified as critical. They do not represent the full array of values
or goals around which social planners might design an optimal system.
Rather, they address the more practical and less idealized dimensions
which policy analysts are required to consider in constructing a welfare reform plan acceptable to a reluctant constituency.
A brief description of the major legislation currently under consideration will be presented. Finally, the results of empirical research will be applied to an assessment of the degree to which existing
proposals can be expected to address the major welfare reform issues.
Will the welfare reform plans as conceived reform welfare in response
to these concerns? The paper will conclude with a discussion which
explains the often inappropriate and inadequate use of the growing
body of social science research in designing and evaluating welfare
policy.
ENDURING ISSUES IN THE WELFARE REFORM DEBATE
Adequacy
The first dimension or goal currently considered in the welfare
reform debate is the adequacy of current benefit levels. Proponents
of welfare reform generally point to the great disparity in the level
of current benefits available to similar families in various jurisdictions. Attempts to establish a floor of income eligible families
nationally have been part of the reform movement since FAP. Critics
argue that benefit disparities are inherently inequitable and impose
undue hardships on participating families in low paying states. Some
have argued that interstate disparities encourage the migration of
eligibles from low benefit to high benefit states. Further, many
argue that the failure of most states to provide benefits at a level
consistent with the federal poverty line results in an unacceptable
level of suffering and hardship when national policy has for some
time been concerned with poverty reduction. Fewer than twenty-six
states currently pay AFDC benefits as large as 2/3 the federal Poverty

families for whom the wages of the male head were inadequate to lift
them from poverty, dissolving their marriages (either real or
feigned) would make them better off. The woman would then be
eligible for AFDC as head of a family. Whatever additional income
sources the former spouse could provide would make them still better
off.
The welfare system, it has been argued, has thus provided the
incentive for economically rational families to split up. Further,
since no federal cash program covers poor single individuals, it is
also claimed that poor women have an incentive to bear illegitimate
children in order to meet the eligibility requirements for AFDC.
Critics of the current system often observe that AFDC discourages poor
young women from marrying the fathers of their offspring by rendering
them ineligible for any assistance if they did.
Finally, many have suspected that granting higher benefits with
increasing family size in the AFDC program results in an implicit
incentive for welfare mothers to bear more children than they otherwise
would. This pro-natalist orientation of the current welfare system
is believed by some to result in larger families and increased
dependency.
Issues related to the perverse incentives for family composition
under the current AFDC program are becoming increasingly central to
the assessments of alternative options for welfare reform. Each
major policy initiative currently awaiting legislative consideration
has taken this alleged impact of the current system for granted,
offering changes which are assumed to reverse the increasing family
dissolution apparent under current arrangements.
Costs
Concern about program costs in the existing income maintenance
system influence legislative response to almost every element in the
design of a welfare reform alternative. A particular dilemma in the
welfare reform debate involves the cost implications of the tradeoffs
between benefit adequacy and benefit uniformity. Establishing a
uniform level of benefits nationally, without making current recipients
worse off, requires setting a floor of benefits at a level as high as
are currently paid in states more nearly approaching the poverty
standard. This results in an extremely costly program, since dramatic increases in benefit levels are required to bring low-paying
states to this level of adequacy. The less costly option, that of
establishing a uniform floor of benefits at a far more modest level,
compromises the adequacy of benefits in all states. When additional
goals such as increased overage are included, the dilemma becomes
worse.

standard and as many as ten provide less than 2/3 the federal poverty
standard when the value of food stamp bonuses is included.
Not only the generosity and uniformity of benefits is included
when the debate addresses adequacy, but implicit in these discussions
is coverage. Twenty-four states deny benefits altogether to two parent
families and no federal program exists to cover singles or childless
In states which have an AFDC-UF program, eligibility rules
couples.
often exclude many needy families from participating. Of the 11.8
million non-elderly poor* in 1967, 6.7 million remained poor even after
Though many families are made
welfare transfer income (CBO, 1977).
better off by welfare, many other families do not have resources
(welfare and non-welfare income) which approach the national poverty
standard. These facts are even more dramatic when one recalls that the
federal poverty standard is based on the Department of Agriculture's
lowest level budget capable of producing a nutritionally adequate
Critics are not, then proposing extravagant benefit levels
diet.
when they speak of adequacy based on this standard (though they are
often accused of such).
Work Effort
Another issue of considerable importance in all discussions of
welfare is that of work effort. Critics of the current system argue
that the system discourages work in a variety of ways and, indeed, that
the system itself breeds continued dependency. No other issues appear
to loom larger than those concerning work in current or previous welfare
reform debates. In fact, almost all changes throughout the 1960's of
the Social Security Act have been made in response to the perceived
lack of work effort among recipient family heads. Two major changes
were made during that period in order to increase the labor force
participation of recipients. One was a mandated Work Incentive Program
(WIN), which required employable recipients to register for work
training or work placement. Failure to do so could result in withdrawal of benefits. Similarly, provisions for day care services,
though limited, were made to permit mothers of small children to
register for training to work. The Talmadge amendments required welfare mothers of children over six to register for WIN.
Thus, an attempt to require work as a condition of continuing
eligibility was institutionalized in the exisitng welfare system in AFDC.
The Food Stamp Program also included a work test. Other efforts to
encourage work were legislated through a reduction in the benefit reduction rate on earned income and more liberal procedures for deducting
work expenses in calculating benefits. Analysts had argued that a
dollar reduction of benefits for each dollar of earning provided a
*below 100% of the poverty line

Indeed, it meant
strong work disincentive for participating families.
that, with modest wages, families would be no better off by working than
they would be by not working. The Social Security amendments in 1967
reduced the "tax" on earnings to 67 percent, while permitting working
recipients to retain the first $30 of monthly earnings without any
reduction of benefits.
Concerns about work effort, however, were not quelled. WIN slots
were limited and so were day care slots. Welfare case loads were
growing dramatically even as national unemployment rates were quite
low. Enforced work was viewed by many as a necessary component of any
further welfare reform. Other critics and analysts began to discover
that although the benefit reduction rate of AFDC was 67 percent, many
recipients of AFDC were also participating in a variety of other cash
or in-kind programs. Many of these programs, such as food stamps and
public housing, had their own benefit reduction rates on earnings.
Thus, the actual cumulative marginal tax rate effective as a function
of the additive rates from several programs could result in benefit reductions of as high as 100 percent or more for each dollar of earnings.
The work disincentive effects of this were thought to be substantial.
Many critics of the current system, therefore, argue for a single
comprehensive cash program with a more modest tax rate.
Economists, while recognizing the potential work disincentive
effects of benefit rates, have also pointed to the work disincentive
effects of high guarantees. The guarantee is the level of benefits
Those whose exclusive
available to an eligible family with no earnings.
priority is very strong work incentives favor both low tax rates and
low guarantees. A high guarantee, it is argued, competes with prevailing wages and thus, the cost of not working may be very small for
a low wage worker eligible for a high guarantee. The debate over
the appropriate levels for both the guarantee and the tax rate in a
reformed welfare system has been at the center of academic and legisThe difficulty of reaching compromises
lative discussions since FAP.
involves the marginal impact that particular tax rates and guarantees
have on a variety of other critical priorities in welfare reform,
including adequacy, program costs, family stability, and equity.
Family Stability
The concern with family stability predated the welfare reform
initiatives of the Nixon administration. Witnessing increasing AFDC
caseload growth, policy makers and analysts began to observe that,
increasingly, the poor and the "dependent" were female-headed families.
Explanations of the increasing number of female-headed families generally included the incentives in current AFDC programs for family
break-up. A minority of states at that time had seized the federal
option to offer an AFDC-UF program which covered intact families
with an unemployed father. Even in states which had such a program,
eligibility criteria precluded participation of low-wage workers who
were employed more than 100 hours a month. Therefore, for many needy

The cost constraints at the national level are reinforced by the
problems experienced by many of the older cities and states in which
large numbers of the poor and welfare recipients live- Many cities
and states, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, are facing
increasing welfare costs at a time when economic growth is declining
markedly. Indeed, these older cities and states are experiencing
declining revenues and population while demands for public and social
services are increasing. Most of these localities resist federal
initiatives which will require any further financial commitments from
their dwindling public treasureies. In fact, cities such as New York,
Boston, Detroit and Chicago are supporting legislative initiatives
which seek to relieve the fiscal burdens which now threaten to overwhelm them.
Current financing arrangements for AFDC and Medicaid apportion
state-federal shares on the basis of a federal formula which compares
state median income to national median income. Several states then
apportion intra-state shares by city or county. New York, to cite an
extreme but important case, is required to finance a full 25 percent
of its welfare and Medicaid costs through its own revenues. These
expenditures constitute the second largest budget category for the
City. Thus, despite all the dimensions on which welfare reform might
be judged, program costs and fiscal relief to states and localities
may emerge as one of the critical criteria on which the potential
for legislative enactment will be judged.
Before considering the usefulness of the Carter Plan and the other
competing pieces of welfare reform legislation in addressing the issues
of adequacy, work, family stability and costs, it is necessary to
emphasize the complexity of these dimensions. The most difficult
problem in designing any social policy is the multiplicity of goals
which planners are simultaneously attempting to maximize in a
single program. Nowhere is the case more dramatic than in the design
of income maintenance programs. Competing goals, in this case,
means that maximizing any one may result in minimizing another. To take
a simple example, policy planners have for some time been committed
to minimizing the work disincentive effects implicit in an income
transfer program. At the same time, they may be required to minimize
increasing program costs.
The work disincentive effects allegedly promoted by the existence of a high marginal tax on earning (high benefit reduction rate)
can theoretically be mitigated through tax rate reduction. Though
a lower tax rate on earnings may reduce the labor force withdrawal of
participating families, at the same time it serves to increase dramatically program costs. It does this for two reason. First, a lower
tax rate results in recipient families receiving benefits at higher
levels of income than they otherwise would.

The level of income at

which-benefits fall to zero (the break-even point) is higher under
a lower tax rate. Second, not only do participating families
receive continued benefits at higher levels of income, but the
number of families eligible for benefits at higher levels is
far greater than at lower levels, given the current distribution of
income. Thus, the simultaneous goals of maximizing work incentives
while minimizing program costs cannot be achieved. Planners must
necessarily trade off acceptable levels of work effort for reduced
program costs or the converse. It is obvious that the larger the
number of goals, the more complex the nature of the trade-offs. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely resolved at the level of the analyst.
Indeed, they generally fall within the domain of political expediency.
CARTER'S WELFARE REFORM PLAN VS. THE COMPETITION
Evaluating any piece of social legislation requires a complex
analysis which includes not only an assessment of the projected
outcomes, given a set of goals, but also a marginal analysis of
the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of alternative means
toward the achievement of those goals. It is beyond the ambition of
this paper to carry out such an effort. Instead, the discussion will
limit itself to a more general review of current research findings
regarding a few key elements in the welfare reform debate. An attempt
will then be made to assess the wisdom of the major legislative
approaches to welfare reform, given the results of recent research.
Comprehensive Approaches
Conventional distinctions between comprehensive approaches
incremental approaches to welfare reform are useful in grouping
current available proposals in only the grossest way. A recent
paper by Levy (1978) suggests that a more useful approach would
see the current legislative options as a continuum on the basis
resources they provide and the reorganization they require.
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The first two bills calling for "comprehensive reform" are
Carter's Plan for Better Jobs and Income (H.R. 9030) and the revision
of this bill introduced in Feb., 1978, by the Special House Subcommittee
on Welfare Reform (H.R. 10950). The two bills which call for "incremental reform" include the Welfare Reform Act of 1978 (H.R. 10711),
introduced by Representative Ullman, and the Job Opportunities and
Family Security Program (S. 2777), sponsored by Senators Baker,
Bellman, Ribicoff, and Danforth.
The Adminsitrations proposal for Better Jobs and Income is
(1) comprehensive case
characterized by three major components:
assistance which establishes a national floor of income for all families
or unrelated individuals; (2) a jobs component which mandates 1.4
million public service jobs for all adults in families with children
"expected to work" but who cannot find jobs in the private market;
and (3) an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income

workers employed in the private market.
The case component would consolidate a variety of existing
programs, including AFDC, AFDC-UF, SSI and Food Stamps. In addition,
it would provide federal coverage for groups currently ineligible
for assistance under existing federal assistance programs, such as
childless couples, single individuals, and two parent low-income
families. The bill also established two benefit tiers based on
whether family heads are "expected to work" or "not expected to
Those not expected to work include the elderly (over 65),
work."
the blind, the disabled, single family heads with children under
seven. One adult in all other households would be expected to work,
including one adult in two-parent households, single individuals and
childless couples, and single parents with children under 14.
Single parents with children between the ages of seven and thirteen
would be expected to work part-time.
Those who head families but who are not expected to work would
be eligible for benefits on the upper tier which vary by family
size and other demographic characteristics related to need. Examples
of the benefit levels available to those on the upper tier would
include $2500 for a disabled or aged individual with no income,
$3750 for a similar couple, and $4200 for a single parent family of
four with at least one child under seven.
Those expected to work would be eligible for reduced benefits
on the lower tier. For example, a family of four in which an adult
member was expected to work would be eligible for a benefit amount
of $2300. After an eight week job search, if no private employment
could be found or placement in a public service job arranged, the
(The Subcommittee
family would move automatically to the upper tier.
If an adult expected to
proposal reduces this period to five weeks.)
work were employed in a private sector job, the $2300 supplementation
would begin to be reduced by a benefit reduction rate of 50 percent up
to a break-even of $8400. In addition, an adult on the lower tier who
is working would be eligible for an expanded EITC. For example, for
a family of four this would amount to 10 percent of earnings up to
$4000, 5 percent up to $9100, and would be reduced by 10 percent
above $9100. At $15,650 the credit would fall to zero.
The Carter Plan thus integrates income support systems for the
working and the non-working poor. It establishes a national floor
of income support and makes jobs in the private sector more desirable
than public jobs, while still offering work to those who cannot find
private employment. It provides federal financing while offering
incentives for state supplementation of basic income support levels.
In addition, though a description will be omitted here, there are
dramatic changes in administration and state-federal responsibilities,

as well as innumerable regulations, including how income is defined,
over what period it is measured for benefit calculation, definitions
of filing units, allowable asset limits, deductible work expenses and
other important design features.
The Subcommittee proposal, while similar, alters financing
arrangement, state-federal responsibility, and the rules and procedures
applicable to the aged, blind and disabled. Federal costs of the
Subcommittee proposal are now estimated to be substantilly higher
than the $19.14 billion first-year cost attributed to the Administration proposal.*
It reduces, however the costs to the states from
what it would be under the Administration plan.
Incremental Approaches
The Ullman proposal falls under the more "incremental" approaches
to welfare reform and, indeed, has a more limited range of goals. Its
major reform feature concerns setting a minimum cash value of AFDC and
Food Stamps for families with children, while retaining existing SSI
coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled. Food Stamp coverage for
single individuals and childless couples would continue in its
current form. The bill seeks to achieve welfare reform by modifying
current programs. It mandates AFDC-UF for all two-parent families in
all states, while simultaneously requiring minimum benefit levels for
both AFDC and AFDC-UF. The benefit levels in the bill, however, do
not vary by family size. The proposal also expands the Earned
Income Tax Credit. The credit is 30 percent of earnings up to $5000.
The credit remains constant at $1000 between $5000 and $7500. It is
then reduced by 13 percent as earnings rise above $7500, until its
value falls to zero at $15,200.
In addition, the Ullman bill provides modest resources ($5.07
billion) for the creation of approximately 560,000 jobs to be administered by the WIN program. First priority of jobs is given to
principal wage earners in two-parent families who are unemployed and
have been receiving AFDC-UF for 16 weeks. A variety of other administrative features are also contained in the Ullman proposal.
First, there is a provision which adjusts state minimum benefit levels
to reflect changes in the state's median income over time.
It utilizes
retrospective accounting which requires recoupment of excess benefits
from families whose monthly income on which benefits were based is not
reflective of annual income. Because the Ullman bill maintains to
a greater extent than the previous proposals continued federal-state
partnership in the administration and financing of welfare efforts,
*cost estimates for the Administration proposal differ dramatically
depending upon the assumptions used. The figure cited is a CBO projection for FY 1982. The Subcommittee Bill is projected to cost
$20.22 billion in FY 1982.

cost estimates indicate that for FY 1982 estimated federal cost will
be between $8 and $9 billion while state and other levels of government
will assume costs of about $6.5 - $8 billion. These estimates were
made by the House Ways and Means Committee.
The Baker-Bellmon bill (S. 2777) is roughly similar in nature
to the Ullman bill. Its goals for reform of the current system are
far more modest than the comprehensive proposals. It seeks first
to achieve a minimum benefit standard for families with children,
while maintaining existing SSI coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled, and retains Food Stamp coverage for childless couples and single
individuals. It has far less emphasis on putting recipients to work
in public service jobs and requires no substantial administrative reorganization or program consolidation.
Specifically, it would mandate AFDC-UF in all states. Minimum
benefits for AFDC and AFDC-UF would be tied to the federal poverty
standard and would vary by family size. The benefit standards include the value of food stamps. This level would be 60 percent of the
poverty standard. Based on current standards, minimum benefit
levels for a family of four would be $3875 (AFDC cash standard is
The benefit levels would
$1764 plus a food stamps value of $2111).
rise in response to the impact inflation has on the poverty standard
over time. In addition, goals are set which would require benefits to
increase to 65 percent of the poverty standard by 1985.
The bill changes the current EITC for the working poor by
setting an earnings limit equal to the poverty line. The credit
would equal 15 percent of earnings up to that point and phase it out
by 20 percent of all earnings over the limit. The poverty standard
for 1978, as currently projected, is $6350 for a family of four.
Under this bill the maximum credit for a family of four would be $952
with earnings of $6350. The breakeven level would be reached when
earnings are above $11,100.
Unlike any of the previously reviewed proposals, the BakerBellmon bill authorizes no resources for the creation of public
In fact, the bill would cut back the existing level of
service jobs.
Title VI CETA jobs from the existing level of 750,000 to 375,000 in
1982. These remaining jobs would be reserved first for principal
wage earners in two-parent families receiving AFDC-UF for at least
90 days. Any remaining jobs could then be filled by single-parent
household heads or others unemployed for at least 26 weeks. The bill
does, however, authorize resources to provide incentives for private
job creation through a tax credit or job voucher for private employers
willing to employ a former assistance recipient. There would be a
ceiling on the maximum credits permitted and regulations prohibiting
the displacement of regular workers. No employer could receive both

credits and vouchers simultaneously. The bill, therefore, provides
no systematic reorganization or dramatic changes in existing programs.
It seeks modest goals through marginal reform much like that of the
Ullman bill.
The brief descriptions of the major existing proposals for
welfare reform are probably less important individually than they
are as a group. None is likely to be enacted in its current form.
They are probably more important as a group because they represent the
current range of thinking among policy makers and because the form
they take indicates a variety of underlying diagnoses of the current
system and the nature and causes of poverty and dependency. Recent
research has provided a considerable mass of findings which is beginning
to reveal new perspectives on poverty and dependency. The dimensions
of the welfare reform debate reviewed earlier can be usefully applied
through the consideration of what the empirical data indicate will be
the likely impact of any of these new proposals. The remainder of
the paper will concern itself with evaluating the impact of the various
types of reform proposals on the status and behavier of the poor.
THE WELFARE REFORM BILLS AND THE RESEARCH
Research on the behavior of welfare recipients in response to
existing and proposed income maintenance programs have been financed
and initialed to a large degree by governments at the local, state
and federal level. Most research has been motivated by government
concern about growing case loads and rising costs. It is, therefore,
not surprising that questions related to work effort have dominated
the research agenda. As we will discuss in the concluding section,
inadequate consideration of exogenous labor market determinants of
work and welfare patterns means that existing research may place far
too much significance on the independent impact of changing the
parameters of income maintenace programs.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of research has contributed
significantly to our understanding of the importance of using
policy analytic approaches in assessing proposed programs. Using
research finding does help to avoid unanticipated consequences often
associated with past program changes. (see Sanger, 1979)

Adaquacy
All the major bills deal to some degree with the claim that current
programs provide inadequate benefits. Each sets a national floor of
benefits for the populations which it seeks to cover. The Ullman
bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill, however, limit proposed coverage
exclusively to families with children. The Adminsitration bill and the
Subcommittee bill not only seek to establish a minimum floor of income
but also to cover all individuals regardless of family composition

exclusively on the basis of need.
The underlying research question in determining the adequacy of
existing proposals is, what will the distribution of income among
poverty families look like after the enactment of any of the programs?
Benefit levels alone have been an inadequate measure of economic
well-being for all recipient families since, in existing programs,
most families do not depend on AFDC benefits as their only source of
income. Recent research has been showing, for example, that the incidence of multiple benefits is quite common (Bernstein, et al.,
1973; Lyon, et al., 1976) and that if the cash value of all in-kind
benefits were included in calculations of resources available to
recipient families, many more would be enjoying command-overresources equal to or exceeding existing poverty standards (Lyon, et al.,
Clearly, the situation is not the same in all states. This
1976).
remains one of the problems; adequacy of existing benefits varies
profoundly.
Not only are multiple benefits and the values of in-kind benefits
important in determining the adequacy of existing benefits, but so too
is the degree to which many recipients have access to other sources
of income. A recent study using longitudinal data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) revealed that when "ever Welfare"
families (headed by women) were followed over time, evidence was
found of substantial serial and simultaneous work and welfare mixes.
Except for some long-term dependent cases, women while on welfare over
the seven years of the study, had between 25 percent and 33 percent of
their total family income derived from earnings. (Rein, 1977) Of
all low income women who headed families over five years of the study,
77 percent worked at some time (Hausman & Friedman, 1975). This
suggests that the value of welfare benefits at zero income may not
be an entirely useful measure of the adequacy of the resources availale
to all potential welfare recipients. The value of benefits available
at zero earnings is, however, a useful and accurate reflection of
economic well-being for those groups in which the incidence of earnings
from work or from other forms of assistance are not substantial. For
those groups, such as the aged, blind, and disabled, the value of
Food Stamps plus SSI benefits is an appropriate measure on which
to evaluate adequacy.
The descriptions of the proposed reform programs above failed to
indicate the degree to which they would encourage state supplementation
of the federal floor of benefits. This inducement to states might be
a significant determinant of the level of adequacy provided by each
program. However, while the degree of state supplementation is likely
to affect how the adequacy of proposals may be judged, it is also
likely to extend the existing criticisms of lack of uniformity. State
supplementation incentives will make it advantageous for states to

assume responsibility for increasing federal benefit levels, but
there are regional disparities in the degree of commitment to social
welfare expenditures. Short of mandating state supplementation,
any incentive scheme is likely to perpetuate existing regional disparities in welfare effort.
There are considerable uncertainties which exist in estimating
the comparative level of adequacy implicit in each of the proposals
reviewed. The first depends on the level of work effort of participating
families. It was mentioned above that female heads of families have
a strong connection to the labor market. Nevertheless, their hours of
work are generally less than male heads of low-income families. Male
heads of low-income families have very strong attachment to the labor
force. Ninety percent of non-white males and ninety-seven percent of
white males work. They, in general, work extensively and have
average hours of work near or above average hours for the labor
force as a whole (Levy, 1976).
The composition of eligibles is therefore important in determining adequacy of benefit levels. Access to additional sources of
income and the probability of seeking and finding work varies among
different demographic groups. Work, it has been found, is far more
pervasive among traditional welfare eligibles than has previously
been appreciated. Many view, however , that the degree of compulsion
and penalties regulating work, as well as the availability and provision of public service jobs, will also affect the average income
available to eligible families and individuals.
The Administration proposal and the Subcommittee revised version
provide most promise for increased adequacy. Because the proposals
do not maintain traditional categorical distinctions, presumably
coverage would be universal and participation rates would likely be
quite high. Distinctions would be made, however, between those
expected to work and those not expected to work. The adequacy of
benefits available to those not expected to work are reasonably
simple to estimate. Without state supplementation the guarantee for
a family of four would be 2/3 the poverty standard. This level of
support would be higher than existing entitlements for AFDC and Food
Stamps in ten states. Current benefits available in all states for
combined SSI and Food Stamp entitlements for the aged, blind, and disabled exceed the Administration proposal's benefits of $3750 for a
couple and $2500 for an individual. The Subcommittee proposal provides
for the retainment of benefit levels for the aged, blind, and disabled
as a separate component at current levels.
Supplementation therefore becomes central for these groups in
assessing their relative level of well-being under these comprehensive
plans, as compared to existing programs. The Administration bill encourages supplementation by absorbing 75 percent of the additional

state costs required to raise the state minimum benefit level to
$4717 or about 3/4 of the projected 1978 poverty standard. Further
encouragement is provided through a federal cost assumption of 25
percent of the expenditures states assume to raise minimum benefit
levels to $6350, the projected 1978 poverty standard.
Similar inducements are provided for supplementation for those
groups expected to work under the Administration and Subcommittee
proposals. There would be a 75 percent assumption of costs by the
federal government for states which raise the guarantee for workers
during their job search period from the federal minimum guarantee of
$2300 to $2583; the same would apply for a state which raised the
minimum benefit level for those expected to work, when no jobs were
available, from the federal guarantee of $4200 to $4717. The Subcommittee proposal, however, pays 75 percent of the state cost of
raising the guarantee from $4200 to $4700 and 25 percent from $4717
to the poverty line or the state's current level of AFDC plus Food
Stamps, whichever is higher.
Though the costs are assumed by the federal government at up to
75 percent for state supplementation to $4717, it should be emphasized
that currently, in many of the lowest paying states, federal cost
sharing for welfare programs is often as high as 83 percent. Nevertheless, these are often the states where benefit levels remain the
lowest in the country. Further, even at a 75 percent rate of federal
matching, $4717 remains lower than the combined value of AFDC and
Food Stamps in many of the most generous states. Therefore, the level
of adequacy for those not expected to work is likely to be increased
in some states, while there is some indication that there will be
places where families will be made worse off under these proposed
benefit levels, even with the incentives for state supplementation.
For those expected to work, thesituation is likely to be better
under these proposals. Since the guarantee is less likely to be
considered apart from earnings for these recipients, and because research shows that these groups work extensively, the combined value
of benefits and wages will probably provide a more useful measure of
Both bills contain a
adequacy (after considering the tax rate).
large jobs componenet with a strong EITC for those employed in private
sector jobs.
A recent study (Sulvetta, 1978) has estimated the impact of the
Administration proposal on benefits for the poor. Tables 1 and 2 compare the status of both those expected and not expected to work under
current programs and the Administration program. Based on a family of
four where an adult is expected to work, comparisons can be made with
existing benefit levels for those assumed to be employed in public
sector jobs under the Administration proposal.

TABLE 1
Comparison of PBJI Benefits and Existing Benefits in
Low-, Moderate-, and High-Benefit AFDC States
Current Program Benefits I
Type of Unit

Median-Benefit
3
State

Low-Benefit
2
State

Single Individual

$

624

$

624

High Benefit
4
State
$

PBJI
Cash Benefits
& PSE Income

624

$1,100

Aged, Blind, or Disabled Individual
2,356

2,688

2,868

2,500

Couple with no
children

1,128

1,128

1,128

2,200

Aged, Blind, or Disabled Couple
3,539

3,980

4,112

3,750

2-Parent,2-Child Family
with 1 Parent
Incapacitated
3 ,4 4 4 a

5,164

6

,5 2 4

2-Parent,2-Child Family
with Head Unemployed
in AFDC-UF State
3 ,4 4 4 a

5,164

6

,5 2 4

2-Parent,2-Child Family
in non-AFDC-UF
State
2,040

2,040

2,040

6,956

1-Parent Family with
3 Children over 13 3,444

5,164

6,524

6,956

1-Parent Family with
3 Children Age 7-13

3

,4 4 4 a

5,164

6

,5 2 4 b

4,950

1-Parent Family with
3 Children under 7

3

,4 4 4 a

5,164

6

,5 2 4 b

4,200

b

b

(6,956
(4,700

6,956

1. Annual benefits include food stamps, SSI, and AFDC where applicable.
2. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefits = to level paid by South Carolina.
Maximum annual amount paid for an AFCD family of 4 in 1977 was $1,404, &
basic federal benefits were paid to SSI participants.
3. Assumes AFDC benefit = to that paid in Maine. Maximum annual AFDC
amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $3,768. SSI payments were $2,254
per individual and $3,768 per couple. See table 5 for an explanation of
benefit composition.
4. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefits = to that paid by New York. Maximum
AFDC annual amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $5,712.
5. See table 9 for component breakdown.
a. Includes AFDC benefit of $1,404 and food stamp benefit of $2,040
calculated as $2,040- (.3(1,404) - (720+ 900)).
b. Includes AFDC benefit of $5,712 and food stamp benefit of $812 calculated as $2,040 - (.3(5,712) - (720 + 900)).
Source:
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TABLE 2
Comparison of Existing Benefits and Proposed PBJI Benefits
when Head of Family Is Expected to Work and Is Employed
at Minimum Wage in Private Sector Job

Current Program
Annual
Earnings Benefits Total

Type of Unit

Single Individual

PBJI
Annual
Earnings

Benefits

Total

$

0

$5,512

0

5,512

$5,512

$ 0

$5,512

$5,512

5,512

0

5,512

5,512

6,964

5,512

1 ,9 2 0 c

6,964

5,512

1,920

7,534

2,756

2 ,5 7 6 d

Couple with no

Children
Two-Parent Family
with 2 Children

5,512

1

,4 5 2 a

Single-Parent Family
with 3 Children
over Age 13
5,512

1,452

Single-Parent Family
with 3 Children
Age 7-13
2,756

4

a

,7 7 8 b

c

7,432

7,432

5,332

Note:
Assumes 1978 projected minimum wage of $2.65 per hour, or $5,512 for
fulltime employment, $2,756 for half-time employment.
a. Includes earned income tax credit of $249 plus food stamp benefit of
$1,203. Earned income tax credit calculated as (.1(4,000) - .1(5,512 4,000)). Food stamp benefit calculated as $2,040 - (.3(5,512 - (720 +
900 + .2(5,512)).
b. Includes earned income tax credit of $276, Maine AFDC benefit of $3,768,
plus food stamp benefit of $734 calculated as $2,040 - .3(6,524 - (720 +
900 + .2(2,756)). This assumes that allowable child care deductions more
than cover the loss in AFDC benefits due to earnings.
c. Cash benefit of $1,444 plus earned income tax credit of $476.
d. Cash benefit of $2,300 plus earned income tax credit of $276 computed
as 10 percent of income up to $4,000. Although benefits are reduced by
50 cents for every dollar of earnings, an annual child care deduction of
up to $1,800 for one child and $3,600 for two or more children is permitted.

Source:

Sulvetta, 1978;
p. 41

The degree of impact is related to whether or not male-headed
families reside in states which currently operate an AFDC-UF program.
For those families in states where no such program exists, the joint
value of wages at the level of the minimum wage and cash benefits
would make them far better off.
In fact, expected value of wages
and cash benefits would result in income in excess of the poverty
standard, For those residing in states which operate an AFDC-UF
program, their status would still be substantially improved by the
administration proposal.
For those family heads expected to work who find private employment, even at the minimum wage, the situation is far better still.
Table 2 indicates that when the value of AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits
are combined with both Food Stamps and the current value of the EITC,
working family heads in private employment are still far better off
under the Administration proposal than they are under any combination
of exisitng transfer programs. The only exception to this is for the
single parent household assumed to be working part-time. Current
benefits for it are substantially better under current arrangements
than under those proposed by the Administration.
The critical factor here, in terms of the average adequacy of
proposed benefits, is the fact that coverage would be greatly increased
as compared with existing programs. Though comparisons have been
made with family heads in states with AFDC-UF, it should be clear that
participantion rates are quite low in these programs, even in states
which have them. For example, for large numbers of low-wage workers
residing in states with no AFDC-UF programs, benefits available
include only the value of Food Stamps and the current EITC. No other
cash benefits are currently available to the working poor in those
states. Indeed, even in states operating an AFDC-UF program, monthly
employment in excess of 100 hours excludes any participation for
families with working heads, even if their income is quite low.
Coverage of the working poor, whether in families with children or
not, clearly results in raising substantially the aggregate level of
adequacy of command-over-resources for millions of currently ineligible
families.*
The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellman proposal fall far
short of the Administration and Subcommittee proposals on the basis
of the adequacy of benefits provided. Neither extends coverage to
The benefit levels used are the median benefit levels paid in a
representative state paying moderate benefits (e.g. Maine).
The Subcommittee proposal goes even further in insuring an increased
level of adequacy by proposing to legislate the indexing of welfare
benefits for changes in the cost of living.

childless couples or individuals. Both retain the Food Stamp program
which restricts the use of a large part of the total value of benefits
available to food, exclusively. Both bills mandate AFDC-UF coverage in
all states. The Ullman proposal restricts participation to these
families if their monthly income exceeds $350. It would permit a
federal AFDC-UF benefit level of $200 per month ($2400 per year) for
male-headed families with, no income. Aid would be available for a
maximum of 17 weeks at federal expense if no public service job were
available. States would be required to extend aid for an additional
35 weeks at their own expense. States would be permitted to supplement
the federal minimum of $200 per month by as much as $150, but the
costs of doing so would be entirely their own. Retaining the Food
Stamp program would result in an estimated yearly benefit level for a
two parent family of four of $4080. These restrictions must be
seen as particularly harsh given the fact that all minima and maxima
are not adjusted, as in the previous proposals, for family size. The
result, therefore, is obvious. Total benefit levels for intact
families, though higher than are AFDC and Food Stamp benefits currently
available in seven states, do not go far enough in approaching
the poverty standard. Large families, a major cause of poverty among
the working poor, will be made the worst off among both intact and
female-headed families.
Adequacy, it has been argued, can be judged best for those expected
to work, based on the expected value of both wages and benefits available.
The Ullman proposal allocates $5.07 billion for public job creation
(approximately 560,000 jobs). These are to be administered through the
WIN program. This compares with an estimated 1.4 million jobs budgeted
to be created in the Administration proposal. The Ullman bill gives
first priority to male heads of intact families already receiving AFDC-UF
who have been receiving assistance for 16 weeks. The jobs are therefore
largely reserved for those who, after a relatively long search period,
still remain unemployed. Wages would be at the minimum wage and credits
would be available to private employers willing to hire WIN registrants.
In general, benefits are available only to families with children
and those already eligible for SSI. Benefit levels mandated are low
in comparison with the comprehensive proposals, as is the proposed
increase in the EITC. No substantial incentives exist for state supplementation and the proposed level of job creation appears low. WIN
has not had a very strong history of success in training and placement
of its registrants and there are no indications that they are now
either equipped to undertake or capable of undertaking substantial job
creation, even with the proposed mandate to contract with CETA prime
sponsors. The lack of benefit adjustments for family size appears
particularly harsh, based on recent research indicating that among
the working poor this appears to be a major source of hardship, even
for those employed in stable jobs. (Levy, 1976).
The Baker-Bellman bill is even less generous in most respects

than the Ullman bill. It also retains existing programs but mandates
AFDC-UF. Far from removing the 100 hour eligibility criterion which now
results in such low participation among families with an unemployed father,
the Baker-Bellmon bill merely retains the troublesome "notch" problems
at a new level by setting an eligibility requirement of income less
than 130 times the minimum wage for benefits for families with an
unemployed parent--($3445).
This results in ineligibility for families
with income in excess of $3445. This appears to be the case regardless
of family size.
Benefit levels would be set at 60 percent of the poverty standard.
This would include the joint value of Food Stamps and mandated state
minimum benefits. This requirement, however, causes benefit levels to
vary with family size. For an AFDC family of four the 1978 cash standard
of combined value of AFDC and Food Stamps would equal a total benefit
of $3875. This exceeds the current state benefit levels of only five
states. This benefit standard would apply to both AFDC and AFDC-UF
households. SSI would be retained in current form. A target date is
set for 1985 to increase mandated minimum benefit levels to 65 percent
of the poverty standard.
Though benefit levels are quite low, generous incentives for
state supplementation would exist. Any state now paying above the
federal minimal level mandated would be required to retain current
levels; (i.e. current recipients would not be made worse off as they
would be under other proposals.)
Federal cost sharing which now bases
the federal rate of cost assumption on the relationship between
state median income and the national median income would be modified
from the existing range of 50 - 83 percent in the following manner:
in 1980 the federal cost share would rise to 120 percent of its obligation under the existing formula.
It would increase to 140 percent in
1981 and 160 percent in 1982.
This would occur until a state's
level of benefits reached the official poverty standard, after which
any additional benefit increases would be exclusively assumed by the
state.
Provision for public job creation is even less than under the Ullman
proposal. The Baker-Bellman bill would retain current resources for
providing the existing level of CETA public service jobs through 1979.
At that point the allocations would decline over a four year period to
reach a level of only 250,000 slots in 1983, providing that the national
level of unemployment does not exceed 6 percent. The major instrument
that the bill proposes for job creation is a system of either job
vouchers or job credits for private sector employers who hire AFDC
recipients unemployed 26 weeks, provided that they pay the prevailing
wage and that there is no job displacement.
Based on the conventional level of adequacy established by the

federal poverty standard, no bill yet proposed insures that minimal
level of adequacy. Only the Administration and Subcommittee bills
insure this level of adequacy for those who are working. Further,
the Ullman and the Baker-Bellmon bills exclude from any more support
than current programs provide, large numbers of childless couples and
single individuals. Though the incremental bills increase the present
value of the EITC now available, neither bill insures a job for those
expected to work. None of the bills totally resolves the difficult
problem of wide national variation among states in their benefit
levels. Though all do set a minimum floor under that part of the
population to be covered, in both incremental bills the floor is so
low that most states already pay that minimum level of benefits.
Substantial incentives exist for state supplementation in all
but the Ullman bill. But state supplementation is ultimately a mixed
blessing. It may result in disparities in benefit levels regionally.
States which have traditionally been more generous in their commitment
to welfare support will probably remain so, while those states which
have not been so generous in their commitments will probably retain
their traditionally low levels of support.
Throughout, an effort has been made to compare the value of
existing benefits to those proposed for different groups in the competing proposals. No mention has been made of the important contribution that the value of in-kind benefits now available to welfare
eligibles through Medicaid might have. The Medicaid dilemma, and how
it will be resolved, has important implications for comparing proposed
income transfer systems to the existing one. Presumably, the incremental proposals would retain existing Medicaid eligibility to participating families. The value of these benefits has been shown to be
substantial. (Lyon, et al., 1976) The comprehensive proposals have
not attempted to extend Medicaid eligibility to groups which would
for the first time become eligible for income transfers under their
proposals. Many suspect that this will result in undue hardship
and implicit inequities in the value of benefits to similarly situated
families within the new program; that is, those eligible under existing
programs will remain eligible under the reform proposals, but those
newly enfranchised will have no such option. If states are required
to assume all responsibility for Medicaid to new eligibles, the costs
may be tremendous. It will encourage further state disparities as
well as interfere with state supplementation incentives. The Subcommittee and Administration proposals have left this question unresolved because of the expectation that national health insurance
will soon make it a moot point. In the meantime, however, it weakens
the adequacy of the proposals while retaining a troublesome "notch"
often criticized as part of the exisitng system.
The goals of simultaneously providing an adequate level of resources
and universal coverage are not met by any of the major legislative

proposals. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee and Administration proposals
make a dramatic effort in beginning to approach those goals. The
problem of making judgments in a vacuum about a particular goal in
welfare reform becomes obvious. Economic theory and empirical research point to the danger of high guarantees. Work disincentive
effects and costs must be traded off against adequacy. The next
section will begin to place the relative merits of these competing
goals in perspective. Though adequacy remains a critical factor in
any attempt to design and evaluate a new income transfer system,
additional concerns weight heavily in determining the optimal mix
of program parameters.
Work Effort
No issue in the welfare reform debate has received more attention
in the popular media or research community than that of the work
effects of the welfare system. Four multi-million dollar income
maintenance experiments have been undertaken for the primary purpose
of estimating the level of labor force withdrawal which is to be
anticipated under a reformed welfare system. A considerable amount
of non-experimental research has also been done for this purpose.
Economists argue that two basic elements in an income maintenance
program affect the work effort of program participants; the guarantee
and the benefit reduction rate (tax rate).
These two program elements
influence how recipients will assess the attractiveness of work.
Experimental research and non-experimental research on both the
current and proposed systems have revealed significant relationships
between reduction in work effort and the size of the guarantee and the
tax rate.
(Appel, 1972; Watts, 1974; Garfinkel, 1974; Cogan, 1978;
Keeley, et. al., 1977)
Most of the research has shown that male heads of families respond the least to changes in these program parameters, followed by
female heads of families. Wives of working heads (secondary workers)
generally respond more immediately and dramatically to changes in the
"cost of work" than do either of the other gorups.
By and large,
male heads of families have a strong attachment to work and changes
in the guarantee and tax rates seem to have a significant effect for
only a small portion of them. (Freidman and Hausman, 1977)
The other finding for which there is wide support is that labor
force withdrawal is more likely for those groups with lower normal
income. Thus, we would expect a greater reduction of work at a given
benefit level and tax rate for those groups where normal income is the
lowest. But since there are far greater concentrations of families as
we move up the income ladder from, say, $1000 to $5000, the danger of
substantial reduction in work effort is contained within a smaller group
of families.

Many have been particularly concerned about the unmeasured work
effects of the current welfare system. The value of many cash and
in-kind benefits often results in high implicit guarantees. Recent
research in New York City demonstrated that the value of multiple
benefits packages that many families received was far higher than
Similarly,
(Lyon, et al., 1976)
they could generate through work.
the cumulative marginal tax rates which result from multiple benefits are suspected of providing severe inhibitions to labor force
(Hausman, 1974) Many of the
participation among eligible families.
existing disincentives and costs of a categorical and multi-program
system go unmeasured. The size and cost of projected reductions
in work effort from a reformed system may therefore seem greater
when compared to the present system than they actually are.
The dominant group on welfare nationally is the female-headed
family. New proposals which extend coverage to male-headed families
are creating the largest amount of concern among researchers and policy
makers because of the uncertainty of their projected labor response.
Profound labor force withdrawal as amesult of new income maintenance
programs is feared for a variety of reasons. Work disincentives
could result in a decline in national output, in the projected
income (and thus, well-being) of the target population and, most
dramatically, in the projected cost of any new program. More important
is the moral conviction, strongly held in this country, that work
ought to be stringently encouraged, if not demanded.
The most recent data on the effects of a reformed welfare system
have come from interim reports from the five year Income Maintenance
Experiment in Seattle-Denver. It reported labor supply effects which
were large and significant. Although it was not possible to distinguish among the specific labor supply responses of families exposed to different guarantees and tax rates, it was possible to
generalize about the impact of a negative income tax program in
general. The results are consistent with those found in non-experimental cross-sectional studies. (Keeley, et al., 1977) Husbands
were found to reduce their labor in response to the program by 5.3
percent, wives by 22.0 percent and female heads by 11.2 percent.
Legislative debates during this round of welfare reform proposals, as in past rounds, recognize the work dinincentive effects of
any income transfer system. Those who react most emphatically
against promoting any labor supply decline, at any cost, often call
for strong administrative components, in any new legislation, which
create compulsion to work. The view that the work test is the proper
vehicle to combat the implicit work disincentives in an income
maintenance program has persisted for virtually hundreds of years.
In view of the lack of any solid empirical support for the effectiveness of administration compulsion to work (Evans, et al., 1975,
Stevens and Austermann, 1975; Stevens, 1974), and the tremendous

resource commitment necessary to attempt to enforce it, it is curious
that it remains a politically necessary component in all proposed
programs.
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals are comprehensive
systems with universal coverage. Presumably a universal approach
would eliminate many of the expensive and inestimable work disincentive
effects of the highly decentralized, categorical, and administratively
complex system of state and local welfare programs which currently
exist. The costs of labor force withdrawal in a universal system must
be weighed, ultimately, after netting out the perverse and highly
costly behavior induced by the current maze of problems.
Nevertheless, the Administration and Subcommittee proposals are
sensitive to the political debate and empirical evidence related to
work effort.
For those expected to work, during the job search
period the head of household who is searching for a job is ineligible
for benefits. The effect of this provision is, of course, to remove
a known work disincentive (high guarantee) during the precise time
when one would wish a recipient's work effort to be the strongest.
If work is not found within eight weeks (five weeks in the Subcommittee
proposal), the family would be eligible for the full support available
for families who are not expected to work. The guarantee at this
upper tier would be 2/3 of the poverty line.
The benefit reduction rate would not exceed 50 percent of
earnings for those expected to work. In addition, benefits do not
begin to be reduced until earnings reach $3800. For those on the
lower tier, therefore, benefits are not reduced at all until earnings
exceed $3800. Provisions for state supplementation specify that a
total benefit reduction rate can never exceed 52 percent for combined
federal and state supplemental benefits. To insure that cumulative
rates do not exceed this maximum, the EITC does not begin to be
phased out until earnings exceed the break-even point for benefits.
Clearly this results in providing benefits from the EITC to families
whose incomes are higher than the poverty line. The target efficiency
of this scheme is lower, but the work disincentives of higher tax
rates within theJ8-52 percent range, including the federal payroll
tax on earnings.
*The level at which most research suggests compromising work
disincentive effects against program costs.
**Most tax rate maxima reported in this section come from recent
calculations made by the Urban Institute (Levy, 1978).

For those not expected to work, the maxima are similar, with
the exception of state supplemental benefits which are permitted
to be reduced as rapidly as 70 percent for each dollar of earnings.
Overall tax rates, however, may not exceed 71 percent for this group
of recipients whose work effort is of less concern.
The Subcommittee proposal does not recognize in its provisions
the same importance of work disincentive effects and has different
provisions for tax rate maxima than does the Administration proposal.
For those expected to work, the maximum tax rate, including state
supplemental benefits, may rise as high as 70 percent. The EITC,
unlike that of the Administration proposal, reaches its maximum
level of benefits at a substantially lower level of earnings. Thus
recipients may still be receiving cash benefits when the 6 percent
reduction rate begins for the EITC. Total tax rates, therefore,
may be quite high. They remain at about 64 percent when the EITC
is increasing and can reach 82 percent when it is phasing out.
Similar ranges face those groups not expected to work.
Neither bill, it was mentioned earlier, deals with the problem
of the Medicaid "notch" which results in loss of all Medicaid
eligibility when a dollar of earnings puts recipients above the
break-even level. The implicit marginal tax rate for those who lose
all Medicaid eligibility can, therefore, be several hundred percent.
It is not clear at this state, however, how many recipients will be
eligible for Medicaid in the first place, since there is no provision
to allow initial Medicaid coverage to those recipients who would not
be eligible under the existing system.
Both bills have a "strong" work test. The first part of the
work requirement is facilitated by a distinction by category between
those expected to work and those not expected to work. The criteria
for classification are based, for the most part, on clearly identifiable demographic characteristics. It is not clear, however, how
disability will be determined and how standards of judgment can be
applied uniformly. This is, of course, a major national problem in
the operation of the disability insurance program.
Though the need for complex administrative regulations is minimized, uniformity of eligibility standards for the upper tier will
doubtless be subject to national variation and unavoidable
administrative discretion.
Failure to accept work by the principal earner in both bills
results in a reduction in benefits; that is, the part of the grant
allocated for the principal earner is deducted from the total family
grant. For a family of four, the benefit standard would be reduced
from $4200 to $2300. Enforcement of the work requirement is not too
difficult for those seeking public service jobs. But for jobs in the

private sector the problem remains as difficult as existing enforcement of the work test in AFDC-UF and Food Stamps programs. It is
quite simple for individuals to make themselves appear undesirable
to a potential employer at a job interview. This type of work evasion
is impossible to monitor or control. Administrative machinery set up
to attempt to enforce a work test is expensive and complex. Attempts
at doing so in state and local program administrative levels have not
been successful in altering work behavior of recipients in existing
programs.
(Evans, et al., 1975)
Recent research has shown that work is substantial even for welfare recipients. (Rainwater and Rein, 1976) Hausman and Freidman
(1975) point out that even among those 3-4 percent of the participants
in the New Jersey Income Maintenance experiment who did not work, it
was health problems, not distaste for work, which determined their
employment status. Most of those who have studied unemployment spells
among low income workers have found that most of them ultimately return
to work. Thus, the question remains whether a work test is likely to
alter either the incidence of unemployment from job separation or the
length of unemployment spells. The issue is whether the costs of
effective monitoring of a work test, when the results in labor force
participation are apt to be quite small, are worth the displacement of
resources from other more effective forms of employment assistance.
The Ullman bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill retain many of the work
disincentives which exist under the current system due to multiple
benefits from a multiplicity of programs. Nevertheless, certain incremental changes are proposed to deal with many of the egregious
criticisms of the current system. The Ullman bill does nothing to
alter the guarantee facing those expected to work during a job search
period; this is potentially more of a work disincentive than under the
comprehensive plans' lower benefits during job search. Nevertheless,
maximum federal benefit levels are lower than in the other two proposals and do not vary by family size (a potentially weaker work
disincentive effect is therefore present for large families, however
unintended). The bill does eliminate a strong work disincentive
present in the current program, the 100-hour rule governing maleheaded intact families. Provisions for recoupment of yearly benefits
in excess of allowable levels (which results from basing yearly benefit
calculations on earnings from one month) provide potential increased
disincentives.
The Ullman bill establishes a tax ceiling for AFDC and AFDC-UP
at 60 percent, whether or not benefits are supplemented by the states.
Food Stamps (with a benefit reduction rate of 20 percent for incomes
less than $7400 and 40 percent above) are sequenced such that Food
Stamps benefit calculations consider both increases in earnings as well

as decreases in AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits. This helps the problem
of additive tax rates. The EITC supplements earnings up until $5000 and
phases out at a 13 percent rate above $7500. All of these rates,
combined with the federal payroll tax of 6 percent, result in maximum
rates for two-parent families of about 54 percent below $5000 and 74
percent between $5000 and $7500. The rates for female-headed families
are similar but slightly higher.
The work test remains basically unchanged from that of the existing system. The principal wage earner in two-parent families and
female heads with children over six are required to register for WIN
training and job search activities. If these groups expected to work
fail to register or fail to accept a bona fide job offer, the family is
disqualified for AFDC and Food Stamps. If the female head failed to
register, she would be disqualified, while payments for her children would
still be made, but to a third party.
The same administrative difficulties exist with enforcement of
these work regulations as currently exist and which were described
for the comprehensive proposals. Their inclusion in all the proposals, therefore, must be taken as a political price necessary to
achieve support in a conservative Congress. Similar requirements
were ultimately included in the abortive reform attempts of FAP, with
no additional confidence among planners or administrators in their
necessity or effectiveness.
Of all the proposed legislation, the Baker-Bellmon bill responds
the least with specific provisions to alter the work disincentive
effects of a reformed welfare system. It provides for a single benefit level, even during job search. It does nothing about the "notch"
effect of the 100-hour rule, since it merely replaces a rule based on
hours with one based on earnings. And, finally, it provides additional
work disincentives through the provision for benefit recoupment.
Benefit reduction rates in this bill, which result from a combination of AFDC and AFDC-UF rates of 67 percent, the current Food
Stamps rates, and 20 percent reduction of the EITC above the poverty
line, and the federal payroll tax, reach a maximum of 66 percent above the
poverty line and 101 percent above the poverty line (as the value of
the EITC declines). These rates, in general, apply to both twoparent families and female headed households. As in the other proposals, no provisions are made to deal with the Medicaid "notch."
Work requirements are similar to those in the Ullman proposal.
Work incentives through low tax rates and low guarantees are
unlikely to have the desired impact when jobs for welfare eligibles
are simply not available. It is therefore important to consider the

strength of the commitment toward job creation in evaluating the
respective impacts the various proposals have on work effort. The
Administration proposal provided the strongest work incentives of
all the proposals currently under consideration. The low tax rates,
combined with the two-tier system, whatever its complexities in administration, provide the strongest work incentives of any of the
bills. The work test, it has been argued, may be seen as unimportant
in effecting work effort, but may have a substantial impact on costs
and indirectly drain resources away from more effective employment
assistance.
The provisions for 1.4 million jobs in the Administration proposal goes further in recognizing the limitations of the existing
job market for the low wage workers than any of the others. Though
it is beyond the scope of this paper, serious problems may arise
in designing proper jobs and providing training which will lead to
ultimate employment in the private sector. The current list of jobs
to be designed does not seem to be entirely appropriate for the target
population. Nevertheless, the combination of program parameters and
the jobs components appears to be most consistent with what current
research has been suggesting are necessary components of a reformed
system. The concerns expressed by those who find the level of labor
force withdrawal in the recent income maintenance experiments disturbing, are probably unfounded in a universal system where no
dramatic changes in benefit levels are likely. Indeed, it appears
that if all of the social costs of the current categorical system
are netted out, the costs of the reformed universal system may seem
quite modest.
Family Stability
During the 1960's the rapid growth of the AFDC caseloads motivated concern about the program's impact on the incidence of female
headship and marital instability. The design of the program seems to
support the view that the program itself encouraged, through financial
incentives, marriages to break up or be postponed. This view was
explained through reference to program eligibility requirements which
excluded support in many states for families with an unemployed male.
Restrictive eligibility requirements in states which did operate an
AFDC-UF program provided additional incentives to break up existing
marriages or not form them in the first place, so that a female family
head could become eligible for income support.
The research has not resolved very clearly the precise validity
of these concerns. Indeed, a variety of data sources has yielded
contradictory results. (Cutright and Scanzoni, 1973; Honig, 1973;
Bernstein and Meezan, 1975; Sawhill, et al., 1975; Hoffman and Holmes,
1976) This section, therefore, will describe the emerging theories

of the impact of income transfers and program design on issues of
family stability rather than attempt a proposal-by-proposal comparison,
as in the previous sections. An attempt will be made to review the
trade-offs in the current system against those in a reformed system,
without detailed references to the specific provisions of each of the
major proposals.
The decision to marry or to dissolve a marriage is based on a
complex combination of social, psychological, and economic factors.
Most of the research on the effect of income maintenance systems on
these decisions has concentrated on the economic determinants. Among
those studies which have found a positive and significant relationship
between AFDC and marital instability, the variation explained is always
quite small (e.g. Hoffman and Holmes, 1976; Bernstein and Meezan,
1975).
Nevertheless, the emerging economic theories which attempt to
explain the incidence of family instability among those on welfare
often emphasize two competing economic relationships. One is called
the "independence effect," which relates to the finding that female
income (or income producing capacity), as well as the access of women
to alternative sources of income (i.e. AFDC), relieves the economic
pressure to remain married or to marry. Several researchers have
revealed the existence of this effect. The second effect, known as the
"income effect," relates to the finding that at higher levels of income
the incidence of family disruption appears to decline. This is often
explained by the recognition that at higher levels of income the interpersonal strains caused by economic insecurity and negative views about
the male role performance are relieved. The table below lays out the
relevant hypotheses and the expected influence that universal and categorical income maintenance systems are likely to have based on the
hypotheses.
Proponents of a universal income maintenance system, like the
negative income tax, have argued that it will remove the existing
incentives for family splits which are motivated by economic need.
A universal system which bases eligibility for transfers on income
alone (and without any family composition requirements) has been
thought to remove incentives for family break-up among needy families
who wanted to meet the eligibility requirements for income support.
The most recent results of the New Jersey Negative Income Tax
Experiment and the preliminary findings from the Seattle-Denver Income
Maintenance Experiments have produced considerable confusion. In
general, the experiments showed, contrary to expectation, higher
levels of marital dissolution among experimental families than among
comparable controls. Control families were permitted to take advantage
of existing welfare programs. A recent study which has had a considerable impact on the debates over the Administration's proposal in
committee points to the danger of inducing even greater family instability by instituting a universal income
(Bishop, 1978)
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Explanations about what caused greater levels of family disruption among the experimental families than the controls usually take
two forms. The first points to weaknesses in the experiments themselves, such as non-random attrition. Further, many have suggested
that the results of the experiments are site-specific and cannot be
generalized to a national program. The other attempts to explain
that the findings are of a more theoretical nature. A closer look
at the Seattle-Denver results reveals high rates of family break-up
at low levels of support when compared to the controls, but comparable or lower rates at higher levels of support. These results may
be showing that at low levels of support the female "independence
effect" dominates but at higher levels of support the "income effect"
dominates. Therefore, far from suggesting that a negative income tax
should be abandoned, the results may be suggesting that a negative
income tax at a more generous benefit level should be instituted.
Others have interpreted the findings differently. It may be
that the stigma of AFDC constrains women in unhappy marriages from
dissolving them, by inhibiting them from applying for AFDC. The
lack of stigma in a universal system may therefore provide these
women with a non-stigmatizing option for escape. (Bradbury, 1977)
The income maintenance experiments provided experimental families
with a considerable amount of program information about the rules and
regulations of participating. Some researchers have argued that the
experimental families, unlike the controls, were aware that they would
be eligible for continued benefits even if their marriages were to end.
This information may have reduced the costs that those in unhappy
marriages might have perceived in dissolving their marriages.
(Hannan, et al., 1977) Alternatively, it may be that the new participation of a working make household head in income supplementation under
the experiment undermines the female's view of his role performance.
That is, the receipt of income supplements may be viewed as a signal
by some families that the husband is a failure and, when he is not
able to fulfill his role as breadwinner, marital tension results.
(Bishop, 1978)
These explanations remain largely unresolved. The table above
demonstrated the degree to which categorical programs or universal
programs are hypothesized to effect marriage and separations. Categorical programs appear to have ony incentives for family dissolution.
Universal programs appear to provide incentives for both decreased and
increased marital dissolutions.
The cash component of the Administration bill and the Subcommittee
bill generally constitutes the archetype of a universal negative income tax program. However, the distinctions made between those who are
expected to work and those who are not, provides a potential for

increased marital dissolution. Though there is no punishment through
withdrawal of benefit eligibility for intact families, there is an
implicit incentive for male heads assigned to the lower tier to abandon
their families. Their families would be eligible for benefits at the
upper tier without the male head. Hausman and Freidman (1977) suggest
that we consider the following example: A two-parent family of four
with at least one young child, and where neither parent works, is
assigned to the lower tier. They are eligible for $2300, but if the
husband leaves, the remaining one-parent family moves to the upper
tier where they become eligible for $3600, or a substantial gain in
benefits. In addition, the separated husband may be eligible for benefits as high as $1100 if he cannot find a job. There exists, therefore,
as in AFDC, a strong financial incentive for the family to dissolve.
The incentive among all eligibles is to move to the tier where the
benefits available are higher. However, this is a dramatic and particular example which is not likely to be as universally profitable as
is the incentive in the AFDC program.
The view described above that providing income supplements to an
intact family signals the failure of the husband as a breadwinner, is
minimized in the comprehensive proposals through the provision of jobs
and, for those employed, an increase in the value of the EITC. This
sort of income supplement is likely to be less stigmatizing since it
is available at relatively high levels of earnings and this form of
supplementation may be viewed as part of the tax system rather than the
welfare system.
Finally, decisions about marriage and divorce are important longrange decisions. The immediate effect of the income maintenance experiments may not be borne out over the long run in a new system. Indeed,
the option to leave a bad marriage may be facilitated by the availability of income support. It may not, however, precipitate such decisions
over the long run. (Ross and Sawhill, 1975)
The added incentives in the current system for illegitimacy,
though not supportable definitively by the research, are removed in
the comprehensive proposals with increased coverage to include single
individuals. The pro-natalist orientation which provides increased
benefits with increased family size remains. Nevertheless, no research
to date has provided convincing evidence that welfare mothers currently
increase their family size for the purpose of increasing their welfare
(Presser and Salsberg, 1975) Results from the New Jersey
grants.
negative income tax experiment revealed no significant difference
between the experimentals and controls in their level of fertility.
(Cain, 1974)
The incremental proposals modify somewhat the incentive for
family dissolution by mandating AFDC-UF in all states. Nevertheless,

the Baker-Bellmon bill constrains eligibility for two-parent families
with an arbitrary earnings limit. This is a potential destabilizing
factor. However, if the stigma effect of welfare does indeed operate
to inhibit the female independence effect, retaining the present welfare system in these bills probably will act to stabilize marriages.
If the independence effect dominates at lower levels of support
and the income effect dominates at higher levels, the more generous
benefit levels of the comprehensive proposals may operate to stabilize
marriages. Further, it has been suggested that in programs with high
marginal tax rates a male head (principal earner) may leave the family
to protect his earnings.
(MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978) The lower tax
rates in the Administration proposal may inhibit family dissolution
for this reason.
Much of the impact of the various proposals on family stability
is mere conjecture. The empirical evidence and the theory are not
consistent. A more important issue may be whether some additional
family break-up is worth the price for reform. Few of these studies
have provided any evidence on the nature of the marriages which dissolved. Bernstein and Meezan (1975), in a small sample of New York
welfare mothers, did provide this kind of evidence. Many of the
women in the dissolved marriages reported a high incidence of drug
addiction, alcoholism, violence, and infidelity among their departed
spouses. As a matter of public policy, permitting women in unhappy
marriages the financial option to leave their husbands, may not be
such a bad thing. Marital stability,for its own sake, does not appear
to be a suitable dictum nor a sufficiently critical priority for
which adequate support and equity ought to be compromised. Indeed,
withdrawal of all income maintenance support is likely to increase
female dependence on marriage, thereby increasing marital stability.
It is not, however, reasonable to compromise the other important goals
of income maintenance reform for the continuation of marriages of
unknown quality. Finally, it is not at all clear whether such fears
will be realized in a new program. Evidence appears mixed and the
alternatives are not terribly attractive.
Costs
Although critically important issues of public policy are raised
by the current crop of welfare reform bills presently before Congress,
it is likely that many decisions on program content will be subordinated
to considerations of program costs. The recent description of President
Carter's principles for National Health Insurance reflects the overriding priority that questions of national economic health will have
in determining any new social programs. Indeed, the proposal conditions
the timing of phasing in national health insurance on the state of the
national economy.

All the critical dimensions of welfare reform addressed in the
previous sections may ultimately rest on their cost rather than any
loftier concerns such as equity or adequacy. Small changes in program
parameters can have a very significant impact on overall program
costs. For example, the higher the guarantee and the lower the tax
rate in any proposed cash assistance program, the higher the cost of
the program. Lower tax rates and higher guarantees result in extending the break-even level of income. Therefore, benefits continue
to be paid to families with higher incomes. As the break-even increases,
given the current income distribution, larger numbers of families
concentrated at higher levels of income become eligible for benefits.
Therefore, the lower tax rates and the higher guarantees of the Administration proposal represent substantially larger resource commitments
than either of the incremental bills.
Data on labor force withdrawal from the Seattle-Denver Income
Maintenance experiment has been a great help in simulating the program
costs of a reformed system. (DHEW, 1978) Labor force withdrawal can
be estimated, using experimental results on the basis of proposed tax
rates and guarantee levels. Further, recent results have shown that
variations in program participation rates are related to these program
parameters. Both of these considerations influence the ultimate cost
of a program.
Additional factors which have significant impacts on program costs
are the number of persons eligible for benefits and the length of time
an eligible recipient is required to wait until he or she is placed in
a public service job.
(Levy, 1978) The number of eligibles is dependent
first on the break-even level of income as determined by the guarantee
and the tax rate. Equally as critical is the proposed program coverage. Obviously, whatever the guarantee and the tax rate, if the
coverage is quite limited, such as to families with children exclusively,
the costs will be far less than if coverage is universal.
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals propose coverage
to all low income families. Included in eligibility for cash assistance
will therefore be groups who are now only eligible for Food Stamps.
Benefit levels in these comprehensive proposals are higher than Food
Stamps benefit levels for these groups and absolute benefit levels are
higher for cash assistance than for AFDC and AFDC-UF recipients in some
states.
Levy (1978) points out that the incremental bills are concerned
with the more limited coverage of AFDC and AFDC-UF populations.
Though both bills expand AFDC coverage, by setting a minimum national
benefit standard and mandating AFDC-UF in all states, they also move
a number of AFDC recipients into public service jobs. "The net result
is a decrease in cash assistance (as distinct from public service wages)

going to the poor. A similar effect exists in the Administration and
Subcommittee bills but it is more than offset by the new groups who are
eligible for cash assistance." (p. 12)
The Administration and Subcommittee proposals require a relatively
short job search period before eligibles can be placed in public
service jobs. The Ullman and Baker-Bellmon proposals require considerably longer job search periods (16 weeks for the Ullman bill and 90
Considerable variations exist in the
days for the Baker-Bellmon bill).
resources allocated for public service jobs, though all the bills
claim to provide them for all eligibles. The difference in waiting
period influences the number of jobs required and this, in turn,
distinguishes the amount of resources required to provide the necessary
jobs. Given the differences in the definition of eligibles and the
length of the waiting periods, a substantial determinant of overall
program costs can be explained by the job component. Indeed, as Levy
has demonstrated, the differences in the cash and jobs components of
the four bills account for most of the total difference among their
total costs.
A variety of specific rules and regulations which have not been
described in previous sections may also result in significant changes
in program costs. Decisions about the period over which income will
be counted for benefits determination (the accounting period), the
maximum benefit level a family can receive as their family size
increases, the limitation on assets, rules governing disability
determination, the method of indexing benefits for changes in the cost
of living, and a myriad of other program features all influence
aggregate program costs. Often, small changes in these features
can have profound cost implications.
Table 4 presents a breakdown of estimated new (net) federal
program costs for each of the proposals. The interest here has been
to calculate incremental costs or total cost minus the offsets produced
by reductions in other programs. (Levy, 1978) Clearly, these are
only crude estimates. A variety of assumptions were necessary, including the projected state of the national economy and the amounts
states will choose to supplement federal benefit levels.
The Subcommittee proposal has the largest overall program costs
but by no means the highest level of fiscal relief for the states
and localities. The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellmon proposal
are the least costly, but they do not provide the same level of new
fiscal relief to the states. In fact, the Baker-Bellmon proposal
provides fiscal relief consistent with that projected for the
Administration proposal.

TABLE 4
BREAKDOWN OF NEW FEDERAL PROGRAM COSTS FOR
ALTERNATIVE WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS, 1982*
(billions of 1982 dollars)
Administration
Bill
1) New funds in cash
assistance and food $2.68
stamps
2) New funds in public
service jobs & the
WIN program
3) New funds in the
Earned Income
Tax Credit

Ullman

Bill

Bill

5.53

-.55 to
-.95

11.03

11.42

5.07

3.99

2.07

1.06

3.33

3.12

.05

1.18

4) New funds in tax
credits and wage
subsidies for
private sector
job creation
5) New fiscal relief
6) Total 1982 costs

BakerBellmon
Bill

Subcommittee

-

3.36
19.14

2.21
20.22

1.0-1.5
Appr ox.
9.0

-2. 01"*

3.05
9.33

*The data on the Administration and Subcommittee bills can be found
in a cost memo sent from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of CBO, to Rep.
James C. Corman (undated). The data on the Baker-Bellmon bill can
be found in a cost memo sent from Rivlin to Sen. Henry Bellmon
(undated). In particular, the Baker-Bellmon bill costed by CBO did
not include regulations for "recoupment," the process by which welfare recipients repay some or all of their AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits if their annual income is above a set level.
Cost estimates taken from "Summary of the Ullman Welfare Reform Proposal."
document prepared by the House Ways & Means Committee Staff, Feb. 7, 1978.
** This number will be lower (more negative) when benefit recoupment
is taken into account.

Source:

Levy, 1978; Table 1, p. 11.

Several analysts of the Administration proposal have suggested
that extreme caution must be exercised in accepting the cost estimates
(Miles, 1978; Freidman and Hausman, 1977) Both
of the proposal.
the Administration proposal and the Subcommittee proposal require
totally new administrative structures. In particular, the jobs
component requires entirely new machinery for job creation, job
placement, and monitoring and enforcement of the work test. No experience to date provides comparable data necessary to estimate the
national costs of such a large scale undertaking with this kind of
target population.
It is extremely difficult, and perhaps somewhat misleading, to
make judgments looking at these comparative program costs in isolation.
Even assuming that the estimates reflect more or less what actual program
costs will be, the real question remains whether or not twice as much
is achieved by double the expenditures from the Administration and
Subcommittee bills as compared to the Ullman and Baker-Bellmon bills.
The previous sections have stressed the very modest changes that the
incremental bills are likely to have. Because we have more experience with existing programs, it is easier to estimate the relative
impact of these modest changes. The comprehensive bills are quite costly
and are attempting more universal changes. They also attempt major
goals with which we have had far less experience and the impact of which
we can predict with far less certainty. Nevertheless, it appears from
all of the analyses of human waste and suffering, as well as of the
perverse incentives and administrative complexities in the existing
system, that considerable weight is added to the argument that
fundamental change is required.
Though program costs are likely to have a critical impact on
legislative action, it is probably well to remember that they reflect
the actual qualitative distinctions in program goals and potential
outcomes. Whether or not such social goals can dominate the debate
on the relative merits of competing strategies may rest on a variety
of exogenous economic factors such as the state of the economy.
Current analysis of the present political climate indicates that
welfare reform of a comprehensive nature does not occupy a priority
position among the majority of legislators. Though both the Administration and officials at DHEW have taken considerable pride in their
effort to design their legislation in response to the best and most
recent results of empirical research, the political process is unlikely
to commit the amount of resources required for passage.
CAN WELFARE BE REFORMED?
There are two ways to answer the question of whether or not welfare
can be reformed. The first attempts a strictly programmatic analysis
which addresses the program criticisms of the current system. Based
on the analysis of current research findings, it appears quite likely

that with the necessary political and resource commitment many of the
most disturbing features of the current welfare system can probably
be marginally rectified. The Carter plan, though not without its
weaknesses, makes the best legislative attempt to date to address
these problems rationally.
The implicit endorsement of a Carter-like plan is conditioned
in this paper exclusively on the degree to which it maximizes the
goals which have emerged as central to the current political agenda.
No attempt has been made to evaluate the criticisms leveled upon
it by other important interest groups. For example, critics from
the social welfare establishment reject the Carter plan as real reform
based on its punitive treatment of those expected to work during
their eight week job search. In addition, benefit levels below the
poverty line and the insistance on a work test are viewed as distasteful if not unacceptable by those whose assumptions for reform include
values derived from socialist notions of a mature welfare state.
Though the author is aware of these alternative values for
assessing welfare reform approaches, it has not been the goal of this
paper to consider goals other than those which have emerged as central
to the political debate. More extensive analysis of these questions
would, however, be critical to a final endorsement of any major
approaches to poverty reduction.
Nevertheless, a second way to answer the question about whether
Carter's plan constitutes true reform involves a more important
institutional analysis. Though the legislative debates continue
to place undue concern on issues related to work effort, recent
research on low income males has shown their work effort to be
substantial.
(Levy, 1976) The real problems for these workers are
low wages and large families. Other research on the secondary labor
market has indicated that many low income males will never achieve
adequate income because labor market segmentation precludes their
access to employment in those industries where on-the-job training and
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971).
"ladders" for upward mobility are available.
Welfare reform of the universal sort typified by the Carter
plan attempts to respond, through income supplementation, to the
consequences of these market imperfections. It does not, however,
attempt a more fundamental reform of the determinants of low wages
and poverty which go to the very root of the market system. Provision of public service employment responds to an immediate problem
of insufficient jobs. No attempt has been made to alter the incentive
and reward structure in the private market which determines the
structure of wages and the level of employment. Though Administration

spokesmen continue to argue that placement in public service jobs
is only temporary, and that the expectation is that low income
workers will move swiftly from public to private employment, there
are no indications as to how this will occur without more fundamental
changes in the economy.
Welfare reform of a programmatic nature is clearly indicated.
Any advanced industrial economy will have those individuals and
families who cannot provide for themselves. Providing an equitable,
decent, and non-stigmatizing system for income support is incumbent
upon a nation which claims to adhere to principles of the modern
Welfare State. Nevertheless, there has always been an inherent
conflict in the United States between the goals of the Welfare
State and the goals of a capitalist economy. Fear of interfering
with the labor market has always constrained social policy
initiatives. One of the current debates over whether wages paid
for public service employment should be set at the level of the
minimum wage or the prevailing wage focuses on just such conflicts.
Strongly held ideological positions about work and income
support have required all legislation to include politically motivated
components (e.g. the work test). The compromises struck between real
efforts at poverty reduction and politically acceptable reform continue
to be uneasy. Nevertheless, it is unlikely in a period of growing
conservatism and skepticism about any government initiative that a
more radical type of reform than that represented by the Administration's reform proposal is realistic. Based on the comparative
analysis of the current legislative alternatives, it is likely to
achieve a variety of modest but important social reforms.*

*Regrettably at the final editing of this paper, a new and less
ambitious plan has been introduced by the president. Far from
achieving the modest goals of PBJI, it resembles far more closely
the incremental bills reviewed here. Legislative analysts argue
that even this pared down version ($5.7 billion) has little likelihood
of passage in the present political climate.
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economic contradictions and systemic crisis.
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".. denn es ist wahr, dass jeder Arbeiter im
2
Kapitalistischen System ein Gastarbeiter ist."

In May 1979 the French National Assembly passed legislation giving
the government sweeping powers to expel foreign workers. fet neither
the government nor the employers really want to send most of the immigrant workers home, and thereby lose them as a source of cheap labor for
both public and private enterprise.
It is likely that the employers
hope to use the new legislation to keep foreign workers in a state of
permanent insecurity, to discourage them from protesting against their
low pay, poor working conditions and the racism they encounter daily.
Indeed, employers would like to see foreign workers treated as a separate
caL._gory of second-class citizens, without the rights of French citizens.
This attempt to divide the workers is a subtle attempt to confuse French
workers into believing that French society is providing charity to support foreign "intruders"
and that this in turn is the cause of the cur3
rent economic crisis.
This effort contends that the plight of the "guestworker" can be
applied toward clarifyin the political-economic and social contradictions inherent in crises of "late-capitalism."4 The ratioiale for what
follows lies in the argument that the "problems" of foreign workers in
Western Europe do not remain solely relevant to or caught within a particular geographical or conceptual frame. A better understanding of the
"guestworker" can conceivably shed light on inter-linked policies of the
extant system of inequalities within which international labor migrations
obtain.
Background
The social history of industrialization is that of mass movements
from country to town; international labor migration is a special case
within this general pattern. While "migration" is in essence a social

process, international labor migrations are in major part a consequence
5
of unequal economic development.
Labor migration is a form of development aid given
by the poor countries to the rich countries. Traditional colonialism took labor (in the form of
slaves) as well as natural resources from the
countries it dominated. Today, neocolonialism extracts capital from the underdeveloped countries
in various ways, the main one being trade on terms
fixed by the developed countries. The transfer
of human resources in the form of migrant workers
is an important part of this transaction. Migration belongs to neocolonialism's system6 for exploiting the wealth of the Third World.
The conditions faced by the migrant represent a reality that is
often harsh: politically he is disenfranchised; socially he is subjected to the most visible and severe forms of xenophobia and economically he often labors without employment or "survival" security. To
understand the plight of the individual foreign worker, his family and
the sending/receiving nations, is to grasp the migration for employment
phenomenon.

International Labor Migrations
Andre Gorz notes: "There is no country in Western Europe where
international labor is a negligible force, or even a marginal quantity
7
One cannot grasp the
fluctuating within the economic conjuncture.'
fact of the growing importance of the immigrant worker in the wageearning, working population of every country in Western Europe (and beyond) without starting from the position of the immigrant labor force in
the structure of social contradictions and the role given to it by the
historical development of the dominant element in this structure, namely,
capital in its "late phase" of accumulation and internationalization.
Since international labor migrations are essentially a socioeconomic phenomenon (i.e., intake of foreign workers into an economy is
geared to the economic capacity to absorb them), economists generally
Within the "freeexplain migrations by the "law" of supply and demand.
trade" paradigm--believed by classical writers to be the best of all
possible worlds--"international movements of capital and labor were re8
Classical writers did not even
garded as largely-a domestic affair."
develop a theory of international labor migrations. "It is widely asserted," observes Nikolinakos, 9 "that there is no need for a special
theory to explain migrations."
This (supply-demand) concept is allied to the
fundamental ideas of classical and neo-classical
economic theory, according to which economic laws

create a harmonious world in which everything
functions in the best possible manner.u
The "best possible manner" is not, however, the net result of
supply and demand at the international level. Myrdal has shown that
it leads to the polarization of development: a "north," toward which
the factors of production move, developes; while a "south," areas out of
which the factors of production move, continues to decline.1 1 In postWWII experience it is obvious that capital is not attracted by the prospects of low wages and high profits alone. It requires, in Nikolinakos'
terms: "security of nure_(political factors) and guaranteed profits
(monopoly position)."T
Supply
.
demand theory alone leaves unexplained
the fact that some countries were unable to go through the same development process which characterizes labor importers like West Germany,
France and Sweden.
Migration is multi-faceted: (a) it is the movement of a population
within or between countries; (b) it is an individual phenomenon affecting the lives of entire families; (c) it is a class phenomenon involving
the ranking of masses of human beings; (d) it is a structural phenomenon.
The structural importance of alien workers is explained by societal
choices concerning the organization of production (i.e., spatial concentration in areas regarded as most profitable).1
A political-economic
consequence of this type of organization is uneven economic development
between sectors and regions. It derives from the clearly stated logic of
capital and the division of labor it commands according to the imperatives
of profit maximization. 14 Labor concentration at the national and international level is determined by the growth of capital. Neither labor
concentration nor uneven development--to the extent there is a different
dynamic attached to the terms--derives from the distribtuion of natural
resources in the world. The countries of emigration are not by definition
"poor in material riches and rich in human resources." They are so because of relationships of dependence enforced by powerful economic interests. 15
The structural fit of emigration-immigration is not within the manpower needs of the economy alone. Immigrations are not purely conjunctural and not as highly sensitive to economic recession as suspected.
One has but to examine the size of the immigrant labor force in the most
productive sectors and its position in the working population as a whole.
Obviously, the less-developed countries of Southern Europe and Northern
Africa represent a superabundant supply of labor--the principal source
of the "reserve army" of labor for the "north." The "north" needs the
"reserve army" because agricultural populations, for example, in West
Germany (7.5%), no longer form an important source of labor. Old people,
women and children also lose some of their significance as reserve.
School leaving age rises, women remain used for cheap child care and
housekeeping and in theory, old people are more certain of recovering
some type of pension. 16

Since the process of replacing labor by capital is expensive in
the short run, and therefore limited, and since a certain percentage
of semiskilled and unskilled workers is also necessary in hi hly
automated firms and other branches of the economy, the import of foreign
workers promises to remain a lasting phenomenon. Actually, one may
pause to appreciate the "genius" of a process which creates a virtually
inexhaustible pool of reserve labor at a physically safe distance from
the industrial cities, across national boundaries.
In 1978 the slums of industrial cities were missing in Sweden and
West Germany. The housing conditions of the best skilled and educated
migrants seemed almost adequate. On the surface, at least, there appeared little crime, little unrest among workers, little unemployment.
Antony Ward, however, describes a discovery which, although not surprising, is disenchanting.
To find the slums of West Berlin, DUsseldorf (Gothenberg,
Malm6), one must travel south to the impoverished towns
and villages of the Algarve, of Andalusia, Calabria and
Anatalia. Here is the home of West Germany and Sweden's
"reserve army," in conditions of poverty as bad as those
in our traditional Harlems. And the people there, while
they may receive some income from their direct or indirect involvement in the industries of the north, enjoy
almost none
of the indirect benefits of industrial capi17
talism.
Well into the 1960's it was taken for granted that the massive outflow of workers from the developing countries was beneficial for everyone. The flexible response of foreign labor to changing demand conditions was regarded as ideal for immigration countries. Emigration was
1 8
felt to provide unemployment relief and much needed foreign currency.
The 1967 recession cast costs against the benefits for labor senders
and receivers. Importers like W. Germany and Sweden became aware of
the structural significance and implications of immigration, i.e., the
infrastructural and cultural costs to be met. Doubts were raised with
regard to the relief of unemployment and the purely beneficial nature
of remittances. The policy problem for countries like France became
centered around (a) how to fill extant labor market gaps so that both
micro and macro-economic profitability remained assured without (b) detriment to a strained social situation; and, (c)without infringing basic
human rights (the "guestworker" issue was beginning to draw notice in
the international press).
Mobility and "Dirt"
Ulrich Freiherr von Ginanth, chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Labor of the Employers Association (FRG), observes: "The great value
of the employment of foreigners lies in the fact that we have at our
disposal a mobile labor potential. It would be dangerous to limit this
mobility through a large scale assimilation policy." 1 9

There can be little doubt that the "guests" of industrial society
are afraid to organize. In a sense, the migrant knows he won't be employed long enough to enjoy long-range victories, pension and health
plans. "If every German in the Federal Republic believes that the migrant worker can be expelled whenever it suits the German convenience,
20
National labor laws provide for anything
so too does every migrant."
but the feeling of security. While paragraph 120 of the West German
Labor Code gives the migrant the right to social benefits enjoyed by
Germans, paragraph 10 of the same code provides that the worker may be
expelled
for lack of self-support (and therefore ineligible for benefits). 2 1
An effect of this mass of unskilled migratory labor has been the
acceleration of the seemingly universal tendency of capitalism to divide
22
"Skilled jobs
labor into every simpler and mind-separate operations.
are divided into simple components which can readily be taught to workers
who have never before stood at the production line. Thus, the sattern
' 3
of demand changes towards the skills available or their lack. "2 This
economic division tends to be reflected in social divisions between the
migrant workers and the native working class.
Castles and Kosack describe the split of the "working class" into
two, highly differentiated segments: the nationals who speak the language and enjoy whatever measure of civil rights and social welfare the
society provides. They are well organized into unions which enjoy a
degree of political power and they work in jobs which require some
minimum skill or training, or which are comparatively clean and involve
little physical strain. In contrast, the migrants do the jobs which are
dirty, dangerous and which require physical strength and less skill and
training.24
It is relatively simple to dwell on migrant workers and dirty jobs.
A great amount of heart-wrenching writing has been published about it;
yet, for the most part, it fails to explain why migrants accept what the
indigenous working class will not. Are migrants naturally submissive?
Is it because of their extreme need?
Castells finds the key to answering these basic questions in the
fact that it is possible to treat the migrant workers as individual wageearners whereas the relationship if the indigenous working class with
capital (in labor importers like Sweden nd W. Germany) is established
collectively through the labor movement.5
. . . the utility of imigrant labor to capital
derives primarily from the fact that it can act
toward it as though the labor movement did not
exist, . . .26
One has but to turn to the legal-political status of the foreigners and
their consequent political-ideological isolation to understand the inferiority of their position vis a vis capital i.e., their limited

27

capacity for organization and very great vulnerability to repression.
As well, dirty jobs are not surrendered by the working classes in Sweden
or FRG because they are "dirty" but because they are less well paid and
less well attached to benefit packages. When dirty work is well paid,
nationals do it. "Immigrant workers do not exist because there are
arduous and badly paid jobs to be done, but rather, arduous and badly
because immigrant workers are present or can be sent for
paid jobs exist
'2 8
to do them.
Capital can't do without "arduous jobs" or the migrant to do them
and that is why the migratory mechanism is "designed" to achieve not just
the balance between the supply and demand of labor but the perpetuation
of the dependency relationship between capital and labor--the center and
the periphery. As Nikolinakos observes, it is the internationalization
of labor through the expansion of migration which reflects the inherent
thrust of capital towards securing this relationship. 29 The ingenious
part of this--from the point of view of capital--is that the migrant
worker is pitted not against capital in the struggle to get social security, for example, but against the national and international state
apparatus of capital in order to meet its demands. Of consequence, the
problem is seen as a welfare state policy issue and not as systemic in
nature.
The poverty of the "south" and the insecurity of the worker must be
seen not as a geographic accident or historical artifact, but as the
continuing effect of an international "system" which simply defines national borders as anachronistic. The economic forces which now produce
comforts in Stockholm and Stuttgart are simultaneously sustaining the
historical poverty of Cordoba and Messina. Always in motion, the migration mechanism draws more and more underdeveloping countries into the
system. Antony Ward describes the system as three tiers deep. Black
Africans migrate to the Mediterranean countries so that '30
Mediterranean
workers can be set free for exploitation in the "north.,
One can conclude that international labor migrations are a major
force towards the perpetuation of international imbalance--and they appear part of a self-feeding system. Second, international labor migrations are supported by an international, institutionalized system of
discrimination anchored in legislation regarding foreigners and in interstate agreements. The psychosocial and survival problems of the aging
migrant, for example, can only be understood within the framework of
political economic analysis and this system of institutionally "necessary" discrimination.
The fate of individuals is determined by the laws of accumulation.
(Those "laws" obviously obtain for internal as well as international migrations). To the extent the migratory mechanism is to be humanized it
is only in so far as it will enable capital to ward off political-social
unrest that would appear to endanger the system. "Progress then, may
seem to be made in one or another detail: shorter waiting time for

unemployment benefits; easier access to family aid. Such small steps may
encourage the careless observer to believe that there is definite movement
toward the ultimate goal of equality for migrants. But the situation is
fundamentally bound by powerful interests (priorities and values) which
will prevent the realization of either extreme--full assimilation or full
excl usi on.,"31
Note on the "Equality" Solution
Equality is the overt policy response of nations to the systemic
and systematic discriminations practiced upon migrant workers.
"The language in which it is applauded by the powers
of this world sometimes leave it uncertain which
would horrify them most, the32 denial of the principle
or the attempt to apply it
Equality of opportunity is, of course, a classic capitalist concept.
rhe essential inquiry revolves around what is being equalized. Equal
opportunity can be toward equal oppression; equal treatment can be toward
equal manipulation and regulation; equal rewards can be toward equal
material hardship; equal social participation can be toward powerlessness.
International labor migrations demonstrate clearly that capitalism requires international inequalities as a precondition for its existence.
The intent of equality objectives of migrant worker legislation is
simply a more random distribution of inequalities for nationals and nonnationals. The message is consistent: if you start from a position of
inequality--among nations and between "foreign" and indigenous labor--you
end up with continued inequality. Equality retains its throne on the
condition that it refrains from meddling
with the profitable business of
the factory and the market place. 3 3
Crisis and Guestworkers
In a certain sense, the "equality" solution to the "problems" of
international labor migrations is symptomatic of the crisis which foreign
workers illuminate. According to Habermas, "crises arise when the
structure of a social system allows for fewer possibilities for problem
34
solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system."
We are experiencing a structural crisis in the allocation of raw
materials and labor power within a world market. This is the source
of international labor migrations and it is the migrant worker--who
experiences the imigration dilemma as critical for his continued existence, and simultaneously threatens his own social identity--in a title
role of crisis. Unequal allocation of raw materials and labor power-socially structured and sanctioned inequalities--have evolved as a key
balance mechanism of the historical conditions, social hierarchy, scale
of values, of first world nations. The "equality solution" merely controls any imbalance threat'from the third and fourth worlds.

Most "developed" countries have concerned themselves with justifying
and explaining national and international inequalities in such a way that
the majority of the population (those who by definition are not privileged) accept it as morally right. They have busied themselves with legitimating inequalities. The ideology of equality of treatment (whether
for migrants or not) attempts to cope with an extant social condition
(internationalization of capital and the need for cheap labor) with
justifications derived from the status quo and it shields extant society
against its own alternatives in the sense
it denies the historical lim35
itedness of any given social condition.
The argument is that international labor migrations are not a conjunctural phenomenon linked to supply-demand manpower needs of expanding
economies but a structural tendency of "late capitalism." This structural
tendency is explained, in part, by uneven development but primarily by
the internal dynamic of late capitalism. Uneven development explains only
why people emigrate; it does not explain why nations like France and West
Germany provide jobs for migrant workers even in conditions of unemployment. Neither does it explain why the dominant classes of labor importing nations introduce a social and political element (migrants) whose
presence contradicts their ideology and necessitates more complex mechanisms of social contol. ". . . the extent of immigration and the strategic role of immigration in the European economy has to be explained,
not in terms of the technical demands of production, but by the specific
interests of capital in a particular phase of its development." 3 6
The central role of the migrant worker is to regulate economic
crises--crises endemic to late capitalism. Capital needs the regularization of immigration but sees to it that the meeting of real needs is
totally inadequate and fragmented. "It is a policy of control (manipulative compassion) and minor modifications concerning immigration, sometimes paternalistic in the economic sphere, always repressive (dissuasive) in the political sphere." 3 7 Immigrants cannot succeed in imposing
a demand of equal rights for that would mean they could no longer play
the role they are assigned by the needs of late capital's low-wage, workintensive, "reserve army." Migrant workers confront foreign systems with
claims and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible with the
extant system's goals. This is a fundamental contradiction.
The essence of this fundamental contradiction is consistent with
Habermas' "crisis:" international labor migrations pose more problems
than the national systems can solve without surrendering elements that
up to that point belonged to their "structural continuity." Solving the
migrant worker problem requires at least momentary and partial surrender
of state nationalism in the granting of rights toward social and economic
security. Nations like France and West Germany have agreed to at least
a portion of these external demands--in the short run--in order to cope
with system maintenance problems. "Equality" is offered to the migrant
as a mechanism to prevent an interruption of the process of accumulation-an interruption which would take the form of capital destruction.

Historically, the state assumed and remains the compensator for the
dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process--especially for
those consequences which elicited politically effective reactions. Thus
the state evolved through various stages of compensatory intervention:
granting trade union rights, marginal improvements in wages, working
conditions, health, education and social security. The state replaces
the market to relieve the social and material costs which result from
private production.
For the migrant within this system, the progressive satisfaction of
his needs by the technological mechanism of production and enormous pos..
sibilities of consumption increase his consent to incorporation in this
way of life. "Everyday life" experiences of the migrant reinforce and
internalize the seemingly immutable nature of late capitalist social
order. What confronts the guestworker is not simply a deception but a
specific and socially determined reflection of a mystified reality. The
"reality" says all the fundamental relations between men in the production
process of their material life can be no different. 38
iet, the continuous growth of per capita income which has heretofore
legitimated persisting material (and international) inequalities and has
bought the migrant, albeit at low, work-intensive wages, appears no longer
possible because the limits to growth have become visible. The multiple
economic crises of the seventies are intensifying middle-class resistance
to both the presence and equitable treatment of "guest workers." The
system of international labor migrations faces a "legitimation vacuum"-providing symbols of participation and an illusory equality are not
enough.
If the foreign worker is forced to define his situation in termns of
his power to shape the conditions in which he lives and to change those
conditions according to his needs for "self-actualization," he is bound
to recognize that power is absent. And if migrants define their situation
in terms of their power as social individuals over their collective social
existence they see that capitalist
democracy--which offers eqAlity of
39
treatment--is devoid of content.
The establishment of a "social policy" which attempts to lelitimate
inequalities or to make-up quantitatively what is lost qualita~i\V o
toward counter-effectiveness. "It is not that the pressures A# wnt haYe
nt
A
been eliminated--far from it--but rather that these have been UPPI
i y
and
t
pros'
more
providing
by
touched
be
cannot
by a discontent which
jobs because these are the very things that produced this dis"'141
ifl
the first place." 40 Essentially, the international state--in
1't
the national state--cannot provide stronger legitimations for
worker's lack of autonomy and security as long as it leaves iV' W' { '
capital infrastructure and its priorities: the "generators o" '
ities."
The market system breaks down. Its collapse is in its i!"'
put together human beings, capital and land in order to produ
factory level of output for' the world. At the international

,"

real issue may be how long the "international state" and the national
state can remain compatible with the needs and purposes of capital.
That question is buried deep beneath the celebration
of Western democracy, the free world, the welfare state,
the affluent society, the end of ideology and pluralistic equilibrium. To have posed it even a few4 1years
ago would have appeared ludicrous or perverse.
The response is demographic, social, political and psychological. The
response to crisis is a "multiplicity of cooperating remedies."
Nothing
short of everything is really enough. 42 Implied is the move beyond the
social system which no longer offers possibilities of problem solving.
New choices based on different values must be confronted.
We can make different social choices concerning the allocation of
natural resources, the social division of labor and the distribution of
rights for a world commonwealth. 4 3 The crises tell us it is time to
choose again, that we are not caught in the immutable downflow of events
over which we have no control. The basis for our new choices requires,
however, the right political motivation.
And the basis for that political motivation should be
that not only do we share a common origin, but, inescapably, we share the same destiny. It is a destiny
that the human race is now capable of choosing. 44
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TOWARD A FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

Alvin Kogut, Center for Social Policy and Social
Services, Adelphi University School of Social Work
Sylvia Aron, Executive Secretary, Long Island
Coalition for Full Employment
ABSTRACT
Unlike more advanced welfare states, the U.S. has not
committed itself to a full employment policy: the full
dimensions of unemployment are not revealed and the
"manpower" programs reflect a welfare philosophy. While
constraints to such a commitment remain formidable, the
developments around Humphrey-Hawkins may be a start.

Unemployment-Same Dimensions of the Problem
In order to be counted as unemployed by the present
system of collecting data, which utilizes the monthly

Current Population Survey, one has to be not working and
must have actively searched for work during the previous
four weeks. The interviewees are not asked directly
whether or not they are unemployed. Discouraged workers,
the under-employed, minorities, women, youtn and older
workers who might want to work, and perhaps would be jobholders or job-seekers in another economic climate, are
ordinarily not reflected in the figures. (1)
Data collected in the survey is extrapolated as a
percentage of the total labor force and is given as the
unemployment rate. Current usage of the term "full employment" is an arbitrary number: it is the amount of unemployment considered reasonable and acceptable by the Council
of Economic Advisors and others, and varies over time.
In 1945, it was figured at 3%, in 1955 it went to 4%, and
now it is thought of as anywhere between 5 and 5 %. (2)

Many economists consider the unemployment figures as
unreliable and implausible, and challenge the prevailing
method of counting the unemployed. Some claim further
that it is not just a question of statistical innacuracy,
but that particular economic and social philosophies are
involved in the choice of methodology. (3)
Inclusion of the groups mentioned above would significantly alter the official 5.7% rate given for June, 1978
(down from 8.5% in 1975). The numbers involved would at
a minimum triple from roughly 5 million to 15 million or
more. The unemployment rate for blacks generally runs
about twice that of whites and the rate for minority
youth is probably somewhere between 5 to 8 times as high.
Including the marginal groups would not only alter the
overall rate but would highlight the disparities within
the potential labor force.
The sweeping negative impact of prolonged unemployment

is generally acknowledged. From an economic perspective
there is lost production, a reduction of purchasing power,
a drag on the economy, a downward pressure on wages,
budget deficits along with a clamor to reduce services
and public subsidies at the very time they are most sorely
needed. For individuals and families it can mean feelings
of failure, worthlessness and discouragement; it also
means loss of skills, unstable families and a greater
dependence on public assistance. Recently, correlations
have been made between unemployment and mental illness,
suicide and coronaries. Divisions and tensions grow as
competition for scarce resources increase. Clearly we are
dealing with something very basic in regard to the human
condition. (4)
Full Employment Deferred: Focus on the Disadvantaged
With the memory of the mass unemployment of the great
depression in mind, liberal Senators introduced a full
employment bill even before World War II had ended.
The contrast between the full employment of the war years
and the bread lines of the depression was too glaring to
ignore. The original bill stated that "all Americans able
to work and seeking work have the right to useful,

remunerative, regular and full-time employment, and it is
the policy of the United States to assure the existence
at all times of sufficient employment opportunities..."
Mechanisms for implementation were built into the bill.
After a year of debate opponents of the bill forced
important revisions. The Employment Act finally legislated
in 1946 was relatively toothless. The words "full employment" were eliminated and a vague statement of intent was
substituted. The President is required to submit an
annual report to Congress assessing developments in the
field. (The "Manpower Report of the President" became
"The Employment and Training Report of the President" in
1976.) Any resulting positive action stems more from the
political and economic views of the President and the
Congress than from any national goal or commitment mandated
by the legislation. (5)
The relatively lively economic activity following
World War II dispersed the coalition that had been pressing
for full employment legislation and led to what Garth
Mangum referred to as the "1946-1961 recess in employment
and manpower policy in the U.S." While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to examine any programs in detail,
we will list the major ones for the purpose of identifying
basic trends and goals. (6)
Despite recessions and surges of unemployment, it was
not until 1961 with the passage of the Area Redevelopment
Act providing small sums to depressed areas that any
intervention targeted on the unemployed began. This was
quickly followed by the Manpower and Training Act of 1962
to retrain mature, experienced family heads. The Vocational
Training Act of 1963 focused on youth,while the more
familiar Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (War on Poverty)
offered a number of programs; Urban Corps, Job Corps,
Work Experience and Training. (Operation Mainstream and
New Careers were added later.) The Work Incentive Program,
begun in 1967, was designed to equip AFDC mothers with
marketable skills and help them move into the labor
force. (7)

Thus far it is clear that the goals of the manpower
legislation were to make the unemployed more employable
through education, re-education, training, rehabilitation,
etc. The focus was on the supply side of the equation.
It was only with the economic downturn of 1970-1971
with its rising unemployment that attention began to be
directed toward what is euphemistically called the
"cyclical problem."
A minor effort to increase the supply
of jobs was initiated by the Emergency Employment Act of
1971 which allocated funds for the creation of state and
This counter-cyclical measure was to end in
local jobs.
two years. Target groups were specified.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
signed into law in 1973 was designed to provide "job
training and employment opportunities for economically
disadvantaged, unemployed and under-employed persons to
enable them to secure self-sustaining, unsubsidized
It reflected dissatisfaction with the fragemployment."
mentation, categorization and centralization of the
previous programs and began to serve as the umbrella for
employment and training legislation. The Job Corps became
Title IV of CETA. As unemployment continued to rise,
Congress passed The Emergency Jobs and Unemployment
Assistance Act of 1974 "which added a temporary one billion
annually for public service employment under a new Title VI
of CETA." (8)
Still another response to the recession of 1975 when
unemployment reached a high of over 9% was the Public Works
Employment Act passed in 1976 over President Ford's veto.
This act made two billion available for construction grants
under the auspices of the Department of Commerce. Further
revisions and additions included a large increase in the
public employment sector and the Youth Employment and
Demonstration Projects Act of 1977.

Critique of U.S. Policy
The late E. Wight Bakke's critical observations of
manpower policy made in 1969 directs attention to what is
still the pivotal issue. Bakke did not quarrel the concept
of providing services to the disadvantaged: he saw this as
a positive social welfare step. However, he vigorously
challenged the limited mission and focus which he feared
would remain the norm. He questioned the premises that
dominated policy, namely that manpower programs should be
"primarily concerned with the supply of labor and its
placement," and secondly, that it be "concerned predominantly with the development of the most disadvantaged and
poverty-stricken portion of that supply."
"The overall function of manpower policy and practice
in the total effort to provide a stable and increasingly
productive economic foundation for national strength and
development, as well as for the economic well-being of the
American people, has all but lost sight of in the concentration on projects labeled Ymanpower" designed to relieve
poverty and hopefully to reduce the chances of riots in
the urban ghettos." But "unless the programs designed to
relieve poverty are recognized as only part of the manpower
function... the manpower function of government will remain
what it is actually becoming, a sophisticated form of
public assistance." (9)
Manpower policy, narrowly defined, does not create jobs.
It may help train and rehabilitate while what is required
are policies and programs that create demand as well as
supply and match the two. For significant impact, it must
be integrated into a total national effort for economic
growth and stability. Without such an effort it is
extremely unlikely that the least employable cai be helped
since the economy will remain one in which a relatively
high unemployment rate is acceptable, and which is
recession prone. The change in terminology from "manpower"
to "employment" by official agencies is to be welcomed:
it not only reflects the large percentage of women in the
labor force, but is also more correctly describes the
goals and boundaries of the field. (10)

The above comments can be illustrated by comparing the
missions of policy in Europe to those of the U.S. While
the effort in Europe is directed toward stabilizing and
expanding employment through economic growth and balance
utilizing a range of interventive techniques, the main
objective in the U.S. has been to deal remedially with
unemployment to provide client services to marginal wgrkers
to increase their employability. One attempts to prevent
unemployment and the other to deal with the consequencesT
one is centered on institutions and the other is clientcentered. The broader policy views all workers both
employed and unemployed as the target population, while
the narrower and residual concentrates on the disadvantaged
among the unemployed. (Cross-national comparison of unemployment rates present thorny problems because of different
methods of collecting data and the great differences in
resources, geography, level of technology, etc. However,
average unemployment rates have generally been regarded
as higher in the U.S. than in Western Europe). (11)
The differences in trends and direction between Europe
and the U.S. became visible in the 1950's and continued to
develop. The divergence noted above must be modified only
slightly as the U.S. began to utilize public employment,
as a counter-cyclical device in the 1970's, but only on a
temporary basis and with strict conditions of eligibility.
(12)
Political and Theoretical Constraints
A commitment to full employment brings in its wake an
acceptance of economic planning. Or to put it another way,
a full employment policy is one facet of democratic
planning for a productive, balanced economy. Planning for
a stable, growing economy means unity of action for
specified goals. Of necessity this would require the
various interventive mechanisms - monetary (budget, expenditures, taxes), fiscal (interest rates, bank reserves,
open market operations), loans, stimuli to investment and
productivity, public employment, control of inflation,
public ownership, etc. - to be harmonized and directed
toward specified economic goals.

Obviously there is still formidable opposition to
governmental peace-time planning in the U.S. and to any
trend that appears to be a further departure from laissezfaire. Planning for full employment in particular is
enmeshed in what appears to be an esoteric economic debate
wherein there is a supposed trade-off between employment
and inflation. Ideological differences and the prevailing
political ambivalence is reflected not only in inaction
and in fragmentary programs, but also in contradictory
policies, tight money to slow growth (and perhaps induce
recession) on the one hand, versus attempts to increase
employment through public jobs on the other.
Deep political, philosophical and class differences are
reflected in the debate on unemployment. Conservative and
main-stream economists, Carter appointees, as well as
Ford appointees, define inflation as the major enemy and
claim there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment so that any attempt to cure the latter will increase
the former.
Leon Keyserling, former Chairman of The Council of
Economic Advisors in the Hearings Before The Joint Economic
Committee, argued that in addition to the failure to plan,
we have done badly because "stagnations and recessions
have been repeatedly contrived, responsive to the "tradeoff" theory that higher employment and greater resources
use bring more inflation and that higher unemployment and
more deficient resource use bring less inflation. Even
today, an adequate program of economic restoration is
being estopped by this false theory." Not only was this
viewed as immoral because it allowed many families to
suffer distrews and humiliation while allowing the comfortable to buy more, but the "empirical evidence for more
than twenty years is that a healthy economy generates far
less price inflation than a sick economy." (14)
The "trade-off" theory is clearly in the tradition of
the "dismal science." When tenaciously held it means that
there is nothing society can do to alter the "natural"
order. In fact, as Malthus and Ricardo pointed out in
their time, failure to accept the inevitable and struggling
against nature in fact worsens the condition of the
suffering. The assumptions regarding the sanctity of

market are difficult to give up despite shifting contexts.
One might point to the quadrupling of oil prices, the
unfavorable trade balance, the growth of multi-nationals,
price-setting by monopolies, the world shortage of agricultural products, declining industries, etc., as impacting
prices, but to little avail. ('15)
The Movement and The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill *
The current movement for full employment gathered
momentum as a response to the 1974-75 recession with its
sharp increase in unemployment. Leadership on a national
scale has been provided by the National Committee For
Full Employment (an educational organization) and the
Full Employment Action Council (an action group seeking
passage of the legislation). Co.chairpersons of both
organizations are Mrs. Martin Luther King and Murray Finley,
President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. The first
annual conference, held in 1975, brought together over
500 individuals representing 150 national organizations.
The breadth of the movement is reminiscent of the
coalition that supported FDR and the New Deal. Mrs. King
remarked at the first conference that "perhaps the most
encouraging aspect of the conference today is the impressive
span of groups and organizations... It is not often that
organized labor, black and minority organizations and
political figures and representatives from the church,
business, liberal and academic communities, as well as
political figures from both parties find themselves joined
together in a single room confronting a single issue." (16)
While labor continued to play a strong role on this
issue as it has in the past, an added dimension to the
movement is the important voice of the Congressional Black
Caucus. Congressman Hawkins told the 1975 conference that
"the experience of my own Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities taught us that in fighting for equal employment
opportunities for women and minorities we could not win
without full employment." (17)
* The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was signed into law by President

Carter on October 27, 1978.

A full range of activist programs from lobbying at the
national level to grass-roots organizing and education has
been under way. It is estimated that from September 4
to September 10 in 1977, a week designated as Full Employment Week by the national organizations, over one million
people in 300 cities and towns were actively involved.
A steady stream of educational and organizational material
flows out of national headquarters.
Just as the broad coalition for full employment is a
reminder of progressive coalitions of decades ago, so the
obstacle course facing proposed legislation appears to be
similar to that fared by the 1946 Full Employment Bill.
The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (which at
this writing has been passed by the House and is awaiting
action by the Senate) would amend the 1946 Full Employment
Act by mandating more specific commitments and by installing
more highly structured planning mechanisms. The bill
establishes as national policy the right of all Americans
to full opportunities for useful employment. A major goal
set forth in the legislation is the achievement of a 3%
unemployment rate for those age 20 and older and a 4% rate
for those over 16 within five years of the passage of the
act.
The President would be required to recommend numerical
goals for employment and unemployment, as well as goals
for production, productivity and real income, in his annual
economic report. He would also be required to specify the
programs and policies necessary to reach these goals.
The Congress, Budget Committees and the Federal Reserve
Board would participate in the planning process to help
assure an integrated and coordinated plan.
While the importance of the private sector is conceded,
the bill lists a variety of options such as public works,
public service employment, counter-cyclical measures and
special programs targeted on youth. Last resort public
jobs could be made available by the President. While the
stress is on "full employment," the bill acknowledges the
danger of inflation and includes a number of anti-inflation
provisions that are viewed as consistent with the attempt
to achieve full employment as defined in the bill. (18)

The bill, so briefly summarized above, represents a
compromise reached after weeks of difficult negotiations
between the bill's sponsors and the Carter Administration.
A White House summary pointed up the bill's commitments to
The original contained
"reasonable price stability."
stronger language in regard to the right to a job, less
administrative discretion, short-range target dates and
less emphasis on inflation. The principle that full
employment policy be accorded an absolute priority had been
watered down. Critics of the bill in its present form
argue that it need not add a single job.
On the other hand, its supporters see it as an essential
first step. They point out that "the legislation would
hold Congress and the President accountable for the first
time, for the achievement of specific, understandable,
numerical economic goals "and that full employment would
The strategy
still be designated as a national priority."
therefore is to prevent further weakening of the bill by
legislative amendment. George Meany perhaps summed up
the situation by expressing support for the bill but
warning that follow-up action is needed to "translate the
promise of this bill into reality." (19)
Social Work and Full Employment
An examination of the statements, literature and
activities of the social work profession indicates, with
some exceptions, a minimal involvement in the campaign for
a full employment policy. A notable exception was the
publication of Manpower and Employment: A Source Book for
Social Workers by the Council on Social work Education
under the editorship of Margaret Purvine in 1972.
Purvine commented then that although manpower and
employment had become increasingly the subject of public
social policy, they have "received little attention from
social work in recent decades. The profession's concern
with the subject has been primarily confined to the need
Yet "both the
for manpower within the profession itself."
individual and the social effects of work or the lack of
work fall clearly within the purview of social work." (20)

Despite this seemingly definitive statement there is
some ambivalence. Noting the criticism directed toward
the overwhelming emphasis on the "supply" side, the editor
states that this is understandable since "to effect broad
changes in the demand for labor requires knowledge and
agreement about the effects of macro-economic forces, as
well as a structure for comprehensive planning and a
commitment to its use, a combination which raises
political issues beyond the scope of this volume." (21)
1his view assumes a body of precise technical knowledge
which social workers perhaps cannot master and a political
and economic consensus which will probably never exist...
not in the foreseeable future anyway. History suggests
that priorities, goals and political biases are decisive,
that the most expert can in fact only help maximize
performance toward the desired social objectives.
The role of social work is viewed from a service
delivery perspective. Manpower programs open up vast new
arenas for service delivery. The profession can bring
to bear its skills in new settings and develop new
relationships between service systems. The thorny policy
issue is at best a very poor second (although it may be
decisive in shaping the services).
The 1977 Delegate Assembly of the NASW, meeting at a
time when unemployment had just reached its highest point
since the depression and when allies were attempting to
build the broadest possible coalition behind the
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, passed resolutions on thirteen
public policy issues. The employment issue was not among
them. (22)
As the political process continues, there can be no
doubt that social work, not only concerned about "picking
up the pieces" but also in seeing to it that there are
fewer pieces to pick up, will become more heavily
involved. Indeed, we have a special contribution to
make. (23)

Discussion
Just as the events of the 1930's forced the abandonment
of the prevailing mode of thought and ushered in new
interventive efforts and new economic concepts, so the
current era will of necessity have to do the same; and
just ae the U.S. was least prepared to combat the
recession because of the absence of any social income,
so it is least prepared to deal with full employment
because of the absence of serious employment policy and
planning.
The possibility of the Full Employment and Growth Act
of 1978 remaining lifeless and going the route of its
predecessor, the Full Employment Act of 1946, is a strong
one. The full employment coalition and its allies face
a most difficult task in pressing for the implementation
of Humphrey-Hawkins. Political opposition at this time is
shared up by a conservative ideology that accepts the
concept of an employment-inflation trade-off. There is a
willingness to accept recession inducing policies in the
illusion that therein lies a cure to inflation. The
emphasis on tight money through the raising of interest
rates and increasing bank reserves is likely to continue
for some time despite its ineffectiveness and the persistence of stagflation. This slow growth, or no growth,
outlook prevents any intervention for significant job
creation on the part of government. New initiatives will
more likely than not remain sophisticated modes of public
assistance.
Failure to act will increase the disproportionate
burden carried by the poor for the malfunctions of the
economic order. It will tend to foreclose significant
reforms in other areas and make future interventions more
and more difficult. An economy based on scarcity rather
than growth will inevitably mean cuts in social spending.
Larger and larger numbers of people will become disillusioned and become more amenable to the message of the
proponents of growth and full employment. Hopefully we
can speed up the process.
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ABSTRACT
This paper employs an analytic framework based on organizational
incentives to explain the failure of recent welfare reform efforts.
The data consists of observations, interviews, and routine inhouse reports collected on a federally funded program, Project
STAR. The project was developed with the aim of mobilizing
lower-class and minority families of the mentally retarded in
support of reform of mental retardation services in five cities
in the U.S. A service-inducement strategy was pursued by the
reform organization to overcome the difficulties of enticing
lower-class families of the retarded to participate in organizational activities. This strategy appears to have had several
unintended consequences on the reform project. The concern with
identifying and providing social services became a major preoccupation of the reformers.
To the extent to which parents did
participate because of the receipt of welfare benefits, this
diminished the reform organization's autonomy relative to the
existing welfare network. A further impact of this serviceinducement strategy was political demoralization of the parents
of the retarded. The "service" focus appears to have attracted
parents the least predisposed towards community change. Once
involved in the organization, the impact of organizational activities was of reinforcement of this predisposition. Analysts of
welfare reform organizations need to pay greater attention to
the cooptative impact of welfare benefits. The data suggests
the failure of community mobilization can be explained by the
organizational incentives used.
The problem reform organizations
face is in finding the proper mix of purposive, material and
solidary inducements which both recruit and retain participants,
at the same time allowing the pursuit of mobilization goals.

INTRODUCTION
An underlying thrust of social policy in the United States

has been to ensure access to the policy-making process of social
groups in society. In the case of unorganized social forces, the
poor and minorities, the role of government has been to politically
mobilize the communities in which they live.
(Greenstone and Peterson, 1973). Community organization as a public policy has assumed
that professional reform organizations can mobilize unorganized
social forces into voluntary associations for social action.
With few exceptions, however, efforts at community mobilization
of the lower-class have met with little success.
(Clark and
Hopkins, 1968, Rose, 1970, Helfgot, 1974).
This paper examines
the internal dynamics of a national effort to mobilize lowerclass families of the mentally retarded.
It is argued that the
mobilization strategy of the government-sponsored reform organization provides an explanation for the failure at community organization. The organizational incentives offered to promote community
participation among the poor lead to de-politicalization and
demoralization. Rather than promoting participation in the institutions of society, government-sponsored mobilization efforts may
well foster dependency and social fragmentation. The organization
to be analyzed is Project STAR. The organization was developed
with the aim of mobilizing lower-class and minority families of
the mentally retarded. The group, once organized, was expected
to provide a setting for social reform of the social welfare
service sector.
METHODOLOGY
The study utilizes three methodological strategies: observation,
historical records and lengthy personal interviews. The multiple
approach adopted in this study was taken, in part, because no
single source of data could provide all of the information considered
necessary for a vivid analysis of the problem under consideration.
(Bouchard, 1976)
For a number of years the author was Research Director of
Project STAR. This position provided a particularly strategic
position to observe the origin and implementation of this major
welfare reform effort. In the role of Research Director the author
had complete access to the files and records associated with the
development and operation of the project. The position also offered
the opportunity to meet and establish friendly relationships with
professionals and community representatives in the five cities in
which STAR functioned.

SOCIAL POLICY AND MASS SOCIETY
The movement towards the extension of social welfare in the
United States has been continuous but slow. With these changes,
explanations for the expansion of social welfare have increasingly
been of concern for social scientists. Arguments about the causes
of the expansion of welfare are varied as well as ideological.
In a seminal work Gronbjerg (1977) identifies a number of reasons
for the growth and transformation of social welfare. In one sense,
the expansion of social welfare is a direct response to poverty.
In this "stratification" approach, welfare has developed as a way
of helping the unfortunate in our society. Social welfare problems
have increased as the public became aware of and concerned with
the presence of poor people in our society. Social welfare is a
way of responding to poverty and economic dependency.
The welfare expansion can also be viewed from the larger perspective of sociological theories about mass society. The expansion
of social welfare is a further step in the extension of "citizenship"
The expansion of welfare programs extends the concept of citizenship to include not only political participation, but "economic"
citizenship as well. The definition of social welfare has been
enlarged so as to encompass conditions other than just stark
deprivation. The extension of social welfare becomes part of a
larger process of modernity rather than a reflection of the
objective needs of the population.
This drift toward encouraging participation by heretofore
excluded segments of the population has been developed by Shils
(1975) in his discussion of "mass society". According to Shils
there is a trend toward the inclusion of sub-groups of the population into the central value system and the cultural symbols of
society. This has occurred primarily through the expansion of
education, social welfare, and mass communications. Public education, radio, television and social welfare have made possible a
closer tie between the central institutions of society, and widely
diffused social groups. Citizenship within this perspective,
includes access of the various groups in society to the political
processes by which social policy is developed.
Historically public policy and the public interest
have been
defined in terms of the organized interests in society. Theodore
Lowi (1969)suggests in his inquiry into public philosophy,

Organized interests pretty much fill up and
adequately represent most of the sectors of
our lives, so that one organized group can
be found effectively answering and checking
some other organized group as it seeks to
prosecute its claims against society... it
is assumed that "counter-veiling" power
usually crops up somehow.
The "process" of policy formulation is elevated as the justificiation for a particular policy. The ends of policy and their
consequences becomes a forgotten issue. Governmental action, according to this public philosophy, is to ensure access of the various
interests in society to the policy-making process, and to ratify
the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing
groups.
(McConnell, 1966)
MENTAL RETARDATION REFORM
This "mass society" view of social welfare places into
perspective the myriad goals and activities of government-sponsored
reform organizations. Poverty, rather than being a situation to
be eliminated, has become instead a status around which an interest
needs to be organized. Social welfare programs, especially those
known as "community development", have focused on organizing the
poor. Since the poor and racial minorities are seen as an
unrecognized force in society, public policy has focused on creating the formation of an organized interest among them. Drawing on
a sociological orientation and interest-group political theory,
government policy has experimented with community organization and
group action to restore a sense of "community" to low-income
individuals.
A pluralist view of policy formation explains the content
of social welfare policy towards the mentally retarded. Mental
retardation policy reflects the activities of organized interest
groups in society. The mobilization of middle-class parents of
the retarded together with the power of professional medical groups
has led to a proliferation of public and private welfare programs
with an emphasis on helping a tiny segment of the mentally retarded.
(Albee, 1968, Segal, 1970, Fontana, 1978) The programs are based
on the assumption of organic damage and permanent deficiency.
(Mercer, 1973) This encompasses only a small number of the mentally

retarded. The group which is ignored or "disenfranchised" are
basically poor, non-white and mildly retarded. Their mental
retardation status is due in some cases to depressed environmental conditions. The large number of minority and lower-class
individuals in the "mildly" retarded category has also been attributed to mis-labeling. The President's Committee on Mental Retardation (1968) has expressed the view that a number of the retarded
may in fact be "six-hour retarded children".
We now have what may in fact be called a six-hour
retarded child-retarded from 9 to 3, five days
a week, solely on the basis of an IQ score,
without regard to his adaptive behavior which
may be exceptionally adaptive to the situation
and community in which he lives.
Thus, a mental retardation status may stem from culturally biased
instruments. This perspective on mental retardation depicts
minority and lower-class retarded as victims of exploitative social,
political and educational institutions.
National concern in the late 1960's and 70's with the convergence of race, poverty and mental retardation led to governmentsponsored efforts to organize lower-class parents of the retarded.
The ultimate objective would be to maximize their influence in
welfare and educational policy formation. Developing a level of
indigenous organization was seen as a necessary ingredient for
interest formation. As Shorter and Tilly suggest (1974)
individuals are not magically mobilized for
participation in some group effort regardless of how angry they feel... their aggression may be channeled to collective ends
only through the coordinating, directing
function of an organization.
It was within this context that Project STAR was developed by the
President's Committee on Mental Retardation and the National Urban
League, and funded for three years by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. The reform project emphasized the need
to extend the rights of "citizenship" to lower-class families of
the retarded. The project was funded to promote the participation
of minority and lower-class individuals in the formulation of
programs and services for the retarded; to change the discriminatory

processes involved in labeling minority children as retarded; and
to increase the involvement of lower-class and minorities as consumers
of welfare services for the mentally retarded.
COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION STRATEGY
The community organization efforts began in five cities in
1971. Each of the five sites were awarded approximately $100,000
a year for each of the three years. In each project there was
a director, two social workers, two para-professionals, and a
clerical staff. Each local project was to recruit a group of 100
minority and lower-class families of the retarded. The "social
action" activities were to be developed by the project staff and
families of the retarded, while social services were to be provided
by existing welfare organizations in the community.
Once the reform project began its operations, the immediate
task was to recruit lower-class parents of the mentally retarded.
The first contact with potential members was geared primarily to
mobilization purposes. Most observers have noted the difficulties
of organizing individuals holding a negative status in society.
(Turner, 1968) Joining an organization of welfare clients might
be viewed as associating oneself with a status one hopes to escape.
In addition, the parents were asked to identify with a group of
lower-class parents of the mentally retarded--who were negatively
stereotyped in society. The common notion of the poor as "disadvantaged" or "deprived" presented a further unappealing reason for
association. Recruitment would probably have been hampered by the
self-guilt that burdens many parents of the mentally retarded.
An example being a mother in one city who indicated to the staff
that her retarded child was "god's punishment for my evil past".
Obstacles to joining the reform organization were also presented
by a kind of economic rationality of the poor. Mancur Olson (1965)
has suggested a keen logic on the part of the lower-class when
weighing social participation.
If the members of a large group rationally seek
to maximize their personal welfare, they will not
act to advance their common or group objectives
unless there is coercion to force them to do so,
or unless there is some separate incentive,
distinct from the achievement of the common or
group interest, offered to the members of the

group individually on the condition that they
help beat the costs or burdens involved in the
achievement of group objectives.
These obstacles to inducing social participation suggested to the
community organizers of Project STAR a mobilization strategy geared
to tangible inducement. The reform organization became interested
in creating an image of the organization as a sure source of
welfare benefits.
It was expected that the project would assume
importance to the families of the retarded as a conduit for various
social and health services. The information and referral services,
plus extensive follow-up on referrals, insured there would be a
tangible return for participation.
In their first encounter with parents, Project STAR organizers
described the reform organization, its local sponsorkhip, and its
goals. The key to success was seen as the ability to convince
parents they could get better welfare services for their children
only if they joined Project STAR. This was accomplished by showing
the potential member the improvements in services (e.g., re-testing
for IQ, welfare services, employment programs, etc.) that might
result from involvement in STAR. After reviewing the services
with the potential member, the STAR staff then proceeded to discuss
the parent's experiences with social welfare agencies in the
community. They were asked "How helpful were health and welfare
agencies in providing assistance to your retarded child?" After
some discussion, the parents were asked the crucial question, "Would
you like to join with other parents of children having limited
capacity in working towards making the agencies more helpful to
low-income families?". The organizers found that many parents
were quite willing at this point to express an interest in participation. About three quarters of those contacted during this
initial recruiting drive indicated an interest in working together
with other parents to improve services. After several months of
canvassing the neighborhoods, the goal of 100 families per project
site was reached.
MAINTAINING ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION
The willingness of low-income parents to participate in the
reform projects, as evidenced by their response to the recruiting
drive, is not an unusual response from this segment of the population. Kraft and Chilman's (1966) review of research into organiz-

ing low-income parents indicates that the problem lies not in
soliciting an interest in participation, but in bringing the
social action program into actuality. The recruiting drive tied
together the receipt of material incentives, i.e., health and
welfare services, with purposive incentives, i.e., the stated goal
of social mobilization and social reform. Why did the parents
express an interest in joining STAR?
Studies of neighborhood
orgranization among the lower-class suggest that large numbers of
poor people can be induced to join voluntary associations, but
only in a very restricted set of circumstances. Saul Alinsky's
(1946) community drives have been predicated on the expression of
hostility and conflict.
The community organizer digs into the morass of
resignation, hopelessness, and despair, and works
with local people in articulating (or rubbing
"raw") their resentments.. .When those prominent
in the status quo call you an agitator, they
are completely correct; that is, in one word, your
function, to agitate to the point of conflict.
This approach may experience difficulty with welfare clients.
Studies of the experiences of welfare clients indicate a relatively
high level of client-satisfaction with their case workers.
Handler (1971) indicates that this is probably due to the fact that
when welfare recipients apply for benefits, they come not as
rights-bearing citizens claiming what is entitled to the, but as
supplicants. Bailes' (1974) history of the National Welfare Rights
Organization suggests that agitation was not a necessary ingredient
in eliciting initial participation. What was necessary was the
concreteness and individual impact that welfare benefits usually
precipitate.
Translating the stated willingness to participate into direct
involvement in organizational affairs became a problem for the
mobilization efforts. The early history of STAR was characterized
by efforts to maintain the interest and involvement of the parents
in the activities of the reform organization. An early report from
one STAR city (1973) expressed this difficulty of organizing parents
of the retarded into groups to discuss their common problems
with the welfare system.
A parent group of Chicano families is having a
difficult time becoming stable. Many of the Mexican -

American mothers cannot leave their home during the
evening due to custom, and their families are large,
making it very difficult for mothers to leave during
the day. STAR workers are providing baby-sitters
when possible, but again, a feeling of doubt exists
with these mothers even concerning this service.
We are starting to provide extensive individual
services (casework) to these families. We are
encouraged by the response to this service.
In response to the precarious position of the parent discussion
groups, the attention of organizers became directed towards providing
increased material benefits to the parents as an incentive towards
their participation.
The major benefit that STAR had to offer the lower-class parents
was its organizational linkage to existing health and welfare
organizations. There were extensive formal and informal relationships that the project had developed with the local human service
network. In order to carry out the promises made to deliver welfare
benefits, the project staff began to spend most of their time in
referral of clients to local service agencies. Records kept at
the project sites indicate there were over 1500 referrals for
(STAR, 1973)
services during the first two years of operation.
The demands that this placed on the project is evidenced by the
amount and range of activities to follow up on the referrals. To
facilitate the delivery of services to the parents, the staff were
involved with escorting parents to service agencies, and participating in meetings with the parents and service agency personnel.
This benefit-inducement strategy proved to be an effective
incentive towards parents' participation. The strategy worked in
that parents started to come to meetings held in the project's
offices. The meetings, however, of necessity focused on the basic
social problems of the families. A report from one city gave the
following assessment of the parent groups:
As the number of participating families increased,
the social workers established the first four of Project
STAR's planned 8-10 groups. Much experimentation
was used to improve member turn-out and group
effectiveness. The groups were still in their
rudimentary forms, but a start had been made.
However, it is still too early in the first
stages of the project to report on the best
method of conducting the parent groups. We have

found that the staff must first concentrate on
any basic problems essential to the survival of
the family before its members will agree to
regular meetings. Basic problems of existence
need attention before the families can begin to
branch out into means of bringing about
institutional change.
(STAR, 1973)
Other project sites were experiencing similar problems of maintaining organizational participation. The dilemma of staff time being
monopolized by service delivery activities is documented in an
early report from one site.
Sixty percent of the total project time was spent in
face to face contact with families of retarded
children in pursuit of individual and group referrals.
(STAR, 1973)
Parents came to the reform project with a multitude of problems
and requests for assistance. Table 1 records the distribution of
requests for services made to Project STAR.
TABLE I.

Request for Services From Project STAR:

TYPE OF REQUEST
Intervention with School System
Have Retardate tested or re-tested
Vocational training or employment for retardate
Summer camp placement
Job for family member
Food, clothing, housing or financial assistance
Assistance with welfare department
Counseling
Remedial Education
Health Care
Transportation
Legal Services
Other

1970-1972
FREQUENCY
11.6%
14.4%
21.5%
1.4%
4.6%
10.7%
8.4%
3.9%
5.3%
7.8%
1.8%
1.1%
7.5%
100% (438)

Clearly the overwhelming majority of problems brought to the attention
of the reform project has little to do with the political issue of
mis-labeled minority children. Only fourteen percent of the requests
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were related to the possible mis-classification of a child. The
remaining requests had to do with routine social welfare services.
Although social services proved useful in promoting attendance,
they also had limitations. Welfare benefits and information had
a short lifetime. They could be given to the same person only once.
Once the parent received a welfare service, she no longer needed
the organization. Thus, the receipt of a specific service by a
parent exhausted the influence of that service as an inducement to
participation. This presented the reform project with a constant
dilemma of scrambling to come up with new methods to maintain the
parents in the organization. After welfare benefits lost their
drawing power, staff turned toward other incentives to retain parent
participation. For example, in the early part of 1971 nine meetings
were held in one city with parents of the retarded in attendance.
The meetings consisted solely of an audio-visual presentation
illustrating methods and techniques for child-rearing. In the
similar vein, other parent groups provided a forum for the "Childhood Stimulation Program" of a local University. The staff gave a
demonstration on education toys and books for young children. The
meetings focused on methods to stimulate pre-schoolers' communication skills.
In all of these inducement techniques, the effort was made to
offer certain benefits in the form of information and access to
social programs for those who made continued contributions to
organizational activities. This became a problem in that the staff
were unable to continually link parent meetings or other organizational activities to the receipt of material benefits, or even to
information about such benefits. The result was a search for new
methods to induce participation. The reform project started to
provide "side"benefits and intangible rewards to participants.
The national office of STAR and the local projects had sizeable
amounts of money earmarked for "travel and conferences."
The
national office had $44,000, while local projects had $2000 each
year in their travel budgets. The money began to be used to "reward"
active participants with free transportation, lodging, and other
expenses for conferences and meetings around the country. Parents
were sent, together with staff, to attend conferences in Denver,
Montreal, Anaheim; Chicago, St. Louis and San Francisco. Although
this inducement proved attractive to the parents, it had distinctive
drawbacks. Providing free travel, room and board ran into thousands
of dollars a year. In comparison to social welfare services, this
was not an expense that the reform project could transfer to local
social welfare agencies. The expenses of service-inducements

were mainly borne by local welfare organizations, who provided
the welfare benefits. Travel expenditures, however, wer borne
directly by Project STAR. This type of participation incentive
was a major drain on organizational resources, limiting its widespread usage. It therefore, had a limited impact because its use
was restricted to proportionally few parents in each project.
A less obvious, but by no means unimportant factor in participation, was the attraction of solidary incentives.
(Clark and
Wilson, 1961) Solidary incentives are basically intangible in the
sense that the benefit has no monetary value, and cannot be easily
translated into one that has. These inducements include the act
of associating and socializing with members of a particular group.
For some of the parents in the reform project, a factor in
participation was the attraction of meeting friends (or potential
friends), or at least fighting loneliness and boredom. The relative
importance of these motives is difficult to measure and undoubtedly
varied from member to member, project to project. However, the
project appeared to be a way of socializing with one's peers.
In one city, for example, the monthly parent meetings were great
social occasions, at which refreshments (coffee, cake, etc.) were
shared. Parents would often stay after the meeting to gossip and
socially intermingle.
While the friendship and social inducements did not create @
financial drain on the organizational resources of Project STAR,
reliance on them as an inducement for participation had certain
costs.
There usually were no more than a handful of members who
were attracted by this incentive. For those members who were
getting together primarily to have a good time, there was little
reason to engage in reform or issue-orientated activities.
Similarly, those who were primarily motivated by friendship or a
desire to end boredom were probably less likely to view racism as
a cause for their family's problems. They thus were less responsive
to the reform objective of building a level of indigenous organization among low-income parents of the mentally retarded.
(Bailes,
1972)
SOCIAL SERVICES AND ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY
The activities developed to entice members of poverty groups
to participate in community activities appear to have had several
unintended consequences on the reform project. A service-inducement strategy was pursued by the social reform organization to

overcome the difficulties of enticing lower-class parents of the
mentally retarded to participate in organizational activities.
Since STAR was not equipped to provide the services itself, it
was forced to rely upon referrals to the existing social welfare
organizations for these benefits. Therefore, to the extent to which
clients did participate because of these welfare benefits, this
diminished STAR's autonomy relative to the existing welfare network.
Litwak and Hylton (1962) have suggested that organizational autonomy
interdependency and standardization.
is dependent upon two factors:
Interdependency between organizations occurs when one organization
must take another into account if it is to accomplish its goals.
The dependency of STAR on welfare agencies for its internal incentives to lower-class parents tied its mobilization goals to the
actions of local welfare organizations. Standardized actions refer
to behavior which is repetitive in character. The daily routine
nature of client referrals between STAR and the local welfare
network established a type of organizational linkage that did not
previously exist. Organizational relationships between Project
STAR and the established welfare agencies that were to be reformed
presented a series of constraints that limited STAR's ability to
move towards the goal of institutional change. Clients became
involved in STAR because of the promise of services. Demands for
services were thus coming from both clients and staff. The serviceinducement strategy required the ready accessibility of an array
of services from the local welfare network. This presented a problem
of organizational conflict of interest. The failure to implement
reforms can no doubt be explained in part by this dependency. The
desire to mobilize the parents of the retarded through the use of
welfare benefits generated pressure on the staff. In a real sense,
a choice had to be made between confrontation or mobilization. To
publicly confront the welfare organizations on their programs and
policies would threaten the accessibility and supply of organizational resources that were being used to mobilize the parents.
Thompson and McEwen's (1958) analysis of organization-environment
interaction suggests that the operative goals of an organization
are influenced by a "field" of organizations. While this has been
amply demonstrated in economic analysis, the case materials from
STAR suggest that the impact can be seen with social welfare reform
organizations pursuing multiple goals.
The emphasis in providing service-inducements deflected
the use
that was made of the meetings between parents. Rather than politically mobilizing lower-class parents, techniques and gimmicks to
foster participation in the groups became a major preoccupation of

STAR staff. Since welfare benefits were some of the most effective
and cheapest devices, they came to consume an ever increasing
proportion of the time and thoughts of the project staff. As
Selznick (1960) suggests, solutions to day-to-day problems in
organizations often become substituted for the original or professed
goals of the organization. This was the dilemma that confronted
Project STAR. The preoccupation with welfare services as a means
of retaining parents deflected from community organization and
became the operative goals of the reform project. The project
moved away from a concern with the mobilization of lower-class
parents to a primary focus on individual parents and their welfare
needs. Table 2 records the number of parent-group meetings held
in 1970 through 1972 and the number of referrals for services made
on behalf of parents during this same time period.
TABLE II.

Parent Group Meetings and Referrals For Social Welfare
Services (1970-1972)

YEAR OF PROJECT

1970
1971
1972

NUMBER OF PARENT GROUP
MEETINGS

132
55
37

NUMBER OF REFERRALS
FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
SERVICES
218
515
624

The inverse relationship between the number of service referrals
and parent-groups meetings, documents the movement from a mobilization to a service referral focus for Project STAR.
The shift in emphasis that took place occurred without a conscious
decision on the part of the staff or the leadership of the organization. The data in Table 2 indicates the wide variation between
official and operative goals. Perrow (1961) suggests that operative
goals tell us what the organization is trying to do, regardless
of what the official goals say are the aims. The evolution of
STAR into a basically service-related organization was mainly a
reaction to internal pressures without a reference to a concrete
model of where the organization was going.
SOCIAL SERVICES AND CLIENT DE-MOBILIZATION
A number of observers have noted that one of the primary

functions of social welfare is social control. Galper (1975)
suggests that social services foster particular behavior patterns
in clients, both as a condition of usage and as a consequence of
service. The basis of his criticisms is the notion that social
services are structured as to service the labor market. The Social
Security System is an example of a social welfare benefit that
compensates for the inadequacies of the labor market and ties people
firmly to it. For a variety of social service programs, a return
to work status might well be taken as the operational definition of
success. The emphasis on work is not the only area in which social
conformity is emphasized by social welfare. The rules and regulations of many programs have functioned to regulate client behavior.
Regulations have been used to influence sexual conduct, family
relations, rights to privacy, budget expenditures, and so on. As
one observer noted, being on welfare means the loss of control over
one's life.
(Mandell, 1975)
The case materials from Project STAR suggest a further impact
on clients---demoralization. The maintenance demands of the parent
groups, aside from imparting an organization focus on individual
service needs of lower-class parents, also appear to have attracted
members of the lower-class the least predisposed towards community
change.
Once involved in STAR, instead of promoting a frame of
reference among the parents that was conducive to community
mobilization, involvement in the parent groups appears to have had
an opposite effect. If they were to be effective in mobilizing
parents of retarded children, the STAR organizers needed to enhance
a "collective" orientation among participants. If the effort were
successful, instead of giving priority to their own private interests,
the parents would adopt a view that their interests are tied to
the interests of others in a similar situation. The parent groups
would provide an opportunity for parents to reinforce each other
in efforts to better their social conditions. In addition to this
collective orientation, mobilization of the parents would require
that participants take a critical or questionning attitude toward
the mental retardation status assigned to their child. This was
clearly one intended purpose of the groups--to help create situations
that exposed the processes that led to a disproportionate number
of minority children being labeled as mentally retarded.
In order to get a sense of the impact of group-participation
on the perceptions of the parents in the reform organization, a
Sumati Dubey
measure of "collective orientation" was utilized.
(1971) has developed a scale to measure a collective perspective

among lower-class individuals. This variable suggests a larger
conceptual scheme to account for basic strategies that the lowerclass could adopt to improve their social and economic status.
Blum (1965) and his associates posit two possible strategies:
individual or collective mobility strategies. A person with an
"individual" mobility orientation would believe that the individual
is responsible for his plight, and it is he who is responsible for
changing it. Consequently, it is his interest which is of paramount
importance, not the interests of the lower-class as a social group.
An alternate response to individual mobility is "collective"
mobility. This strategy would encompass the belief that one's own
conditions cannot improve unless additional economic resources,
social power and the like are made available to all members of
one's socialgroup. As a measure of this variable, the following
five items were used to operationalize "collective" orientation:
1.

Without sit-ins, lie-ins, and picketing, welfare clients
will not get adequate financial help.

2.

The only way for welfare clients to get what they want
is to organize themselves in a united front.

3.

Non-violent demonstrations, like picketing or sitting-in,
are the best way for the poor to get what they want.

4.

The only way for the poor to improve their condition in
American society is to fight violently with the power
structure.

5.

People treat you right only when they know you can strike
back at them.

Respondents were defined as either "individualist" or "collective"
depending upon whether they received high or low scores on the
scale.
Our measure of participation in the parent groups was based
on the attendance records of parents kept by the project staff.
There were two categories created to differentiate among the
participation rates of parents:
never attended, or attended more
than one-quarter of all the meetings. It was assumed that
attendance at more than one of four meetings would allow the group
to have an impact on the participant. Table 3 records the relationship between attendance at parent meetings and the view that one's
interests are tied to a larger social group.

TABLE III.

Parent Group Participation and Social Problem Orientation

SOCIAL PROBLEM
ORIENTATION

PARENT GROUP PARTICIPATION

Never Attended Meetings

Attended More
Than One-Quarter
of All Meetings

Individualist

45%

607

Collectivist

55%

40M

100% (64)

100/ (111)

If we examine the two groups of parents, those that never
attended a meeting, as opposed to those that attended more than onequarter of all the group meetings held, we notice some differences.
The parents who never attended a meeting apparently have a higher
collective orientation than those who were participants. In other
words, they are more likely to view social change as a collective
enterprise. Fifty-five percent of the non-attenders could be
considered as having a collective orientation, compared to only
forty percent of those who attended the meetings somewhat regularly.
To infer a causal relationship between attendance at meetings
and an individualist orientation toward social problems is probably
premature. As table 3 suggests, there were a large proportion of
parents, 45 percent, who were "individualists," even though they
never attended meetings. What we might be witnessing is a process
of self-selection. The service activities developed by Project
STAR to increase participation might have selectively attracted
members of the community that were least predisposed towards a
collective solution to social problems.
If this were the case,
then the impact of the group was probably one of reinforcement.
Another area existed where there was a relationship between
attendance at parent group meetings and social orientation. This
was the question of whether parents were critical of the retardation label assigned to their child. The parents were asked whether
there was any doubt in their mind that their child was retarded.
Parents who indicated some uncertainty were asked to explain the
basis of their doubt. Those parents who were uncertain gave a
variety of reasons for their doubts, such as, "child was not tested

adequately", "child just slow, not retarded," "child retarded
because he/she is black or poor," "observation of child outside of
classroom."
Those that were "uncritical" had no doubt about their
child being retarded. Table 4 records the apparent impact of
attendance at parent group meetings and criticisms of retardation
status assigned to their child.
TABLE IV.

Attitude Toward Mental Retardation Status and Parent
Group Participation

ATTITUDE TOWARD MENTAL
RETARDATION STATUS OF
CHID

GROUP PART IC IPAT ION

NEVER ATTENDED
MEETINGS

Critical
Uncritical

56%
44%

67%
33%
100%

ATTENDED MORE
THAN ONE-QUARTER
OF ALL MEETINGS

(66)

100% (116)

Apparently the parents who attended meetings regularly showed more
of a disinclination to view their child's retardation status as a
political or racial phenomenon. Those who attended the meetings
were less aware of the processes that lead to minority children
being labeled as retarded, or at least did not believe that such
processes applied to their child.
Any inferences we develop from these data are tentative. The
relationships displayed in the tables, while not statistically
significant, are analytically suggestive.
The data suggest that
analysts of social welfare reform organizations should pay greater
attention to the cooptative impact of welfare benefits.
It appears
that the social welfare benefits delivered to STAR parents might
have had the unintended effect of reinforcing an already apolitical
orientation among lower-class parents. Those who were "active"
parents appeared to be less sensitive to the issue of mis-labeled
minority children and less supportive of a social strategy of
collective action. Although there are no direct data to explain
this apparent relationship, a number of theoretical formulations do
lay a groundwork for an understanding.

TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL DE-SOCIALIZATION
Cloward and Piven (1965) have highlighted the role of welfare
services in socializing welfare clients to a conservative political
stance. They argue that client passivity and conformity are
encouraged by conditional welfare benefits without adequate procedures for appeal. In general, welfare bureaucracies have been
granted discretion in the distribution of various benefits.
Handler's (1972) study of welfare policy and federalism suggests
that the flexibility or looseness of the welfare system at the lower
levels of administration can be understood as a general agreement
between the central government and the local community that the
"moral reform" of the poor be handled at the local levels.
This
suits politicians and administrators at the higher level since they
are more than willing to avoid taking a stand on controversial
questions. The result has been to allow the lowest level of
administration to make what are, in effect, decisions as to eligibility for benefits. The regulations governing many welfare services
are, therefore, shot through with discretion. In this situation
welfare clients are at the mercy of individualized, ad-hoc discretionary decisions.
The discretionary power of welfare organizations is enhanced
by the connection between expertise and welfare benefits. The
distribution of welfare benefits has increasingly been seen as
requiring expert skills. This approach is exemplified by the
changes in welfare services during the 1960's. A series of
amendments to the Social Security Act promised a reduction in poverty
through an intensive effort of trained and skilled caseworkers.
However, beyond prescribing that in order to qualify for federal
funds, a social worker could not carry more than 60 persons, little
was said of the relationship between caseworker and client. The
precise nature of the intensive service and how social workers'
(Gilbert
activities were to reduce dependency were never clarified.
and Specht, 1974) This linkage between expertise and benefits
extends further the discretion of social welfare organizations
over clients. The "scientific" basis of knowledge and techniques
has had the effect of shielding welfare bureaucracies from a review
by political leaders and public groups.
The enormous discretionary power of welfare bureaucracies over
the distribution of benefits has the potential of being an instrument of social control. Ordinarily, a group gains power and increased
public benefits through organization, conflict, and political
machinery. Today's poor, however, are able to secure benefits
through passivity and acquiescence. For example, a number of

observers of health services have noted the relationship between
sick role behavior and the receipt of services. The more like
a helpless object the patient is, the easier it is for the medical
staff do their work. Lorber's (1975) study of hospitals suggests
that for the sake of the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, medical personnel encourage "uncomplainingness" and
"undemandingness" in patients. A study of dying patients also
found efforts at social control. Nurses scolded, reprimanded, and
avoided patients who asked lots of questions, created emotional
scenes, or refused to cooperate with hospital routines.
(Glaser
and Strauss, 1965).
The increased involvement with welfare organizations following
participation in the STAR parent groups may have exposed parents
of the retarded to influences that reinforced political demoralization. Bureaucratic procedures reinforce the premise that the poor
have few rights. The discretion inherent in the distribution of
welfare benefits allows the bureaucracies the freedom of arbitrary
action. Once the poor have internalized this view of welfare, they
become accepting of the vague administrative procedures and
conditional benefits. The manipulation of benefits is a powerful
mechanism of social control. It can take the form of either the
withdrawal of essential resources as punishment for dissent, or
selective appeasement, as when certain benefits are granted to
the leaders of a community, while the grievances of the larger
group remain. Political demoralization appears to occur since the
welfare recipient is likely to be overwhelmed with a sense of
powerlessness, frustration and resignation. The arbitrary procedures
and actions contribute to alienation. The individual moves through
life no longer experiencing himself as the master of his own destiny.
When this occurs, the client sinks into a state of political and
social inertia.
The types of social welfare benefits offered to STAR parents
may have possibly contributed to political demoralization. The
benefits they received were ones which were not linked to acceptable
social roles. Rather, the client categories by which the welfare
agencies defined eligiblity were "non-roles."
Gilbert (1970)
suggests that client dependency and fragmentation are reinforced
through the use of isolative benefits.
This reinforcing is done by defining eligibility
for benefits in terms of unacceptable role
categories or non-roles:
the clients are
unwed; uneducated, unemployed. They are also

unlikely to form groups that associate them with
the role failure such a categoric status represents. Collective action is stymied.
CONCLUS ION
Our study of the internal dynamics of Project STAR suggests
the utility of an analytic framework based on organizational incentives as a way of studying welfare reform organizations. The major
attraction of Project STAR to the lower-class parents of retarded
children was the receipt of welfare and health services. The reform
project can therefore be described as dependent upon material
incentives. Administrators of such organizations are under great
pressure to obtain the resources that will provide an inducement
to participation. The preoccupation with material incentives from
local welfare agencies can account for the eclipse of community
mobilization.
Analysis of the incentive system also provides a possible
explanation for the failure to successfully organize lower-class
In multi-purpose
parents of the retarded into social action groups.
organizations such as STAR, the organizations's reform goals are
not an important incentive and have little impact upon participation.
This explains the reluctance of parents to be involved unless there
were tangible gains to be made. Given the relative unimportance
of the stated mobilization objectives, the organizers were able
to be tactically flexible in the types of rewards offered to parents,
e.g., services, travel, sociability, etc. The preoccupation with
maintaining material incentives, however, resulted in scant attention being paid to the political functions of social services.
The price of organizational maintenance was the necessity to adopt
activities which may have in the long run, proved inimical to community
mobilization. The exposure to increased welfare services through
the parent groups appears to explain, in part, the diminished
collective orientation of parents and their willingness to accept
the mental retardation label assigned to their child.
The reliance on welfare benefits rather than ideology as an
incentive for participation was recognition of STAR's weak political
position to effect changes in the welfare system. Social change,
implied in the ideology of community mobilization, would have been
painfully slow, or even an impossible task, given the resources of
the reform project. Reforms in intelligence testing and in services
for the mentally retarded were only in small part amenable to change
from the local level. Most of the mental retardation organizations

in the five sites were part of national and state associations.
Local efforts to reform them would most likely have produced minimal
reforms in programs for the lower-class retarded. STAR was, however,
in a strong position to deliver on the promise of welfare benefits.
Its linkages with community agencies made the supply of serviceincentives predictable. This was, therefore, a more secure
inducement for participation than the promise of institutional
reform.
This analysis of one attempt at interest-formation among lowerclass families of the mentally retarded suggests a "rational"
behavior on their part. The case materials further suggest the
failure of community mobilization can be explained by the
organizational incentives used. Project STAR's problem appeared
to lie in finding the proper mix of purposive, material, and
solidary inducements which both recruit and retain members of the
lower-class, at the same time allowing the pursuit of mobilization
goals.
From the Project STAR experience it appears that the use of
welfare benefits to organize lower-class communities may well
reinforce passivity and political inertia. This may explain in
part, the apparent failure of recent reform efforts to mobilize
the poor and extend their social and political rights.
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Abstract

To a greater extent thn before, social welfare agencies are emphasizing
social change over direct services. A social reform movement is a mechanism by which societal and institutional change may be accomplished.
The
relationship between social welfare organizations and social movements
has not been clearly defined. The sociological theories of Smelser,
Turner, Killian and others on collective behavior and social movements
provide a useful knowledge base for welfare organizations and professionals espousing social reform goals. The single parent family population
is discussed as a group with the potential to generate into a social reform movement.
Today many social welfare agencies have reemphasized social reform
and institutional change as their major organizational goals. Agencies
that formerly stressed direct service activities and individual case objectives now focus on social change activities and braader system-oriented objectives. A social reform movement is one way by which institutional change may be accomplished.
However, the connection between social reform movements and social welfare organizations and the professionals employed in such organizations has not been studied explicitly.
In the following paper, this relationship will be considered, first
through a summary statement on the theory of social movements, and second through an examination of the strengths and limitations of social
agencies in instigating a social movement and in assisting the movement
once it is underway.

Knowledge of this sort would have been useful in describing how social welfare organizations could have provided a greater amount of assistance to national and local Welfare Rights Organizations a few years
ago. Social welfare professionals were involved in assisting the Welfare Rights Movement, particularly in linking local welfare rights orAlthough the Welfare Rights Movement
ganizations to the national unit.
has dissipated today, other social issues will undoubtedly continue to
trigger the collective concern which leads to social reform movements.
A single parent family movement is one such possibility.
As a group, single parents have a constellation of problems: economic, employment, social, child care, and housing. The reported dif1
ferential in need between one and two parent families in these areas
suggests a need for broad institutional changes. The diversity and
scope of need for this group would diminish the effectiveness of a purely direct service approach. If a large scale social movement of single
parents can be instigated and proves to be an effective vehicle for improving the overall social conditions of single parents, an organizaOne parent families could use
tional structure would be established.
that organization from that point on,to implement more specific sociological changes (e.g., the Women's Movement can be mobilized for specific issues such as improved day care or increased educational opportunities for women in a relatively short period of time).
Vattano has described how a general movement such as the power-tothe people movement has caused greater consumer participation in the 2
social services and the emergence of nonprofessional self-help groups.
In this paper, we narrow the focus to a very specific movement and reverse the casual process by examining the role that individual self-help
We assume that
groups could play in a single parent family movement.
self-help groups of single parents acting together could lead to a recognition of the need for societal system changes and the beginning of a
single parent family movement.
It may seem ironic to some that social agencies faced with implementing social reform goals are participating in direct service activities such as assisting in the development of self-help groups. However,
we must be clear at the outset that direct service activities per se do
Certain conditions must be met before
not lead to social movements.
direct service group processes can be defined as self-help group processes and before self-help groups link together to initiate a social
movement. Furthermore, there is the more basic question of whether
there is any proper role for the social service agency and the human
Self-help groups derive much
servi~e professional in self-help groups.
of their power from the interest of members in assisting one another and
continued professional involvement might usurp the self-help power
3
In addition, we will raise question about the proper role of the
base.
social service agency in a social movement.

Our interest in defining the one parent family phenomenon as a
social reform movement was instigated by developments in England and in
Canada. In England, voluntary associations of local self-help groups
such as Mothers in Action and Gingerbread have brought attention to the
4
The writings of
common disadvantages of the single parent status.
6
5
social policy professionals such as Wynn and Marsden recorded the
common needs of one parent families and,as a result,the Finer Commission
was established to study the socio-legal conditions of the one parent
7
Single parent associafamily and make family policy recommendations.
tions have exerted their influence to see that the recommendations of
the Finer Commission are implemented.
In Canada, voluntary associations of single parent families such as
Toronto Single Parents Associated or the Vancouver Single Parents Association have been organized. A number of studies have been conducted to
8
As far as
publicize the social conditions confronting single parents.
we can determine, these single parent organizations developed from selfhelp groups of single parents acting together to change social conditions
for the single parent family.
In the United States, the closest thing to a national voluntary
association of single parents is Parents Without Partners; however, this
organization has often been criticized for emphasizing social activities
9
The one parent phenomenon has not been
over social change activities.
defined by Parents Without Partners as a social movement. Other than a
10
no
recent study on the economic conditions of female headed families,
national policy research has been undertaken on the single parent phenomenon in this country.
All indications suggest that social issues related to the single
parent family could be defined in terms of a social reform movement. The
question under study in this paper is "Can a social agency instigate a
social reform movement?; or, "Are there certain activities a social
agency might perform after the movement has developed which might add to
its success?"

THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Collective Behavior
In sociological theory, a social movement is located in the class of
social actions broadly categorized under the term collective behavior.
We will discuss definitions of collective behavior and then identify the
distinctive characteristics of a social movement as a special type of
collective behavior.
Collective behavior has been defined as "mobilization on the basis
11
Collective behavior encomof a belief which redefines social action."
passes a wide range of events including a panic, a riot or a social
movement. The discussion of the theories of collective behavior in this
paper will center on two major theorists, Smelser and Turner.

Smelser views collective behavior as the outgrowth of a popular
desire to do something about a situation that has created stress for a
number of individuals. He feels that structural strain is the underlying
condition of an episode of collective behavior. Generalized beliefs are
present and facilitate the collective understanding of the condition.
This eventually leads to social action in response to the strain. Other
conditions he identifies as contributing to particular episodes of
collective behavior include: a precipitating incident that confirms the
participants for action; and, finally the
belief; the mobilization of
12
collective action itself.
Turner notes that episodes of collective behavior appear when conventional norms fail or weaken in an ambi ous situation that provides an
1
opportunity for individuals to interact. l
A situation leading to the
establishment of a new norm and a new definition of the situation to
which the norm is applied can arise only when conventional norms are
neutralized.
The "emergent norm" develops as part of the new interaction
and it determines the direction and intensity of crowd behavior.
Turner's theory assumes that individuals experience social pressure to
conform to the emergent norm.
There are several general concepts which are common to both Smelser
and Turner's discussions of collective behavior. First, a strain of some
sort or another is a necessary condition that determines episodes of
collective behavior. Second, the process of communication under conditions of strain is important. Third, collective behavior is not seen as
the behavior of aggregates of unrelated individuals but the behavior of
collectivities.
Each theorist sees the determinants of collective behavior somewhat
differently. The theoretical emphasis differs in that Smelser's theory
is from a cultural perspective while Turner's theoretical emphasis is
social structure. Smelser and Turner each began with a different initial
focus.
Smelser's theory looks to explain social movement, the most
structured form of collective behavior.
Turner began by explaining the
activities of the crowd, a less formally organized type of behavior.
Social Movements
A social movement is a distinctive and more highly developed form of
collective behavior. The distinguishing characteristics of social movements include: (1) a sense of group identity among participants; (2)
sustained enthusiasm; (3) a considerable degree of organization and
division of labor; (4) members' activities which are disciplined rather
than chiefly impulsive; (5) a conscious effort to bring about the new
Social movement is defined as "a collectivsocial and cultural forms.14
ity
acting with some continuity to promote or resist
a change in the
'1 5
society or group of which it is a part."
A social movement has consequences for the larger social system. To
be successful a social movement must result
"
clanificant social change.

significant social change initially may become social movements later on.
A movement may contribute to social change through "forcing the established structure of the society to come to terms with it and its
values."16 The larger social system may eventually respond by incorpo"1 7
rating some features of its program into the existing institutions. 1
There are many theories which attempt to account for the emergence
of a social movement. The common elements of each theory will be
presented in this paper. A social movement is usually studied as a
developmental process. Elementary episodes of collective behavior develop into social movements under certain conditions. Social strain is a
necessary precondition for the development of a social movement; but,
social strain alone is not a sufficient cause of a social movement.
Social change activities must develop.
If the social order fails to meet the individual's needs or provide
a stable framework from which to carry on activities, the individual will
seek to challenge the social order. If the individual's dissatisfaction
is shared by others in the society a social movement may develop.
Further, there must be a "yi sion, a belief in the possibility of a difThus, strain within the social structure
ferent state of affairs."
must exist and be a common experience for many individuals, who are willing to act toward change.
Rush and Denisoff also identify strain within the social structure
and a willingness to act for change as the essential elements in the
development of a social movement. For a temporarily organized public to
develop into a social movement the necessary elements are: (1) a consciousness of dysfunction related to a social problem, and (2) the
19
mobilization of action to ameliorate the problem.
As another necessary determinant of a social movement, the generalized belief of collective behavior must develop into shared values. Abel
20
separates values into two dimensions, "the issue" and "the ideology."
some
may
organize
The issue is the groundwork upon which individuals
collective program, but if such action is to become a social movement,
concerned opposition is not sufficient. A collective plan, an ideology,
must be developed, for without the ideology, action cannot be maintained.
21
suggests that even if the above conditions of social
Jackson
strain, social change activities, and shared values are present, a substantial social movement may still not develop. For progression of an
organized social movement there must be an effective linking of likeminded people over an extended area into one group whose image and action
can be effectively coordinated. There must be leadership which will be
followed by individuals from a variety of local areas and as formal organizations that can operate from a communitywide rather than a local
base. The ideology and program must be suitable for rallying the protestors and need to be widely disseminated through channels of communication. The public image of the movement must gain substantial and
growing strength, promising tangible accomplishments in the near future. 22

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR
THE SOCIAL AGENCY
Having briefly outlined the characteristics of collective behavior
and social movements, we return to our original question. Is it possible
for a social welfare agency to instigate a social movement?
As with any formal organization, a social agency has a pattern of
activities for which it is accountable. As described in the sociological
literature, a movement itself is a very complex phenomenon. Therefore,
predicting the emergence of a social movement is a tenuous proposition.
A social agency could not guarantee the initiation of a particular movement and does not have ultimate control over whether or not the movement
develops. Rather, the agency would need to pursue a number of social
issues which could develop into reform movements. However, a welfare
agency has a well established structure which tends to limit its flexibility.
This hinders the ability of the agency to quickly shift direction, for example, from issues related to welfare rights to issues
related to the single parent family. Agency professionals on staff who
are experts in welfare rights could not immediately become experts on
the single parent family.
For an agency to help instigate a movement, agency professionals or
board members must support an emerging norm at an early stage of development-the stage of generalized belief. To lend assistance in
initiation of a movement requires some risks board members and staff may
be unwilling to take. In the formative stages of a movement, the agency
might need to help in planning and instigating precipitating incidents
(mass demonstrations, public rallies, etc.) A welfare agency charged
with representing some general population of people would most likely
support such activities only if a new norm were emerging quickly and becoming readily accepted.
Assuming the new norm did become readily accepted, social service
professionals who are especially skilled at organizing and mobilizing
consumer groups could prove useful to the leaders of the emerging movement, even in its initial stages. However, if the identified groups were
to establish an obvious and open dependence on soeial welfare organizations, the initial trust of the movement might be dissipated. This is
especially true as reform movements of interest to social agencies would
be those movements which attack the existing social service structure.
The social welfare agency, of course, has vested interests and could
benefit from co-opting the movement early on, for instance, by suggesting incremental changes within the social service structure when more
dramatic and comprehensive changes are called for.
After the incipient movement develops, a social agency is more
likely to be of assistance. As the movement establishes its own formal
organization and division of labor, the movement becomes more structurally consistent with the social welfare agency. At that point, agency
professionals would be more likely to participate. The following are
three examples of how a social agency might share channels of

communication, resources or leadership training with members of the
movement.
Social agencies have accumulated experience and expertise in using
a variety of communication channels. They frequently issue press releases, have facilities to print materials, and can get news coverage
or radio time. The social movement literature indicates accessibility
to communication is an important criterion in the success of the movement. This would enable a social agency to gain public attention to the
needs of the group, make members of the group aware of the activities
and engage their support, enable them to easily reach large numbers for
particular events, i.e., mass rally, planning sessions, and so forth.
Social agencies have at their disposal financial resources and thus
can provide, at least initially, needed funds.
Funds are often difficult
for those engaged in a movement to secure and much energy would need to
be exerted by the members of the movement.
Unsuccessful attempts at fund
raising could detract from the success of the movement. Resources would
enhance the image of the movement and give the impression of a successful
rather than a floundering endeavor.
Immediate resources would enable the
movement to establish a formal organization headquarters, obtain telephones, send out mail, and so forth.
Effective leadership is vital to the birth and development of a
social movement. Effective leadership helps to structure and coordinate
activities of the collectivity, and this is a key element in determining
if a social movement has arrived. Although it often appears that the
leadership is directed by one person, more often it may be a group of
individuals acting together. Leadership requires various skills and attitudes which would be nearly impossible for one person to assume.
Killian identifies three types of leadership: the charismatic leader, who
creates the movement and its ideas and whose personal qualities draw support from others; the administrative leader, who is concerned with developing a practical strategy for the attainment of the goals; and the
intellectual leader, who elaborates and Justifies the values of the
movement. 2 3 Social agencies could train individuals to assume some of
the necessary administrative and intellectual leadership roles. A social
agency could also identify a charismatic individual in the community.
Agency training might also be appropriate in this case, provided it does
not interfere with the development of the individual's charismatic qualities.
In addition to structural consistency between the movement and the
agency, there is some functional consistency between the goals of a social agency and a movement. Social agencies have a history of involvement with social reform issues.
The "new" social agency should provide
leadership and direction for efforts aimed at social and legislative
change. Agency involvement may be appropriate in spelling out the policy
changes which are needed. However, social movements often call for
radical social change. Those participating in the movement sometimes
engage in illegal or violent activities. And so, even at a later stage
in the development of social reform, participation may present a dilemma

for the agency. Agency involvement depends upon the degree to which radical social change is sought. In the social welfare sector, this means
to what degree the existing social service structure and the practice
assumptions of social service professionals are challenged. It is easiest to illustrate this by returning to the example of a single parent
family movement.

A SINGLE PARENT FAMILY MOVEMNT
The characteristics of a single parent family movement have been
evident in England where self-help groups of single parents have organized into voluntary associations calling for social reform. Assuming
the initiation of a one parent family movement in this country, could a
social agency assist in the initial development of such a movement?
This depends upon two interrelated factors: 1) the degree to which the
existing social service structure and practice assumptions of social welfare professionals are being challenged; and 2) how quickly the new norms
of the movement are becoming accepted.
Part of the ideological core of a single parent movement directly
challenges the assumptions of social welfare professionals and social scientists, namely, that one parent families are "disorganized", "unstable"
or "broken" families. In England, single parents in the movement report
they were reluctant to even seek social services for fear of being judged
as abnormal or unstable by social service professionals.
...the social service system (is) ingrained with a
patronizing complacency that the individual is
psychologically inadequate-not the system ....24
The social service worker is often the embodiment of professional
distance and callousness that has led single parent self-help groups to
emphasize personal interaction and subjective experience. Self-help
groups generate their own power from portraying the service they provide
as an alternative to traditional social services. A close relationship
between the self-help group and the social agency could lead to a reduction in the self-help power base and the co-optation of the self-help
leadership. Although both the self-help group and the human service
professional may be needed in an integrated human service network, the day
when they can both function in a spirit of close cooperation may never
come.
If social welfare professionals participate with members of the social movement in formulating position papers and policy statements,
professional values may move the ideological core of the movement to a
more conservative position. For instance, when the Finer Commission reported the inadequacy of social services for single parents, it recommended a traditional remedy--greater coordination of social welfare services, 2 5 rather than a basic re-thinking of the rationale upon which social
services to single parents are based. Also, while the Finer Commission
recommended that single parents did not need specialized services for fear

of developing fragmented services, 2 6 it might be useful politically if
members of a single parent movement took a separatist stance and argued
for specialized service structures tailored to their unique family
status.
For social agencies that have recently shifted from clinical to
social change goals, the clinical orientation of social welfare professionals can also present problems in linking with the movement.
Social
service professionals may be tempted to offer single parents direct
service or access to services as part of the negotiation provess. Agency professionals may emphasize self-help groups which focus on personal
problem-solving or therapeutic goals rather than groups which emphasize
social advocacy and social change goals.
This "method lag" in agencies
that now emphasize social reform can be problematic as agencies attempt
to provide assistance to social movements.
Assuming greater acceptance of the norm and if basic social services assumptions are not under attack, there are many areas of agency and
professional expertise and power that would be useful to leaders of a
single parent movement. Knowledge about group development, identification of self-help members who would make good leaders, and the use of
agency facilities may be needed and shared after the movement has developed. Interrelationships are much more problematic in the earlier
stages of social reform.

CONCLUSION
In this paper we have briefly explored the theoretical dimensions
of social movements and the possible consistency between these dimensions and the characteristics of social welfare agencies. We have found
that the more obvious advantages of an agency's interrelationship with a
social movement exist after the movement had gained a degree of social
acceptance rather than in the initial stages of social reform. Furthermore, participation by social service professionals depends upon the
degree to which traditional social service assumptions and practices
come under attack.
In the initial stages of a movement, the social agency professional
must be a sensitive diagnostician of social processes and be able to
recognize a willingness on the part of potential members of the movement
to participate in substantial social change. Since it is impossible to
predict the beginning of a social movement with any certainty, the service professional should be allowed to pursue a number of social issues
which could conceivably develop into reform movements. The social agency must maintain a low profile in laying the foundation for the later
development of a connection between the agency and the movement. Assuming this is possible, staff of the agency can assist in the organization
of consumer groups and in the planning and documentation of incidents
and events that call attention to the movement and the unequal societal
treatment given to its members. Agency board members and professional
staff would most likely offer more support under conditions of rapid

societal change as the generalized beliefs of the movement gain acceptance and develop into an emerging norm and when basic assumptions of
social work practice are not being challenged.
After a social movement gets off the ground, service professionals
will find members of the reform movement engaging in some familiar
processes such as building a formal organization and establishing some
division of labor among its membership. Members of the movement might
be advised to seek agency expertise,provided that staff of the welfare
organization recognize how the organizational structure of a reform
movement differs from the structure of a traditional social agency.
Bureaucratization would interfere with the need for rapid social change.
Social agency staff could also provide the movement with needed community support, introduce the members of the movement to the use of mass
media, assist in the development of value statements and action platforms, and provide leadership training.
On the other hand, we wonder if social welfare organizations which
often pride themselves on rational social planning and planned social
change can participate with flexibility and freedom in a social process
that is more art than science. Traditional social agencies may not be
willing to risk radical social change, participation in violent or
illegal social action, or the questioning of basic assumptions of social
work practice. Human service professionals who are more expert at
diagnosing client rather than system problems would be less effective
at advancing a particular cause. However, we must recognize that the
burden of overcoming these incongruities between social agencies and
social reform movements should rest with the social work profession
and the social service agencies. After all, it is the profession and
the agencies, not the membership of social reform movements, who have
recently reemphasized social action and social reform goals.

NOTES
The authors wish to express gratitude to Francis G. Caro, Director of
the Institute for Social Welfare Research of the Community Service
Society for his guidance in the preparation of this paper and selected
staff of the Community Service Society who commented on drafts of the
paper.
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ABSTRACT
This paper will examine the political, social, and economic factors which underlie the transition in services from unwed mothers to
teenage parents over the past 15 years. The experience of agencies in
the Boston area serves as the basis for this case study. Data have
been collected from open-ended interviews with key service providers
who have developed and implemented policy related to adolescent
parents.
The findings indicate that, prior to 1960, agencies were responding to what was perceived as individual problems or circumstances. Illegitimacy was thought to be an unconscious attempt by white middle
class women to fulfill psychological needs. The rediscovery of poverty
resulting in the expansion of human services, and the declining utilization of maternity homes due to changing social attitudes relative to
abortion and childbearing led to the creation of comprehensive service
programs for adolescent parents. Unlike their predecesors, these programs were designed to serve a younger, black population that planned
to keep its infants. The reorganization of the service system, however, still failed to address the problem of white working class adolescents who comprise the greatest number of teenage parents.

The last 15 years have witnessed the creation of a vast array of
specialized services for pregnant adolescents. Prior to the development of such programs, little help was available to this group.
Some
youthful pregnant girls found assistance in the maternity homes that
worked cooperatively with child welfare agencies. These programs were,
however, designed to provide shelter for a group of largely white,
middle class, past-adolescent women who had become pregnant out-of-wedlock. Casework services at these homes sought to encourage the mothers
to release their infants for adoption so they could be raised in a more
advantageous environment and the mothers could resume their "normal
life course" following delivery. Since most of the residents were over

18, there was no need for educational services. In addition, most
pregnancies and deliveries were normal, so they required only conventional medical care.
In marked contrast, the 1960's and 1970's saw the development of
comprehensive service programs specifically designed for pregnant girls
who were still of school age and who in most cases planned to keep
their children. School age mothers had been found to be at greater
risk than women who bore their children later in life (Klerman and
Jekel, 1973; Furstenburg, 1976; Presser, 1978). These young women and
their children suffered worse medical outcomes. They typically dropped
out of school, and they were faced with the problems of completing
their own adolescence while raising a young child. As a result, the
comprehensive service programs offered a combination of medical, educational and social services throughout the prenatal period to help alleviate the consequences of adolescent childbearing.
In order to explain this shift in service delivery it is necessary to consider what happened during the sixties that resulted in the
redefinition of three aspects of the service delivery system: (1) of the
problem, from illegitimacy to adolescent parenthood; (2) of the service
population from white middle class young women who planned to place
their infants for adoption to low income, primarily minority, adolescents who plan to raise their own children; and (3) of the service
needs, from intensive casework around the issues of loss and fulfillment to a comprehensive approach including medical, educational, and
social services.
Certainly one factor which led to these changes was the rapid increase in the number of pregnancies and deliveries to school age women
(Baldwin, 1976). Much of the current literature on teenage pregnancy
has placed the main issues of the field in the context of changing demographic trends. It is common for articles to begin with a statistical
description of patterns of adolescent sexuality and reproduction. A
publication of the Allan Guttmacher Institute (1976) goes so far as to
speak of adolescent pregnancy as an "epidemic". While such studies
adequately document the extent of need, they do not explain the shape
services take at a particular time. If one is to understand both the
development of new models of services to school-age parents and the
problems for which solutions still must be found, it is necessary to
look beyond demographic changes and to examine the impact of social
movements.
It is the contention of this paper that the black protests in the
sixties and the women's movement both shaped the response to the rapid

increase in the number of adolescents bearing children. Black protests
greatly influenced the redefinition both of the problem and of the population which was to receive the newly defined comprehensive services;
further, the women's movement helped to create new options for those
women who had previously gone to maternity homes to conceal an out-ofwedlock pregnancy. A review of the situation also demonstrates that
one group is still not receiving comprehensive services. These are
white, working class adolescents whose births far outnumber those of
blacks. Similarly, their exclusion from the service sector must be
analyzed in terms of these two social movements.
BLACK PROTEST
By 1960, the economic and social dislocation which had begun
during the preceding decades had been brought forcefully to the attention of the American public. Books such as Harrington's The Other
America not only documented the extent of poverty in the United States,
but also demonstrated the association between poverty and race. Over
a 20-year period more than one quarter of the black population had
migrated from the South to Northern industrial cities. During the
same period, black unemployment rose to a level two times greater than
white.
The dislocation of black families was also marked by growing
social unrest. Following the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
the Board of Education, the civil rights movement developed a strong,
active base in the South. By the early sixties, the movement had come
North. The ghetto protests started with demonstrations against disparities in social conditions and ended in several summers of rioting.
The government responded to the growing disturbances with social
legislation. The programs sought to address economic and social inequities by attacking what were perceived as the psychological and
social factors causing poverty. First, programs such as Head Start
were designed to alter the social conditions which reinforced an individual psychology of poverty. Second, efforts such as the Community
Action Programs addressed the institutional practices which sustained
individual dependence on the social system.
Pregnant adolescents were viewed as victims of the poverty cycle
and welfare colonialism. Adolescent parenthood was believed to be one
of the factors which reinforced the frustration and apathy associated
with ghetto life. Campbell's (1968) often quoted statement about the
certainty of an adolescent mother's future is an excellent example of
this fact:

"The girl who has an illegitimate child at the age of 16
suddenly has 90 percent of her life's script written for
her. She will probably drop out of school, even if someone
else in her family helps to take care of the baby; she will
probably not be able to find a steady job that pays enough
to provide for herself and her child; she may feel impelled
to marry someone she might not otherwise have chosen. Her
life choices are few, and most of them are bad. Had she
been able to delay the first child, her prospects might
have been quite different..." (p. 238)
In addition, the pregnant adolescent was confronted with nonresponsive
social institutions. Social service agencies were uninterested in
adolescent mothers who planned to keep their children because they did
not conform to the psychological theory which guided their work
(Morisey, 1970).
School policy, whether official or sub rosa, was to
exclude pregnant girls from the classroom because the schools were not
prepared to cope with the issue of teenage sexuality (Howard, 1972).
And out-patient obstetrical clinics of busy city hospitals did not have
the time to provide the supportive services teenagers needed (DeVise,
1969).
The development of the Webster School in Washington, D.C. in 1963
heralded a new approach to adolescent pregnancy (Howard, 1968). Like
the anti-poverty programs, comprehensive service programs such as the
Webster School were designed to overcome the personal and institutional barriers which confronted pregnant adolescents who for the most part,
were low income and black. In practice, this meant that the young
women received extended prenatal care to decrease medical risk; continued schooling to achieve economic self sufficiency; and emotional support to sustain them during a potential period of crisis.
The situation in Boston followed this developmental model.
The
impetus for organizing the city's first comprehensive service program
came from a social worker at the Boston City Hospital, located in the
black ghetto. The worker noticed that the prenatal clinic was serving
a large number of adolescents who had been excluded from Boston schools.
Working with a local social service agency and eventually the Boston
School Department, she was able to organize CENTAUM, a program for pregndnt adolescents which received funds in 1963 from the Office for Economic Opportunity. In a pattern which paralleled programs in many
other communities, CENTAUM utilized the resources of several agencies
to organize an alternative situation where a young woman could receive
medical, educational and social services throughout the prenatal period.

The services organized in Boston subsequent to CENTAUM reflected
the same pattern in terms of the scope of the problem and the populaIn 1969, funds from the Legal Enforcement Assistion to be served.
tance Act were used to organize the Kennedy Home, a residential program for twelve adolescent mothers, who had been ajudicated delinquent,
and their infants. The purpose of the home was to teach the mothers
alternative life styles while providing a healthy environment for the
infants during their first year of life.
The third Boston program which received funds from the Massachusetts Department of Education was also organized by a staff member of
the Boston City Hospital. This program was developed for high risk
adolescents who fell between the cracks of the service system. They
were not "attractive" to the traditional social service agencies because they planned to keep their children, and they were not eligible
for CENTAUM because they had already dropped out of school. This program, like CENTAUM and the Kennedy Home, provided an alternative structure for adolescents primarily from the black community.
Despite the obvious need for their services, none of these three
programs survived. After a few years of serving relatively large numbers of young women, the Boston City Hospital withdrew support from
CENTAUM, declaring that it was the responsibility of the Boston School
System. Eventually, CENTAUM was absorbed by one of the programs described in the following section of the paper. The Kennedy Home ceased
operating in 1973 due to fiscal mismanagement by its sponsoring agency.
The Boston City Hospital program for high risk teens was not refunded
by the Department of Education because it appeared to duplicate the
services offered by CENTAUM.
Although these initial programs did not endure in the following
years, new comprehensive programs which reflected subsequent changes
in social policy were organized to take their place. During the sixties, the problem of adolescent pregnancy had been redefined as a result of growing Black protest and the policy of the Great Society.
It was no longer the stigma of illegitimacy which concerned the social
planners, but rather the contribution of adolescent parenthood to the
poverty cycle and the inability of the service system to meet the needs
of the population at risk. Black teenagers appeared to suffer the worst
consequences in terms of poor medical outcomes, incomplete education
and unstable social relations. The government had responded to newly
perceived needs of the black community with a series of social action
programs, including comprehensive service programs for school-age
parents. These programs had ultimately been designed to ameliorate, if
not alleviate, the consequences of poverty.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
While black protest influenced the redefinition of social problems and therefore the scope of services and population at risk, the
women's movement must be examined to determine how young women from
the white middle class who had formerly used maternity homes, coped
with unwanted pregnancies. Their withdrawal from the social service
sector is closely associated with the changing economic and social conditions which gave rise to women's liberation and ultimately to another
method of responding to an unwanted pregnancy. The women's movement
reemerged in the sixties out of an awareness of the subjugation of
women in American society. Although women were becoming increasingly
more active in the labor force, they were continually confronted by
discriminatory practices in employment opportunities and wages. Not
only did women find themselves exploited in the workplace, but they
also became sensitive to the exploitation in their daily lives. The
traditional roles of wife, childraiser, and housekeeper were perceived
as ways in which women were oppressed, isolated, and infantalized.
Female activists believed that the strengths and skills of women
were not being recognized. Through collective action, they felt they
could achieve the changes which were important to their lives. Although women were divided between the liberal feminists, who were attempting to overcome the barriers that kept women from competing economically and politically with men, and the women's liberationists,
who called for more sweeping change in terms of the social relations
which shaped existing institutions, these two groups were united on
the question of abortion rights. Their protest took the form of lobbying, demonstrations, and underground networks for women seeking illegal abortions.
As in the case of the ghetto revolts, the government slowly responded to the growing pressures of the women's movement. In 1967,
Colorado liberalized its abortion law. In 1970, New York and Washington, D.C. both legalized abortion upon demand. Finally, in 1973, the
Supreme Court ruled that states could not interfere with a woman's
right to an abortion up to the age of viability.
Initially it was white middle class women who were most affected
by the Supreme Court's decision. Members of this group had formed the
backbone of the women's movement and the protest for the legalization
of abortion. These women who had economically been able to utilize the
services of the maternity homes or secure illegal abortions, could now
seek them legally. Several studies have shown that white college

educated women are more likely to terminate an unwanted pregnancy by
abortion than are non-white, non-college educated women (Moore and
Caldwell, 1976; Rosen, 1976). This pattern has been reinforced by current legislation which prohibits the use of federal funds for all abortion related activity (CARASA, 1979).
Although there are no accurate figures regarding the utilization
of abortion services in Boston, several factors suggest that they serve
a large portion of white middle class women. Three of the four free
standing abortion clinics are located in middle class neighborhoods:
Two in Brookline, a white suburb adjacent to Boston, and one in Boston's most fashionable shopping district. Also, these clinics have
have continually resisted serving Medicaid patients. Their arguments
are based on inadequate fees, slow payment, and excessive requirements
for documentation.
The legalization of abortion services undermined the basis of the
maternity homes by creating a new option for adolescent and young women
confronted with an out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The decline in maternity
home utilization in Boston, following the legalization of abortion in
New York is well documented. The number of residents in the homes operated by the Salvation Army, the Crittenton Hastings House and the Catholic Archdiocese dropped by one half to three quarters. The child
welfare agencies saw a similar decline in the number of infants placed
for adoption.
Confronted with this decline, the homes reevaluated their role in
the provision of services to unwed mothers. The Salvation Army changed
its focus entirely and used its Booth Home as a center for juvenile
offenders. Crittenton Hastings House and the Catholic Archdiocese independently decided to concentrate most of their staff and funds on the
operation of day programs for pregnant adolescents from the inner city,
while maintaining their residential programs on a smaller scale. Since
the women's movement had effectively created a new option for the management of out-of-wedlock pregnancy among their former white middle
class clients, these agencies moved in the direction urged by the federal government and advocacy agencies. They redefined their purposes,
their target population, and their services and created comprehensive
service programs for a population consisting largely of black pregnant
teenagers who planned to keep their babies.

PROBLEMS STILL TO BE RESOLVED
While comprehensive service programs in Boston and elsewhere
seem to serve primarily minority and poverty group adolescents, and
abortion clinics apparently manage the needs of the white middle class
adolescents and young women, few programs address the needs of a group
which can be loosely characterized as the white working class. Granted,
the working class was not politically visible during the sixties when
social services were realigned and therefore, may have been disregarded
in the development of new social service models. However, because
births to white teenagers far exceed in number those to blacks, this
group cannot continue to be ignored. In Massachusetts in 1970, there
were 8,705 births to white women 19 years and under and 1,091 births
to black women in this age cohort, even though the black birth rate
exceeds that of the whites (Annual Report of Vital Statistics, 1970).
The literature on school age parents pays little attention either
to the paucity of white working class adolescents in comprehensive service programs or to the ways in which this group meets the needs of adolescent pregnancy. Apparently, social services are available, although
differing in quality, both to those who are capable of purchasing them
out of pocket and to those who are subsidized by third party payments.
Those persons, however, who support themselves but are "social service
indigent" find it difficult to obtain essential services. Both the social service agencies and the abortion clinics, for example, initially
served middle class women who could afford to purchase services, and
later provided services to low income blacks who were subsidized by the
State.
It appears that working class families have learned to care for
their own pregnant adolescents without the aid of supportive services.
This decision seems to reflect the working class' attitude towards social services. Mayer and Timms (1970) found that working class women
only sought services if their informal networks proved inadequate.
Even then they were not satisfied with the insight oriented therapy provided by the social welfare agencies because their problems seemed to
be rooted in their financial situation, and not their psyches. Working
class attitudes towards social services can also be seen in the current
movements which oppose further expansion of the welfare state. The
anti-busing and anti-abortion groups have both found their leadership
within the working class.

CONCLUSIONS
Any evaluation of the trends in providing services to teenage
parents must view both the inclusion of low income blacks in service
programs and the legalization of abortion as positive expansions of
the human service system. The continued exclusion of the working class
from the service system, however, must be seen as a failure to meet
the needs of a major social group. Unfortunately, very little is known
either about the reasons for their exclusion or the ways in which they
cope with adolescent pregnancy and parenting. Research must be directed toward determining the needs of these young people and programs acceptable to their life styles must be developed. Their large numbers
make it impossible to ignore them and still claim to be making progress
in ameliorating the problems of adolescent parenthood.

NOTES
1.

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Public Health Association, Washington, D.C.,
November, 1977. The preparation of this paper was supported in
part by funds from the Biomedical Research Support Grant of Brandeis University from the National Institute of Health.
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